University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2017

The Effects Of Accessibility On Judgment And Decision-Making
Evan Weingarten
University of Pennsylvania, evan.weingarten@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Advertising and Promotion Management Commons, Marketing Commons, and the
Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Weingarten, Evan, "The Effects Of Accessibility On Judgment And Decision-Making" (2017). Publicly
Accessible Penn Dissertations. 2633.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2633

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2633
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

The Effects Of Accessibility On Judgment And Decision-Making
Abstract
When making decisions, individuals may only use a subset of all available information. The experience of
thinking about and attending to this accessible information can, atop of the actual content, exert an
impact on what information (and the weighting thereof) is employed in judgments. In this dissertation, I
examine how experiences associated with memory-based accessibility (i.e., ease-of-recall) and stimulusbased accessibility (i.e., amount of attention allocated, salience) influence decision-making. Accessibility
serves as the connecting construct for two essays of this dissertation for a meta-analysis of the ease-ofretrieval effect and how salience affects valuation.
In essay one, I meta-analyze an instantiation of how accessibility experiences (i.e., feelings associated
with trying to retrieve information from memory) affect decisions: the ease-of-retrieval effect. The easeof-retrieval effect contends people employ cognitive feelings of ease from recall as an input to judgment. I
explore this idea through a common manipulation of ease-of-retrieval in which individuals generate either
few or many examples of a given topic such as times they behaved assertively (Schwarz et al. 1991). This
manipulation is argued to affect subjective ease and thereby other downstream dependent measures.
Specifically, I test whether subjective ease fully mediates the impact of the manipulation. I also test
several theoretical moderators of the use of cognitive feelings of ease as information (e.g.,
misattribution) and how much of the effect may be attributable to publication bias. Across over twentyyears of studies using conceptually-similar manipulations, I find evidence for several theoretical
moderators, and find that publication bias only explains a small portion of the effect. Further, I find that
subjective ease only partially explains the ease-of-retrieval effect, which means other explanations of the
effect may also exist, yet they are understudied in the literature.
In essay two, I turn to stimulus-based forms of accessibility: namely, salience, or the amount of attention
devoted to a stimulus. While prior theories of decision-making contend greater salience increases
information accessibility, they do not specify how salience influences the weighting and valuation of said
information. Instead, these theories mostly distinguish between low versus high accessibility due to
salience as affecting information used in judgments, and that information valuation occurs separately
based on task goals. I demonstrate through three rating-based conjoint experiments across multiple
product categories (e.g., cars) that even when all information is highly accessible, differences in salience
may have an impact on the valuation and weighting of that information. I show these effects can arise
from both perceptual (e.g., position effects) and cognitive (i.e., elaboration in working memory) sources.
However, I also demonstrate the persistence of salience-biases differs between these two sources:
biases due to cognitive salience decline over repeated decisions, whereas biases from perceptual
salience do not.

Degree Type
Dissertation

Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Graduate Group
Marketing

First Advisor
John W. Hutchinson

Keywords
accessibility, judgment, salience, valuation

Subject Categories
Advertising and Promotion Management | Marketing | Psychology

This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2633

THE EFFECTS OF ACCESSIBILITY ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING

Evan Weingarten
A DISSERTATION
in
Marketing
For the Graduate Group in Managerial Science and Applied Economics
and
Psychology
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2017
Supervisor of Dissertation
_____________________
J. Wesley Hutchinson
Stephen J. Heyman Professor, Professor of Marketing
Graduate Group Chairperson
______________________
Catherine Schrand, Celia Z. Moh Professor, Professor of Accounting
______________________
Sara Jaffee, Associate Professor of Psychology
Dissertation Committee:
Barbara E. Kahn, Professor of Marketing
John G. Lynch, Professor of Marketing, University of Colorado Boulder
Barbara A. Mellers, Professor of Marketing

THE EFFECTS OF ACCESSIBILITY ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING
COPYRIGHT
2017
Evan Weingarten

This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
License
To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-ny-sa/2.0/

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I’ve received support from several individuals during my time in the doctoral
program, all of whom deserve some recognition below.
I thank my advisor, Wes Hutchinson, for his patience with me for the past handful
of years, and for teaching me about how to think deeply and carefully. Wes allowed me
to dive deeper on the ideas that were most interesting to me, even if others deemed them
too old school, obscure, or difficult. Wes’ insight and recommendations remind me daily
that I still have much to learn, which only makes the field that much more exciting.
I thank Jonah Berger for teaching me how to be succinct, how to remain positive,
and how to sell my ideas. Before I met Jonah, I was aboard the 20,000-page train to
express a five-word idea. I thank Dolores Albarracin for her tutelage, support, and
wisdom in so many areas of research. I thank Patti Williams for her positivity and
willingness to let me explore off-the-wall ideas that may not have worked out, and for
bringing a ray of sunshine to discussions. I thank Barbara Kahn for teaching me how to
care more about the practical sides of marketing. I thank Barb Mellers for being a guide
for ideas that I learned more about from her than from years of trying to learn the
literature. I thank Gal Zauberman and Kristin Diehl for their insight into what’s
important, their patience with me, and their willingness to fight for me.
I’d like to also thank my dissertation committee for their feedback and comments:
Wes Hutchinson, Barbara Kahn, Barbara Mellers, and John Lynch, Jr., the last of whom
expressed a kindness to me in his advice and words even though he barely knew me.
I also thank numerous members of the Wharton doctoral program for fostering a
community and helping cohere our students as a unit. To Eric Schwartz, who was a silly,

iii

kind mentor and friend. To Jonathan Berman and Cindy Chan, who served as wonderful
parents to the program in an invaluable way. To Arun Gopalakrishnan and Jeff Cai, who
encouraged a vigorous social life and were always open to provide feedback on anything
under the sun. To Joy Lu and Kathy Li, who were close friends during tough times in the
program. And lastly, to Alix Barasch, who has been an extremely supportive colleague,
mentor, and most critically, friend. If people have anyone even half as helpful as you
were and are during their doctoral program, they are unfathomably fortunate beyond
words. The success the program really hinged on these people and the culture of
openness, friendliness, and mentorship they maintained.

iv

ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF ACCESSIBILITY ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION-MAKING
Evan Weingarten
J. Wesley Hutchinson
When making decisions, individuals may only use a subset of all available
information. The experience of thinking about and attending to this accessible
information can, atop of the actual content, exert an impact on what information (and the
weighting thereof) is employed in judgments. In this dissertation, I examine how
experiences associated with memory-based accessibility (i.e., ease-of-recall) and
stimulus-based accessibility (i.e., amount of attention allocated, salience) influence
decision-making. Accessibility serves as the connecting construct for two essays of this
dissertation for a meta-analysis of the ease-of-retrieval effect and how salience affects
valuation.
In essay one, I meta-analyze an instantiation of how accessibility experiences
(i.e., feelings associated with trying to retrieve information from memory) affect
decisions: the ease-of-retrieval effect. The ease-of-retrieval effect contends people
employ cognitive feelings of ease from recall as an input to judgment. I explore this idea
through a common manipulation of ease-of-retrieval in which individuals generate either
few or many examples of a given topic such as times they behaved assertively (Schwarz
et al. 1991). This manipulation is argued to affect subjective ease and thereby other
downstream dependent measures. Specifically, I test whether subjective ease fully
mediates the impact of the manipulation. I also test several theoretical moderators of the
use of cognitive feelings of ease as information (e.g., misattribution) and how much of
the effect may be attributable to publication bias. Across over twenty-years of studies
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using conceptually-similar manipulations, I find evidence for several theoretical
moderators, and find that publication bias only explains a small portion of the effect.
Further, I find that subjective ease only partially explains the ease-of-retrieval effect,
which means other explanations of the effect may also exist, yet they are understudied in
the literature.
In essay two, I turn to stimulus-based forms of accessibility: namely, salience, or
the amount of attention devoted to a stimulus. While prior theories of decision-making
contend greater salience increases information accessibility, they do not specify how
salience influences the weighting and valuation of said information. Instead, these
theories mostly distinguish between low versus high accessibility due to salience as
affecting information used in judgments, and that information valuation occurs separately
based on task goals. I demonstrate through three rating-based conjoint experiments across
multiple product categories (e.g., cars) that even when all information is highly
accessible, differences in salience may have an impact on the valuation and weighting of
that information. I show these effects can arise from both perceptual (e.g., position
effects) and cognitive (i.e., elaboration in working memory) sources. However, I also
demonstrate the persistence of salience-biases differs between these two sources: biases
due to cognitive salience decline over repeated decisions, whereas biases from perceptual
salience do not.
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Introduction

Although it might sound optimal for consumers to weight all possible information
both in memory and the environment by importance when making decisions, consumers
often only use a subset of available information (i.e., what is accessible or top-of-mind).
Consumers may instead employ several oft-studied heuristics and strategies (Bettman et
al. 1998; Feldman and Lynch 1988; Johnson and Payne 1985; Payne et al. 1993; Tversky
and Kahneman 1974). These strategies allow for possible contamination based on what
information is made accessible (i.e., more salient), especially when that information is
irrelevant (e.g., Carpenter et al. 1994).
Although there are decades of research about how accessible information may
influence judgment, there is still much work to do on how we model and conceptualize
accessibility. For example, classic theories of consumer behavior segment the judgment
process into steps involving information becoming more accessible, and that information
being evaluated and potentially acted upon (Barry 1987; Feldman and Lynch 1988).
However, these theories often treat these steps as a binary model: information is either
accessible or not, and only accessible information is evaluated independent of the search
process. Yet, it is also possible that accessibility exerts an impact on the evaluation
process itself above and beyond the content of information made accessible.
I examine how the experience of recalling (memory-based accessibility) and
searching for information (stimulus-based accessibility) affects downstream judgments
above and beyond the relevance of the content that is generated or located. This
dissertation also concentrates on how salience plays a role both memory-based
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accessibility experiences and stimulus-based product judgments. I integrate older
literature on affect-as-information (Schwarz and Clore 1983; Pham 1998) and
accessibility-diagnosticity (Feldman and Lynch 1988) to establish two frameworks for
salience: the salience-inference framework for affect-as-information (where feelings are
made salient), and the salience-valuation framework for consumer behavior (where some
relevant information is made salient).
Essay one examines how cognitive feelings function as informational inputs to
judgment in a meta-analysis of a classic use of feelings of ease in judgments: the ease-ofretrieval effect (Schwarz et al. 1991). According to the ease-of-retrieval effect,
individuals’ accessibility experiences (i.e., feelings of ease associated with recall) may
serve as informational inputs to judgment separate from the content of recall. This essay
answers the question about the extent to which cognitive feelings of ease fully (or only
partially) explain the ease-of-retrieval effect. Additionally, this essay develops a salienceinference framework for how salience moderators (e.g., attention, range, polarization)
affect the experience of ease that accompanies the recall process, while inference
moderators (e.g., misattribution, representativeness) affect the relationship between ease
and a downstream judgment. I test this framework both by meta-analyzing the overall
impact of a classic ease-of-retrieval manipulation, and by testing how these moderators
influence the indirect effect and direct effects by which ease (and potentially several
unmeasured constructs) judgment. I find evidence for both a medium-sized impact of
inductions for ease-of-retrieval and for several canonical salience and inference
moderators (e.g., processing depth). I also demonstrate that publication bias cannot
completely account for the ease-of-retrieval effect, and that only half of the ease-of-
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retrieval effect may be due to ease. Therefore, there may be other explanations of the
ease-of-retrieval effect, especially for cases in which another construct or theory connects
ease to the dependent measure of interest.
Essay two switches from recall-based accessibility to stimulus-based accessibility
to demonstrate how salience may bias product valuations. It expands upon the
accessibility-diagnosticity framework (Feldman and Lynch 1988) by proposing that even
when all information is accessible and relevant, salience can influence valuation of
information (e.g., product attributes). Further, this essay contends that these salience
effects can originate from both perceptual and cognitive sources, and that the temporal
dynamics of these effects over repeated decisions can elucidate the psychological
explanations of these salience effects. Three studies and an internal meta-analysis using
several different product categories (cars, cell phone plans, Disney vacation packages) in
rating-based conjoint paradigms both tease apart cognitive and perceptual salience effects
on valuation and show divergent temporal patterns for each source. Specifically,
cognitive salience effects induced at the beginning of the study dissipate over repeated
decisions (consistent with self-correcting process explanations), whereas perceptual
salience effects directionally increased over repeated decisions (possibly due to enduring
features of the product display).
This dissertation advances several developments about accessibility and salience’s
impact on judgment and decision-making both by reflecting on classic effects and by
updating classic models of decision-making. While many years have passed since these
models began circulating, there are still important theoretical developments and insights
that inform consumer behavior.
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Essay 1

Does Ease Mediate the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect? A Meta-Analysis

1

Abstract
A wealth of literature suggests individuals use feelings in addition to facts as sources of
information for judgment. Specifically, in one classic manipulation in social psychology,
participants list either a few or many examples of a given type, and then make a
judgment. Instead of using the number of arguments or evidence strength, participants are
hypothesized to use the subjective ease of generating examples as the primary input to
judgment. This result is commonly called the ease-of-retrieval effect. The “few” task is
easier than the “many” task, and this feeling of ease is assumed to mediate the effect. We
use meta-analytic methods across 142 papers, 263 studies, and 582 effect sizes to explore
the robustness of the ease-of-retrieval effect, and whether the effect is mediated by
subjective ease. On average, the standard manipulation of ease-of-retrieval exhibits a
medium-sized effect. About half of this effect is mediated by subjective ease, which both
supports the standard explanation and suggests that other mediators are commonly
present but seldom identified. Further, we find evidence of publication bias that can
reduce the standard effect by approximately one-third. We also find that (1) moderator
manipulations that differ from the standard manipulation lead to smaller, often reversed
effects that are not as strongly mediated by ease, (2) several manipulations of theorybased moderators (e.g., polarized attitudes, misattribution) yield strong theory-consistent
effects, (3) method-based moderators have little or no effects on the results, and (4) the
mediation results are robust regarding assumptions about error structure.
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Does Ease Mediate the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect? A Meta-Analysis

A man’s wife asks him, "Do remember the day we first met?" He immediately
answers, "Of course.” She then asks, "What was I wearing?” He replies, "Tight fitting
jeans, a black sweater, black Nike running shoes, and a weirdly huge leather jacket." She
smiles. He smiles.
It is not surprising that the wife believes that her husband's excellent memory is
evidence of his love. What is surprising is the conjecture that his quick, easy memory
strengthens the husband's own belief about the depth of his love for his wife. That is, in
addition to the facts that are recalled, the conjecture claims that the experience of
remembering, the feeling of ease, is itself treated as information that can influence our
judgments. This conjecture is called the ease-of-retrieval effect, and there is a large
literature devoted to it. This paper is a meta-analysis of that large literature and also aims
to answer the question, "Does ease mediate the ease-of-retrieval effect?"
Introduction
Decades of decision-making research have challenged “rational” theories of
proper adherence to complete and consistent weighting of all available information
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Johnson & Payne, 1985; Simon, 1978). Critically, individuals
do not always base their decisions on the weight of evidence pro and con, but often use
other cues and heuristics (Albarracin, Johnson, & Zanna, 2005; Bettman et al., 1998;
Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 1983;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). One famous example is the availability heuristic.
According to the availability heuristic, individuals make judgments based on how easy it
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feels to bring examples to mind rather than based on the strength of those examples
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
Affect-as-information theory explains many types of behavior by postulating that
feelings are mixed with facts in human decision processes. For example, affect-asinformation theory argues that the availability heuristic results from the use of feelings of
ease as an input to judgment (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988, 2007). More generally,
individuals may use many different types of feelings as decision inputs (Greifeneder,
Bless, & Pham, 2011; Pham, 1998; Schwarz, 2010; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988, 2007).
These feelings include both affective feelings (i.e., experiences of moods or emotions,
such as happiness; Pham, 2004) and cognitive feelings (i.e., experiences of mental
activities, metacognition, such as feelings of ease; Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011;
Schwarz, 2010; Schwarz & Clore, 2007).
Cognitive feelings are typically divided into two major forms: processing fluency
and accessibility experiences (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Processing fluency is the
subjective ease with which information is encoded, and accessibility experiences are the
feelings of the ease with which information is retrieved from memory (Alter &
Oppenheimer, 2009; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). This paper focuses on the hypothesis that
accessibility experiences are part of a meta-cognitive process that affects judgment
(Schwarz, 2010; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). This meta-cognitive role is very similar to the
role of feelings of familiarity in the recognition literature (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981;
Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Johnston, Dark, & Jacoby, 1985).
One seminal demonstration of the effects of accessibility experiences is Schwarz
et al. (1991), in which individuals first generated examples of being assertive and then
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rated their assertiveness on a multi-item scale. The critical manipulation was whether
few (6) or many (12) examples were requested (i.e., a few-versus-many manipulation).
The critical result was that self-rated assertiveness was lower in the "many" condition
than in the “few” condition. Schwarz et al. contended that although those in the “many”
condition had more evidence to support high assertiveness than those in the “few”
condition, they rated themselves lower because they inferred low assertiveness from their
experienced difficulty in the example-generation task. This type of metacognitive
inference has become the standard explanation the effects of the few-versus-many
manipulation and, therefore, such effects are commonly called the ease-of-retrieval
effects. Importantly, the ease-of-retrieval effect is the opposite of what is predicted by
content numerosity (i.e., people using number of examples, which they have more of in
the “many” condition; Pelham, Smurata, & Myaskovsky, 1994) and polarization (i.e.,
attitudes becoming more extreme as more examples are generated; Lord, Ross, & Lepper,
1979).
Metacognitive inferences based on subjective ease have also been proposed as
explanations for the effects of the few-versus-many manipulation on other types of
judgment. For example, this manipulation has also been used in studies of health (by
influencing perceived vulnerability; Raghubir & Menon, 1998), consumer preference (by
tilting preference for compromise options; Novemsky et al., 2007), and policy and
political figure attitudes (by affecting support for them; Haddock, 2002; Wänke, Bless, &
Biller, 1996). Moreover, this manipulation has been used in experiments examining a
wide variety of tasks, such as product choice (Zhao et al., 2012), cooperation (Müller et
al., 2010), and prediction (Pham, Lee, & Stephen, 2012). One indicator of the influence
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of both the paradigm and the ease-of-retrieval explanation is that the original Schwarz et
al. (1991) paper has 540 citations on Web of Science and 1121 on Google Scholar (as of
December 2016).
Although subjective ease is the dominant explanation, other accounts of the easeof-retrieval effect have been proposed. First, individuals in the “many” condition might
spontaneously think of more conflicting examples than individuals in the "few"
condition, which would yield directionally-similar effects as ease (Tormala et al., 2007;
but see Wänke et al., 1996; Wänke, 2013). Second, Kühnen (2010) proposed that placing
the ease question before the dependent measure in studies creates a demand effects that
explains the results. Finally, ease might increase confidence, and confidence affects
judgment, making ease a distal, rather than a proximal, mediator (Wänke & Bless, 2000;
Tormala et al., 2002).
The existence of these alternative explanations and causal paths increases the
desirability of determining the extent to which subjective ease by itself mediates the easeof-retrieval effect. If ease does not fully explain the effect (e.g., a mediation analysis
reveals a residual direct effect that is comparable to the indirect effect based on subjective
ease), then the alternative explanations are potentially necessary for a full account of the
phenomenon.
This paper reports a meta-analysis of the ease-of-retrieval effect and is designed
(a) to test the robustness of the effect, (b) to examine the extent to which subjective ease
of retrieval mediates the effect, (c) to find evidence for or against several theoretical
accounts of the effect, and (d) to determine if methodological factors might account for
variation in effect sizes. We find five main results from our analyses. First, we find a
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medium effect size estimate for paradigms intending to conceptually replicate the original
ease-of-retrieval effect, which we call the standard paradigm. Second, we find that
accounting for publication bias could potentially reduce the standard paradigm’s effect
size by approximately a third. Third, we find support for several theory-based moderators
of the effect. Fourth, we find little support for several potential artifacts that have been
proposed in the literature or for methodological moderators other than publication status.
Fifth, we find that subjective ease is a robust partial mediator, but that the direct effect is
equally robust, suggesting that other mediators are present.
Theory-Based and Methodological Moderators of the Ease-of-Retrieval
Effect
One important goal of this meta-analysis is to examine a wide range of theorybased moderators that have been proposed in the affect-as-information literature. These
moderators provide potential explanations of heterogeneity in effect sizes that might be
observed. We divide these moderators into those that potentially inform theories of
judgment (e.g., misattribution and involvement) and those that are mainly exploratory or
methodological (e.g., the country in which data were collected).
It is useful to subdivide theory-based moderators according to how they influence
the use of subjective ease. First, there are moderators that affect the experience of ease.
We call these moderators salience-based because they influence the experience or even
interpretation of ease. Second, there are moderators that influence the relationship
between the manipulation and the dependent measure by changing either the weighting of
ease as an informational input or by the processing of other non-feeling inputs. We call
these moderators inference-based because they affect the downstream impact of ease.
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The impact of these two classes of moderators can be seen in Figure 1. By making
subjective ease more salient, salience moderators might change the effect of the
manipulation (S1 in Figure 1), or they might change the effect of subjective ease on the
dependent measure by changing the accessibility of this input (S2). Inference-based
moderators might also change the effect of ease on the dependent measure (I2), not by
changing the accessibility of ease, but by changing the implications people draw from
this cognitive feeling. Additionally, inference-based moderators might trigger some other
non-ease mechanism (I1).
We drew upon a series of reviews within the ease-of-retrieval and affect-asinformation literatures to identify a set of salience and inference moderators. These
reviews included Greifeneder, Bless, and Pham (2011), Petty et al. (2007), Schwarz
(1998, 2004), Schwarz and Clore (1988, 2007), and Wänke (2013). Our meta-analysis
builds on these reviews by systematically coding the ease-of-retrieval studies in our
database in terms of these moderators and then quantitatively testing the extent to which
those moderators are associated with differences in effect size.
While some moderators apply to the whole study (e.g., type of dependent
measure, publication status), other moderators exist only with some conditions of a study
(e.g., misattribution used or not; polarized attitude or not). Therefore, for each paper, we
split up the experiment by moderator level into a few-versus-many effect size for each
level of the moderator.
Salience Moderators
Salience moderators are those that affect the retrievability of content or the
experience of ease. These salience moderators should therefore exert an influence
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through an impact of the manipulation on experienced ease (S1) or the impact of ease on
the dependent measure (S2).
Range. Feelings of subjective ease are likely to become more salient when the
retrieval task is either much easier or much more difficult than usual. As the difference
between the number of items required for the “few” and “many” conditions increases, it
is increasingly likely that one or both will be far from the usual level of retrieval ease.
We operationalize this moderator as range (i.e., "many" target number - "few" target
number). This metric should be positively related to the size of the effect, as it should
affect ease and the downstream impact of the manipulation.
Attention. The salience of cognitive feelings should be enhanced when attention
is explicitly directed toward those feelings. Many ease-of-retrieval experiments include
an explicit measure of feelings of ease. When the feelings of ease are explicitly measured
before (rather than after) the target judgment, attention is drawn to cognitive feelings,
which makes them more salient during the target judgment (Danziger et al., 2005;
Kühnen, 2010). This should lead to larger effect sizes.
Polarized attitude. Individuals with polarized or crystallized attitudes are less
likely to experience difficulty in generating examples, which should decrease the impact
of the few-versus-many manipulation and thereby decrease effect sizes (e.g., Dijksterhuis
et al., 1999; Haddock, 2002; Haddock et al., 1999). However, it is also possible that those
with polarized attitudes make fewer meta-cognitive inference based on ease (I2) or rely
on other information or inferences (I1).
Inference Moderators
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These moderators include those manipulations within experiments or differences
across experiments that affect the perceived meaning of feelings of ease (I2) or introduce
considerations of other possible cues to judgment that run contrary to the predictions of
ease as an input (I1).
Processing motivation (depth). The first set of moderators concerns processing
motivation, meaning the extent to which an individual is willing to deeply consider the
scenario or judgment in question (Chaiken et al., 1989; Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham,
2011; Petty et al., 2007; Schwarz, 2004). We distinguish two types of processing
motivation: depth and involvement.
Depth of processing factors found in the ease-of-retrieval literature include
accuracy motivation (i.e., no ease effect for high accuracy motivation; Aarts &
Dijksterhuis, 1999), availability of cognitive processing resources (i.e., ease effects
stronger for those under cognitive constraint; Greifeneder & Bless, 2007), and whether
people are in positive or negative moods (Ruder & Bless, 2003), the latter of which
should lead to greater systematic processing (lower effect sizes; also see Tiedens &
Linton, 2001). Consistent with this logic, Ruder and Bless (2003) find a reversed ease-ofretrieval effect for participants induced to feel sad.
Processing motivation (involvement). The most prominent type of motivation
factor in the ease-of-retrieval literature is whether people engage in low involvement or
heuristic (i.e., individuals process few pieces of information with less effort) versus high
involvement systematic (i.e., individuals analytically evaluate much more information
carefully; Chaiken et al., 1989) processing. The ease-of-retrieval effect was originally
specified in terms of the heuristic-systematic model and hypothesized to reflect a
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heuristic (low elaboration) strategy for individuals for whom the target judgment has low
personal relevance (Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). Two initial articles
found that individuals with higher personal relevance (which presumably increased
systematic processing) in a topic reversed the predictions of ease-of-retrieval, while
individuals with lower personal relevance (which presumably increased heuristic
processing) produced results consistent with ease-of-retrieval (Grayson & Schwarz, 1999;
Rothman & Schwarz, 1998). However, Tormala et al. (2002) provides another account of
how involvement should affect the use of feelings of ease. In this view, individuals who
elaborate more should pay attention to their higher-order thoughts and thus incorporate
ease into their judgments (Hirt, Kardes, & Markman, 2004; Petrocelli & Dowd, 2009;
Petty et al., 2007; Tormala et al., 2002). Thus, these authors hypothesize that their
manipulation of processing motivation should have effects opposite to those of the
previously mentioned authors (i.e., the ease-of-retrieval effect should be enhanced).
Although the manipulations of involvement are not identical across studies, they are
conceptually focused on personal relevance and the difference in predictions arises from
assumptions about how personal relevance affects the likelihood of systematic
processing. Thus, the meta-analytic results for this moderator are potentially informative
about the relationship between cognitive feelings and systematic processing.
Representativeness (retrieval target). Individuals should be more likely to apply
feelings to target judgments when their feelings are believed to be more representative of
the target of the retrieval task (e.g., your own assertiveness; Schwarz et al., 1991;
Greifeneder et al., 2011). For example, individuals are more likely to display an ease-ofretrieval effect when making judgments about themselves as opposed to others (e.g.,
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Caruso, 2008) because their feelings are more representative of themselves than of others.
Similarly, the applicability of ease differs depending on whether individuals judge ingroup as compared to out-group members because their feelings are more representative
of the in-group than the out-group (Rothman & Hardin, 1997; Woltin et al., 2014).
Representativeness (misattribution). Feelings should be less likely to be used as
an input to judgment when the informational value of the feelings has been obviated by
other information (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Several studies employ misattribution
paradigms in which participants are given another cause to which subjective ease can be
attributed (e.g., difficulty due to simultaneous music; e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991). These
elements are hypothesized to render subjective ease non-diagnostic for the judgment
(reduce effect sizes) because some other source was the reason for ease, so the
metacognitive inference about the meaning of personal ease is discounted (Schwarz et al.,
1991; Unkelbach, 2006). In Schwarz et al. (1991), this source was music; in Ruder and
Bless (2003), this source was an oddly-shaped writing space. Neither of these sources had
meaning for the target judgment.
Relevance of feelings (judgment task). Multiple articles within the feelings-asinformation stream of research suggest that people are more likely to use feelings as
inputs when those feelings are perceived to be relevant to the target judgment task
(Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2001; Pham, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1988). This is
exemplified by Schwarz and Clore’s (2007) perceived relevance of feelings of ease for a
judgment. This concept is different from perceived informational value because, unlike
that construct, relevance focuses on the bearing feelings have on the judgment task rather
than the target of retrieval.
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Relevance of feelings (disposition). Relevance may be influenced by such
factors as individual differences (disposition) such as reliance on feelings or expertise
(Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Multiple papers within the ease-of-retrieval paradigm suggest
experts are less likely to employ feelings (Ofir, 2000), and those who are more likely to
trust their feelings (e.g., higher or lower experiential style; higher faith in intuition; e.g.,
Danziger et al., 2005; Keller & Bless, 2009) are more likely to show the ease-of-retrieval
effect (i.e., stronger effect sizes).
Exploratory Methodological Moderators
We additionally investigate potential moderators of the ease-of-retrieval effect
that are mainly methodological and have few, if any theoretical implications. Thus, these
moderators are more exploratory in nature.
Year. The ease-of-retrieval effect studies in question range from 1991 to presentday. We examine whether there is variation in effect sizes depending on publication year,
which may be concurrent with changes in the methodology and the hunt for more
moderators (Mooneyham, Franklin, Mrazek, & Schooler, 2012; Schooler, 2011).
Country. The ease-of-retrieval effect has been studied across continents in
America (e.g., Tormala et al., 2002), Australia (e.g., Laham, 2013), Germany (Schwarz et
al., 1991), and other countries.
Publication Status. As in many other meta-analyses, the publication status of
studies may be related to their effect size. Studies with nonsignificant p-values or small
effect sizes may have been rejected by journal editors and relegated to the "filedrawer" or
could be hidden within parts of unpublished dissertations (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008).
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Number of dependent measures. The number of measures used to measure
subjective ease and the dependent variable of interest also varies widely from study to
study. Some studies include only one measure of ease (e.g., Bartels & Urminsky, 2011),
while others include two (e.g., Greifeneder & Bless, 2008) or three (e.g., Avnet, 2005).
These measures are typically averaged to form a single ease-of-retrieval index. Similarly,
studies measuring trait ratings or attitudes have substantial variation in their number of
measures used to form a composite dependent variable. We incorporate this variability
into our analyses as a measure of precision and potential measurement error for the
hypothesized mediator (i.e., subjective ease) and the dependent measure of interest.
When effect sizes were composed of an average of two dependent measures with
differing number of items (e.g., a one-item scale and a six-item scale), we averaged the
number of items for this variable (yielding 3.5 for the previous example).
Type of dependent measure. We classify the different dependent measures in
this literature into two broad categories: attitude-based measures and non-attitude
measures. These broad categories are meant to capture potential differences in dependent
measure types (such as reliability, response bias, or response scale familiarity). Attitudebased measures cover multiple different types of responses (e.g., self-rated traits, policy
evaluations; Ruder & Bless, 2003; Schwarz et al., 1991), whereas non-attitude include
such measures as subjective likelihood and frequency (e.g., Sanna et al., 2002) or
observable behaviors (e.g., Stephen & Pham, 2008).
A Taxonomy of Ease-of-Retrieval Data: Standard and Moderated, Proximal and
Distal
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To determine the extent to which ease mediates the ease-of-retrieval effect, it is
necessary to identify the experimental conditions meant by the authors to conceptually
replicate the original Schwarz et al. (1991) ease-of-retrieval effect. We refer to these
conditions as using the "standard" paradigm. The remaining experimental conditions, in
which authors hypothesize that the ease-of-retrieval effect will be attenuated or reversed,
are said to use a "moderated" paradigm.
Based on this taxonomy, we construct three datasets: standard, moderated, and
combined (i.e., both paradigms). The combined dataset provides the greatest variation in
moderators because many moderators are held constant in each paradigm (i.e., moderator
present or moderator absent). Therefore, the combined dataset is most useful for
assessing the overall effectiveness of the moderators proposed in the literature to alter the
size (and direction) of the ease-of-retrieval effect. Also, through mediation analyses, this
dataset is most useful in identifying the sources of moderation. More specifically,
mediation analyses provided estimates of effect sizes due to the proposed meta-cognitive
mechanisms involving subjective ease and effect sizes due to other causal factors (i.e.,
indirect and direct effects, respectively; see subsequent discussion). The standard
paradigm data provides (1) the best estimate of the size of ease-of-retrieval effect and (2)
the best test of subjective ease as the best explanation of the ease-of-retrieval effect as
originally conceived. Analyses of the moderated data set are included for completeness.
One further division in the data pertains to the relationship between the recall task
and the dependent measure used within each study. In some studies, subjects are asked to
recall examples of assertiveness then complete a dependent measure for self-rated
assertiveness (e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991), or recall reasons in favor or against public
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transportation before evaluating public transportation (Wänke et al., 1996). In these
cases, there are no intermediary mechanisms between what is recalled, ease, and the
outcome (often an attitude or likelihood judgment), which are strong examples of the
affect-as-information ideas on which this meta-analysis is based. These effect sizes are
proximal effect sizes. However, there are also several cases in which the few-versusmany manipulation pertains to one subject matter (e.g., reasons New York is positive or
negative; Alter & Balcetis, 2011), while at least one dependent measure concerns
something not recalled (e.g., how far away New York feels). In these cases, beyond what
is recalled in the few-versus-many manipulation, there is usually an intermediary
mechanism (i.e., a connection between attitudes towards New York and how far away it
feels) between ease and the dependent measure. We call these distal effect sizes because
there is an additional step between ease and the dependent measure.
We therefore split each of the datasets (combined, standard, moderated) into two
pieces to analyze separately: proximal and distal. We perform the above analyses on both
datasets for completeness. However, the proximal effect sizes are of greater interest
because they are more direct tests of cognitive feelings of ease being used as information.
Methodology
Literature Search
The widespread use of the "few-versus-many" manipulation in disparate
experimental literatures made keyword search ineffective because no simple set of
keywords could capture the entire literature efficiently. Sets of keywords such as “easeof-retrieval” and “retrieval fluency” did not capture all of the papers that forward
searches of the major articles in the literature did, whereas the latter yielded all papers
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found by the former. Therefore, we examined forward citations of the original empirical
paper that reported the ease-of-retrieval effect, Schwarz et al. (1991), and two major
reviews, Schwarz (1998) and Schwarz (2004), using the ISI Web of Knowledge. We also
looked at forward citations of published articles citing Schwarz et al. (1991) that
employed the few-versus-many manipulation within the following ten-year period (19922001)1. Additionally, we searched Proquest Dissertations and Theses database for papers
that had the names of the Schwarz et al. (1991; “Ease of Retrieval as Information:
Another Look at the Availability Heuristic”), Schwarz (1998; (“Accessible content and
accessibility experiences: The interplay of declarative and experiential information in
judgment”), and Schwarz (2004; “Metacognitive Experiences in Consumer Judgment and
Decision Making”) in their text as citations. Finally, we cross-referenced
PsychFileDrawer.org and the Reproducibility Project Open Science Framework for any
replications of papers in our search. We completed this search by April 2014.
We then contacted authors2 who had available contact information to inquire
about unpublished studies, effect sizes not reported in their paper, and to ask them to
verify our classification of their experimental conditions into standard and moderated
paradigms. As part of this process we sent spreadsheets to individual authors that
contained the effect sizes we had obtained from their publications. The spreadsheet also
indicated which measures were missing and how we had interpreted their studies in terms

1

These articles included Aarts & Dijksterhuis (1999); Belli, Winkielman, Read, Schwarz, & Lynn (1998);
Broemer (2001); Dijksterhuis, Macrae, & Haddock (1999); Grayson & Schwarz (1999); Haddock,
Rothman, & Schwarz (1996); Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & Schwarz (1999); Merckelbach, Wiers,
Horselenberg, & Wessel (2001); Ofir (2000); Raghubir & Menon (1998); Rothman & Hardin (1997);
Rothman & Schwarz (1998); Vaughn (1999); Wänke, Bless, & Biller (1996); Wänke, Bohner, &
Jurkowitsch (1997); Winkielman & Schwarz (2001); Winkielman, Schwarz, & Belli (1998)
2
We contacted first authors except when an author with multiple publications was also on the publication
and was contacted, or when the first author’s contact information could not be found.
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of the standard and moderated paradigms. An example of one of these sheets for Pablo
Briñol is provided in Appendix Figure A1. Example e-mail text is provided in Appendix
A.
Further, to solicit researchers for other possible file-drawer studies, we sent
messages requesting unpublished data through the following listservs: ACR-L, SCP,
SJDM, and SPSP.
Inclusion Criteria
We included articles using the following two criteria:
1) Presence of few-versus-many manipulation: Studies had to include a betweensubjects manipulation that required writing or imagining a smaller number of examples
versus a larger number of examples. We only used between-subjects manipulations given
the overwhelming majority of studies were between-subjects, and because it is unclear
how to interpret the within-subject version of this task since that effect may not entirely
be due to ease. We excluded conditions in which readers reviewed what writers had
produced (e.g., Wänke et al., 1996; Weick & Guinote, 2008) because these conditions do
not require the task of interest (i.e., example generation).
When multiple numbers of arguments were present (e.g., four, eight, and 12
arguments; e.g., Belli et al., 1998; e.g., one, three, and seven arguments; e.g., Sinha &
Naykankuppam, 2013, Study 1), we only used the minimum and maximum number of
arguments conditions that were of the same topic for computing effect sizes. Only three
papers in our final database ultimately used more than two levels for number of
arguments.3

3

Excluding the studies that tried multiple levels of few and many conditions does not have an enormous
impact on our effect size results (Standard: r = .253; Moderated: r = -.178; Overall: r = .121).
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2) Statistics: Studies needed to have enough information from which to calculate a
contrast between the “few” condition and corresponding “many” condition. When
information to compute effect sizes was unavailable, we contacted authors as mentioned
earlier.
Meta-Analytic Methodology
We used means and standard deviations, F ratios, t-tests, d values, r values, and
log-odds ratios to compute effect sizes based on standard formulae (Lipsey & Wilson,
2001; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 2008).
Most experiments manipulated some other factor in addition to few-versus-many.
Sometimes all levels were the same paradigm type (e.g., a standard paradigm might
manipulate whether assertiveness or unassertiveness was the dependent measure with the
expectation that these were conceptual replications). Sometimes the manipulation
changed the paradigm type (e.g., control versus alternative attribution for subjective
ease). In all cases, each level of the factor was used to obtain effect sizes. Three effect
sizes were sought: (1) the effect of few-versus-many (X) on the dependent variable of
interest (Y), (2) the effect of X on subjective ease (M), and (3) the effect of subjective
ease (M) on the dependent variable of interest (Y).
We calculated effect sizes in terms of Pearson’s r because of its ease of
interpretation across different measures (Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001). We conducted
analyses of the simple correlations using Fisher’s z for distributional reasons, but we
report all results in in terms of r for interpretability (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004; Rosenthal
& DiMatteo, 2001). We weight the effect sizes by their inverse variance (i.e., n-3 for
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Fisher’s z) using random effects formulae4 from the meta-analysis literature (Borenstein
et al., 2009; Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).
We averaged the rXY values across effect sizes for all dependent measures with
sufficient statistical information to prevent biases based on trying to pick a “best” or
“most relevant” dependent measure for each study. However, for the mediation triplets,
we used only one dependent measure based on which measure had sufficient statistical
information available for rMY. When multiple measures had information for rMY, we used
the median value (or minimum of two values when an even number of values were
present); additional analyses with non-included values yielded similar results. Taking the
average of the rMY values for the averaged rXY values could potentially violate rules of
mediation, so we strayed from complicating these analyses.
Publication Bias
We assessed publication bias by examining the simple ease-of-retrieval effect, rXY,
in two ways: trim-and-fill analysis of funnel plots (Duval & Tweedie, 2000a, 2000b;
Light & Pillemar, 1984) and PET-PEESE (Carter & McCullough, 2014; Stanley &
Doucouliagos, 2014).
First, the funnel plot is a graphical display of precision (here standard error) by
effect size (Light & Pillemar, 1984). In a standard funnel plot, effect sizes should
converge towards a tighter estimate of an overall effect size as the studies become more
precise, producing a funnel shape (Sutton, 2009). However, if there is publication bias,

4

We also note the weighted fixed-effects aggregate effect sizes are different (Standard: r = .144;
Moderated: r = -.173; Overall: r = .083) from our main random-effects results. However, this deviation is
primarily due to several heavily-weighted, small, unpublished effect sizes from the standard paradigm
(Yeager & Krosnick, 2014). Removing these points reveals a weighted fixed-effects aggregate effect size
that’s not drastically different from the random effects results (Standard: r = .241; Moderated: r = -.173;
Overall: r = .118).
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there will be an asymmetry in the funnel for smaller, less precise studies with near-zero
effect sizes that may not have had significant findings to publish (Egger et al., 1997). The
trim-and-fill algorithm (Viechtbauer, 2010) "corrects" this asymmetry by first trimming
the asymmetric portion of the funnel plot, then re-estimating the mean effect size and its
confidence interval for the remaining studies. Finally, the trim-and-fill algorithm re-fills
in the funnel with both the trimmed studies (that created the funnel asymmetry) and their
corresponding "missing" observations reflected across the mean of the funnel (Duval &
Tweedie, 2000).
Second, PET-PEESE is a method by which an effect size is extracted from the
intercept of an Egger regression that is intended to represent the publication-bias adjusted
effect size with a study with zero standard error (Carter & McCullough, 2014; Stanley &
Doucouliagos, 2014). PET (Precision Effect Test) employs standard error as the predictor
in this regression, and errs on the side of underestimating the true effect size. PEESE
(Precision Effect Estimate with Standard Error) uses variance instead. Stanley and
Doucouliagos (2014) advise that when PET yields an intercept significantly different
from zero, individuals should rely on the intercept from PEESE as the underlying effect
size. Otherwise, PET’s estimate of the effect size is more accurate (but, also see Gervais,
2015).
Moderator Coding
Salience moderators. We code the three salience moderators discussed earlier as
follows. First, we code the difference between the number of arguments in the “many”
and “few” conditions as range. Second, we code whether the measure of subjective ease
on subjective ease occurred before or after the dependent measure of interest (1 = before,
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-1 = after) as attention. Finally, we code polarized attitude as present (+1; -1 otherwise),
if such attitudes were explicitly noted in the paper (e.g., high interest in politics;
crystallized attitude; e.g., Haddock, 2002; Haddock et al., 1999) or if participants were
described as having expertise (which was assuming to imply a polarized attitude).
Inference moderators. We code the six inference moderators discussed earlier as
follows. First, we code processing motivation (depth) based on whether processing depth
or motivation was influenced by a non-involvement manipulation (+1 = increased, -1 =
decreased, 0 = no manipulation). Examples of manipulations that would increase
processing motivation or capacity would be inducing sadness (e.g., Ruder & Bless,
2003), boosting accuracy motivation (e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999), or increasing
uncertainty (e.g., Greifeneder et al., 2011a). Examples of manipulations that decrease
processing motivation or capacity would be those that eat up cognitive resources (e.g.,
Greifeneder & Bless, 2007) or decrease uncertainty (e.g., Greifeneder et al., 2011a).
These manipulations should decrease effect sizes if depth is boosted. Second, we code
processing motivation (involvement) based on whether involvement is stated to be
manipulated as more (+1; e.g., higher need for cognition individuals; e.g., Tormala et al.,
2002) or less (-1) personally involving than when involvement is not explicitly
manipulated (0). Third, we code representativeness (retrieval target) based on whether
the target of recall is the self (+1) or not (-1).5 Fourth, we code representativeness
(misattribution) paradigms based on whether an attribution to another source (e.g., music,
an unusual writing space; e.g., Ruder & Bless, 2003; Schwarz et al., 1991) was present

5

We alternatively also coded a variable about whether the recall was episodic or semantic. The same
results held for this coding scheme, which was highly correlated with self/not-self.
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(+1) or not (-1). Fifth, we code relevance of feelings (judgment task) based on whether
individuals are making judgments about themselves (+1) or not (-1).6 Sixth, we code
relevance of feelings (disposition) based on whether individuals are personally more
likely to see their feelings as relevant to judgment (+1; e.g., experiential processors, highpowered individuals; e.g., Danziger et al., 2005; Weick & Guinote, 2008) or less likely (1; e.g., individuals with less faith in intuition; e.g., Keller & Bless, 2009; 0 for no
manipulation).
Exploratory methodological moderators. We coded the following study
characteristics as moderators as part of our exploratory analyses: (a) the year, (b) the
country in which the study was published (in the US = +1, non-US = -1), (c) whether the
study was published or unpublished (+1 = unpublished, -1 = published); (d) the number
of items in the subjective ease measure; (e) the number of items in the dependent variable
of interest;7 and (f) attitude dependent measure (e.g., +1 = attitude measure, -1 = all other
measures).8
Taxonomy. Based on a careful reading of the authors' hypotheses, experimental
conditions were classified as either a standard or a moderated paradigm. As part of our
outreach to authors, we requested authors review our categorization of standard and
moderated paradigm assignments for their experiments. We provided authors with the
following definition of standard and moderated paradigms: "Importantly, we are

6

We recognize this has some conceptual overlap with representativeness and may be better categorized as
such; the results for both this moderator and retrieval target are consistent, and we return to these in the
general discussion.
7 We cap the maximum number of measures at 9 given 89% of the distribution falls between 1-8 measures,
and all other measures use far lengthier scales that skew the distribution.
8 One question may revolve around whether attitude certainty measures are coded separately from attitude
measures. These measures comprise a small portion (<5%) of the database and do not significantly differ
from any other category of dependent measure (attitude or non-attitude).
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separating reported results into experimental conditions that the authors present as
conceptual replications of the original effect reported by Schwarz et al. (1991) -- the
standard paradigm -- and conditions in which the authors change the standard paradigm
in ways that they expect will moderate the effect, causing attenuation or reversal."
We also separated effect sizes based on whether they were proximal or distal
effect sizes. Examples of proximal and distal effect sizes can be found in Table 1. These
examples and divisions were based on conferring with the editor. In some cases, a paper
could contribute both proximal and distal effect sizes (e.g., Alter & Balcetis, 2011;
Bartels & Urminsky, 2011).
Coding reliability. All moderators were originally coded by the first author, and
then coded a second time by at least one of two independent raters to confirm reliability.
The first author is an advanced graduate student in Psychology with completed graduate
coursework training. The two independent coders were undergraduate research assistants
with extensive coursework in psychology and research experience. All coded variables
included in the final analysis had satisfactory or better (i.e.,  > .6) agreement.
Mediation Analysis Plan
As noted earlier, a subset of our data includes a measure of ease-of-retrieval in
addition to a dependent measure of interest, and therefore it permits statistical tests of
mediation. Mediation analysis provides a computational method for decomposing the
total effect (c) into indirect (a x b) and direct (c') effects, given the assumption that a
variable, M, causally mediates the relationship between an independent variable, X, and a
dependent variable, Y (Baron and Kenny, 1986; MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007;

24

Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010; see Figure 2).9 These estimates quantify the qualitative
relationships depicted in Figure 1.
The traditional explanation in the standard paradigm is that subjective ease
mediates the ease-of-retrieval effect (Schwarz, 2004). In terms of the mediation model
depicted in Figure 2, a and b should be large if the traditional explanation holds. More
specifically, the traditional explanation suggests that subjective ease should fully mediate
the effect, which implies that the indirect effect, a x b should be larger than the direct
effect, c'. At a minimum, the traditional explanation predicts that the indirect effect
should be significantly positive. If the direct effect is found to be substantial (i.e., as
large as the indirect effect and significantly different than zero), then traditional
explanation is inadequate insofar as a substantial direct effect suggests that one or more
mediators, other than subjective ease, are involved. In the moderated paradigm, the
mediation should be disrupted (i.e., indirect effect is reduced) or some other mediator
should exert a stronger influence than feelings of ease (i.e., direct effect is increased).
For every triplet of effect sizes (rXM, rMY, and rXY) obtained from the literature and
directly from the authors, standardized regression coefficients were computed based on
the traditional mediation equations with subjective ease as the mediator of the effect of
the few-versus-many manipulation on the dependent measure of interest (Baron &
Kenny, 1986; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). These equations are:

However, one piece of conceptual confusion is whether subjective ease is a “manipulation check” or an
explanation; we argue it is the latter. Although many studies report measures of subjective ease as a
manipulation check, we believe "manipulation check" is a misnomer because subjective ease is a
psychological construct. Further, Fiedler et al. (2011) present simulation evidence that manipulation checks
should not significantly mediate the dependent measure of interest. Following this, if subjective ease is
found to often pass the mediation test, then our claim that subjective ease is a mediator, not a manipulation
check, is supported. For the subset of experiments for which results are reported for measures of subjective
ease, statistical tests of mediation are possible, and we compute and meta-analyze such tests when possible.
9
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a = rXM
(1)
b = (rMY – rXY * rXM) / (1 - rXM2)
(2)
c' = (rXY – rMY * rXM) / (1 - rXM2)
(3)

We did not obtain rMY or estimate mediation models for studies using spotlight
analyses due to the difficulty of obtaining a meaningful correlation at one standard
deviation above and below another factor.10

Results
Literature Search
A total of 152 papers, published and unpublished, were found that employed the
few-versus-many manipulation. As of the time of this article, no replications with
publicly available results were available on PsychFileDrawer or the Open Science
Framework/Reproducibility Project.11 There were 121 published papers, 23 dissertations
and theses 12, and eight unpublished papers (two studies were left out from a published
paper, and 17 studies came from seven unpublished manuscripts). These 152 papers
contained 284 studies. One study was excluded for using a within-subject design (Corby

10

We thank John Lynch, Jr., for his advice on this topic.
However, a study from Stephen and Pham (2008) was under processing (yet not conducted as of initial
submission) in the OpenScience framework database.
12
We e-mailed 92 authors who had available contact information and were the common links across
multiple papers, of whom 64 (69.57%) responded.
11
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& Homa, 2011, study 2). Other studies and conditions were excluded due to insufficient
statistical information (e.g., Corby & Homa, 2011; Florack & Zoabi, 2003; Frederick &
Mochon, 2012; Hermann et al., 2002; Hirt et al., 2004; Kivetz & Zhang, 2006; Lee, 2005;
Ofir, 2000; Sackett, 2006; Sanna & Schwarz, 2004; Tormala et al., 2002, study 3; Walton
& Cohen, 2007; Wehr, 2010, Study 1; Yahalom & Schul, 2013), as specified above.
These exclusions left 142 papers and 263 studies. A comprehensive table with effect sizes
and descriptions of studies can be found in Appendix B. The data file can be found in the
Supplemental Materials.
Of the 142 papers, there were 263 studies that yielded 582 effect sizes (i.e.,
observations in the database): these 582 effect sizes were composed of 454 proximal and
128 distal.13 Of these 454 proximal observations, 298 were categorized as standard
paradigm observations, and 156 as moderated paradigm observations. The distal
observations were composed of 92 standard paradigm and 36 moderated paradigm
observations. For our mediation tests, we had 209 triplets of rXM, rMY, and rXY from
proximal and 44 from distal.
A descriptive set of statistics for the 582 effect sizes split into proximal and distal
can be found in Table 2.
Total Effect Analyses (c = rXY)
Overall effect size. All reported analyses of effect sizes and regression models
used a two-level meta-analytic model with random intercepts for papers (Raudenbush &
Bryk, 2002; see Singer, 1998 for a similar model). We use a restricted maximum

13

We also analyze our results excluding the two papers from the proximal analyses: Yeager & Krosnick’s
replications, which have several hundred participants per cell, and Bares’ (2007) dissertation from which
multiple observations were gathered. Removal of these papers does not affect our overall effect sizes
drastically (Standard: r = .258; Moderated: r = -.181; Overall: r = .125).
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likelihood estimation method (Littell et al., 2006). The dependent variable was the Fisher
z transform of rXY, and all predictors were standardized. We report the mean effect sizes
and 95% confidence intervals in Table 3.
We first examine the proximal effect sizes. As shown in Table 3, the mean effect
size for the standard paradigm was positive, rXY = .253, 95% CI [.224, .281], t(110) =
17.05, p < .001), and the mean effect size for the moderated paradigm was negative, rXY =
-.178 (95% CI [-.215, -.140], t(52) = -9.27, p < .001). Both the standard and moderated
paradigms rejected the null hypothesis of homogeneity based on Cochran’s Q (standard:
Q(297) = 720.795, p < .001; I2 = 58.80%, 95% CI [53.19%, 63.73%]; moderated: Q(155)
= 202.26, p = .006; I2 = 23.37%, 95% CI [5.85%, 37.62%]). An 𝐼 2 value corresponds to
the proportion of total variation attributable to true heterogeneity and not sampling error;
we caution, however, that it does not represent absolute heterogeneity (Borenstein et al.,
2009; Higgins & Thompson, 2002; Huedo-Medina et al., 2006). We also observe a grand
mean effect size of the combined (i.e., standard and moderated together) dataset14 of rXY =
.121 (95% CI [.094, .149]; t(113) = 8.79, p < .001; Q(453) = 1395.33, p < .001; I2 =
67.53%, 95% CI [64.23, 70.53]). We present the distribution of the individual proximal
effect sizes in each paradigm in Figure 3. For the standard paradigm, 91% of
observations are greater than zero. For the moderated paradigm, 83% of observations are
less than or equal to zero.
We next turn to the distal effect sizes, which are depicted in Figure 4 for the
standard (panel A) and moderated (panel B) paradigms. 96% of the standard paradigm

14

Alternative strategies yield similar proximal results for nesting within studies (Standard: r = .254;
Moderated: r = -.183; Overall: r = .102) and within clusters of authors (Standard: r = .232, Moderated: r = .174; Overall: r = .117), where clusters were defined as sets of frequent co-authors.
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observations are greater than zero, whereas 67% of the moderated observations are at or
below zero. The standard paradigm again had a positive mean effect size (rXY = .264, 95%
CI [.220, .307]; t(41) = 11.83, p < .001; Q(91) = 117.452, p = .032; I2 = 22.52%, 95% CI
[-1.19%, 40.68%]), whereas the moderated paradigm had a negative mean effect size (rXY
= -.082, 95% CI [-.158, -.005]; t(19) = -2.23, p = .038; Q(35) = 53.075, p = .026; I2 =
34.06%, 95% CI [0.75%, 56.18%]). The combined dataset again had a slightly positive
effect size (rXY = .165, 95% CI [.120, .208]; t(44) = 8.98, p < .001; Q(127) = 281.822, p <
.001; I2 = 54.94%, 95% CI [44.99%, 63.08%]).
Publication bias. We investigated publication bias using both trim-and-fill and
PET-PEESE methods (Duval & Tweedie, 2000; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). Both
methods suggest that publication bias may reduce the ease-of-retrieval effect by up to
one-third in magnitude in the standard paradigm (and reduce the moderated paradigm by
about a fifth). However, the null hypothesis that the true effect size is 0 is still rejected
after adjusting for publication bias.
Funnel plots based on trim-and-fill analyses 15 for effect sizes from standard
paradigm, moderated paradigm, and combined datasets for proximal effect sizes are
provided in Figures 5-7. In Panel A, the funnel depicts the confidence interval for the
sample mean before applying the trim-and-fill algorithm. In Panel B, the funnel depicts
the confidence interval after applying the trim-and-fill algorithm. In Panel C, the funnel
depicts alpha contours assuming the null hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true (white indicates

15

One difficulty with funnel plots is that missing studies may occur due to multiple reasons, inclusive of
non-significant results or small study effects. We employ contour-enhanced funnel plots, which illustrate
the regions in which studies are statistically significant. These contours help indicate whether studies are
missing from areas of the chart in which the effect sizes would emerge from non-significant studies
(Palmer et al., 2008; Peters et al., 2008).
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non-significant, light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of funnel p < .01). The
standard paradigm had 88 potentially-missing observations imputed by trim-and-fill for
an adjusted effect size estimate that did not have 0 in its confidence interval (r = .159,
95% CI [.137, .181], z = 13.78, p < .001; Q(385) = 983.37, p < .001). Many of the
imputed, potentially missing effect sizes (white circles in Figure 5B), however, occur in
regions of statistical non-significance (p > .10, white), while fewer imputed effect sizes
are in regions of marginal (.05 < p < .10, light grey) or traditional (.01 < p < .05, darker
grey; p < .01, outside the funnel) statistical significance. So, the asymmetry in the funnel
is more likely to be due to publication bias than from other elements such as variance in
study quality for smaller-sample studies (Palmer et al., 2008; Peters et al., 2008). In the
moderated paradigm, no studies were filled in (r = -.177, 95% CI [-.206, -.147], z = 11.34, p < .001; Q(155) = 202.26, p = .006). In the combined dataset, only 33 potentiallymissing studies were filled in for an adjusted effect size estimate that did not have 0 in its
confidence interval (r = .080, 95% CI [.054, .105], z = 6.01, p < .001, Q(486) = 1625.62,
p < .001).
The accompanying trim-and-fill funnel plots for the distal model effect sizes can
be found in Figures 8-10 for standard (Figure 8), moderated (Figure 9), and combined
datasets (Figure 10). The standard paradigm had 31 potentially-missing observations
imputed by trim-and-fill for an adjusted effect size estimate that also did not have 0 in its
confidence interval (r = .188, 95% CI [.154, .222], z = 10.62, p < .001; Q(122) = 222.27,
p < .001). In the moderated paradigm, 8 studies were filled in (r = -.013, 95% CI [-.078,
.052], z = -0.387, p = .699; Q(43) = 84.61, p < .001). In this case, the moderated
paradigm became nonsignificantly different from zero. However, given the effect sizes in
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the moderated paradigm are garnered from studies intended to attenuate or reverse the
effect, this result is not troublesome. In the combined dataset, only 18 potentially-missing
studies were filled in for an adjusted effect size estimate that did not have 0 in its
confidence interval (r = .132, 95% CI [.092, .172], z = 6.39, p < .001, Q(145) = 373.67, p
< .001).
Our PET-PEESE results on proximal effect sizes similarly suggest a downward
correction of the effect size to account for publication bias. For the standard paradigm,
the results of PET suggest a new effect size of r = .104 (95% CI [.034, .172], t(110) =
2.95, p = .004), while PEESE points to a more modest correction to r = .193 (95% CI
[.153, .232], t(110) = 9.51, p < .001). Given that we reject the null hypothesis for PET
(that the intercept is equal to 0), the value from PEESE is generally recommended (Carter
& McCullough, 2014; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). This adjusted value is almost a
fourth reduction in the effect size and is less extreme than the trim-and-fill estimate, so
only a third of the effect may be explained by publication bias. Our moderated paradigm
results yield similar conclusions from PET (r = -.162, 95% CI [-.276, -.043], t(52) = 2.72, p = .009) and PEESE (r = -.179, 95% CI[-.237, -.120], t(52) = -5.99, p < .001). We
again opt for the PEESE estimate based on the PET-PEESE rule to select PEESE if PET
is significantly different from 0 (Carter & McCullough, 2014; Stanley & Doucouliagos,
2014). On the combined dataset, we see a PET estimate of r = .111 (95% CI [.034, .188],
t(113) = 2.84, p = .005) and a PEESE estimate of r = .121 (95% CI [.078, .164], t(113) =
5.57, p < .001). Therefore, we see a non-zero effect with PET-PEESE (opting for
PEESE), but the effect sizes warrant an adjustment towards zero from where they were
originally.
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Analyses on the distal effect sizes yield divergent results. The estimates for the
standard paradigm for PET (r = .020, 95% CI [-.076, .115], t(41) = 0.41, p = .683) are
nonsignificant; the same was true for the moderated paradigm (r = .053, 95% CI [-.254,
365], t(19) = 0.35, p = .727). The combined dataset also had a nonsignificant value for
PET (r = .070, 95% CI [-.047, .185], t(44) = 1.20, p = .237). Although the PEESE values
for the standard (r = .140, 95% CI [.082, .198], t(41) = 4.79, p < .001), moderated (r = .011, 95% CI [-.173, .151], t(19) = -0.14, p = .89), and combined (r = .109, 95% CI [.041,
.176], t(44) = 3.23, p = .002) datasets were significant, we must default to the PET
values. Therefore, for the studies using distal models of ease-of-retrieval that may employ
the manipulation more opportunistically, which makes up a minority of the overall data,
it is plausible that the true effect size is nonsignificantly different from zero for studies
seeking to replicate the ease-of-retrieval effect.
Although there is evidence of publication bias for proximal effect sizes as well, it
is also important to note two aspects of the adjusted effect size. First, in the standard and
moderated paradigm analyses, both trim-and-fill and PEESE find the lower bound of the
95% confidence interval is far from 0 relative to the mean (Borenstein et al., 2009), so
publication bias is unlikely to be the primary explanation of the ease-of-retrieval effect.
Also, for the standard paradigm, many studies were potentially-missing from regions of
non-significance in the contour trim-and-fill, suggesting that a filedrawer effect is likely.
Finally, we note that trim-and-fill techniques have been challenged in the
literature (Johnson & Eagly, 2014; Terrin et al., 2003), so we acknowledge that the
results should be accepted with some caution. On the other hand, our results are not as
susceptible to these criticisms as they might be because we greatly reduce one source of
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bias in the trim-and-fill estimation method (i.e., heterogeneity) by separating the analysis
by paradigm in addition to presenting the combined results.
Moderator Analyses
Table 4 presents analyses for the total effect sizes (rXY) based on the combined
dataset (N = 454) and the standard paradigm data only for the proximal paradigm (N =
298) using both a bivariate regression model for each moderator and a multiple
regression model that includes all moderators. We find no concerns with collinearity
diagnostics for these predictors. Each predictors’ variance inflation factor (VIF) was
below 10 for both the combined dataset (maximum VIF = 1.56) and the standard
paradigm data (maximum VIF = 1.44), and the maximum condition index was below 30
(Cohen et al., 2003; 2.26 for the combined dataset and 2.12 for the standard paradigm
data). The same holds true for Table 5, which depicts the same analyses for the combined
dataset (N = 128, maximum VIF = 2.33, maximum condition index = 3.16) and standard
paradigm data (N = 92, maximum VIF = 2.14, maximum condition index = 2.99) for the
distal paradigm.
Regarding the salience moderators, we find a strong negative effect of having a
polarized attitude associated with lower effect sizes. This result is consistent with extant
theory suggesting ease to be less prominent of an input to judgment for those individuals
(Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011). Also, we find little impact of increased range or
attention (via placement of the subjective ease question, contrary to Kühnen, 2010), even
in the standard paradigm.
Regarding the inference moderators, there were strong effects of manipulations of
processing motivation (both depth and involvement), misattribution, and disposition.
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Manipulations of processing motivation that increased processing depth were negatively
related to effect sizes (significantly for proximal and directionally for distal), which is
consistent with systematic processing reducing reliance on ease. For involvement-based
manipulations of processing motivation, we find observe a small increase in effect size
when involvement is high (and decrease with lower involvement). That is, consistent with
Tormala et al. (2002), individuals who have greater involvement with an issue may rely
on higher order thoughts and feelings as a heuristic to judgment. With respect to
representativeness, we find that misattribution paradigms, which alert participants to task
difficulty being non-informative for judgment, clearly reduce (and reverse) effect sizes.
Finally, with respect to relevance based on disposition, we find that people who are
predisposed to use feelings for judgment have larger effect sizes for proximal effect sizes.
However, we also find two results that are inconsistent with our predictions for
the inference moderators. First, we observe a reversal of our expected result for the target
of retrieval. Retrieving information about the self reduces rather than increases effect
sizes in the standard paradigm for proximal effect sizes (and directionally for distal).
Further, we do not find evidence supporting the claim that making judgments about
yourself leads to larger effect sizes. In fact, we find a reversal in the standard paradigm
for proximal effect sizes.
Regarding the exploratory methodological moderators, we only observe a strong
effect for publication status. Unpublished studies have lower effect sizes than published
studies. This result holds both for the combined dataset and for the standard paradigm
data for proximal and distal effect sizes. However, aside from publication status effects,
we do not see consistent results across bivariate and multiple regression models on

34

whether other facets of the dependent measures (e.g., number of measures, type of
measure) have an impact on effect sizes.
Mediation Analyses: Indirect and Direct Effects
Of the values of rXY in the total database, also had associated values of rXM and
rMY. For each of these triplets, standardized regression coefficients from the mediation
models, as defined in Equations 1 - 3, were used to compute estimates of the indirect
effect (a x b) and the direct effect (c'). These estimates were analyzed without
transformation.16
The usual explanation of the ease-of-retrieval effect predicts that the indirect
effect (a x b) should be large, which we find. For the proximal effect sizes combined
dataset, the indirect effect was .096 (95% CI [.060, .132], t(56) = 5.34, p < .001; Q(208)
= 182.149, p = .902; I2 = 0% ). Thus, the standard explanation is supported. The direct
effect (c') was .019 (95% CI [-.105, .053], t(56) = 1.14, p = .259,; Q(208) = 450.362, p <
.001; I2 = 53.81% [45.96%, 60.53%]), which suggests that other mediators may not be
involved on average. However, the combined data includes moderated paradigm data, so
this interpretation may be less straightforward. However, for the distal effect sizes
combined dataset, we observe an indirect effect of .034 (95% CI [-.020, .087], t(17) =
1.32, p = .203; Q(43) = 57.185, p = .072; I2 = 24.81% [-9.83%, 48.52%]), and a direct
effect of .112 (95% CI [.034, .191], t(17) = 3.02, p = .008; Q(43) = 116.093, p < .001; I2
= 18.98% [-18.57%, 44.64%]). As compared to the indirect effect, the direct effect was
much larger for the distal effect sizes, which is consistent with the distal model’s

16

Unlike bivariate correlations, standardized regression coefficients from multiple correlations (i.e., b and
c') are not bounded by -1 and +1, so skewness is less of a concern.
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operationalization as requiring another non-ease explanation between ease and dependent
measure.
The standard paradigm data show partial mediation of the effect through
subjective ease. For the standard paradigm data for proximal effect sizes, the average
indirect (a x b) effect was .114 (95% CI [.074, .154]; t(56) = 5.68, p < .001; Q(142) =
166.916, p = .075; 𝐼 2 = 14.93% [-5.87%, 31.64%]). However, the average direct effect
(c') was similar in size, .105 (95% CI [.064, .145]; t(56) = 5.19, p < . 001.; Q(142) =
278.555, p < .001; 𝐼 2 = 49.02% [38.06%, 58.04%]). This indicates that subjective ease
does not fully mediate the ease-of-retrieval effect. Moreover, because the direct effect (c')
is positive, it cannot be due to numerosity or evidence strength, which would otherwise
yield a negative effect. Thus, the results of the analysis of mediation model estimates is
mixed. The standard explanation is supported, but the large direct effect is unexplained
by the constructs typically discussed in this literature.
However, distal standard paradigm effect sizes do not show mediation by ease
through the indirect effect. The indirect effect was .046 (95% CI [-.029, .121], t(15) =
1.32, p =.208; Q(30) = 54.722, p = .004; I2 = 45.18% [16.25%, 64.11%]) and the direct
effect was .208 (95% CI [.144, .272], t(15) = 6.96, p < .001; Q(30) = 56.751, p = .002; I2
= 47.14% [19.52%, 65.28%]). The relative larger size of the direct effect, and the relative
lack of mediation by ease is consistent again with the conceptualization of distal effect
sizes as requiring an additional step between ease and the dependent measure of interest.
We also find a reversal in the moderated paradigm on the remaining direct effect.
For proximal effect sizes’ moderated paradigm data, the average effect size of the direct
effect (c') is -.205 (95% CI [-.273, -.137]; t(25) = -6.18, p < .001, Q(65) = 84.174, p =
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.055, 𝐼 2 = 22.78% [-5.63%, 43.55%]), which is a reversal of the ease effect, and is
consistent with numerosity or evidence strength. However, the indirect (a x b) effect for
these proximal effect sizes was significantly greater than zero, .042 (95% CI [.010, .073];
t(25) = 2.75, p = .011, Q(65) = 14.216, ns; I2 = 0%), which suggests that some easerelated effect is present, but is too small to overcome the negative direct effect created by
the moderator manipulation. On the other hand, for the distal effect sizes, the indirect
effect was .002 (95% CI [-.034, .037], t(8) = 0.11, p = .92; Q(12) = 1.632, ns; I2 = 0%)
and the direct effect was -.121 (95% CI [-.232, -.010], t(8) = -2.51, p = .036; Q(12) =
15.005, p = .241), which again demonstrates the small relationship between ease as an
indirect effect and the total effect for distal effect sizes.
Mediation Analyses: Moderators of the Indirect and Direct Effects
Tables 6 and 7 present moderator results for indirect (a x b) and direct (c') effects
for triplets pooled over the standard and moderated paradigms for proximal and distal,
respectively (see Appendix C for standard paradigm moderator results). As a reference
point, Tables 6 and 7 also present estimates of the total effect (c).
For salience moderators, we observe three results. Range has little effect,
polarized attitudes moderate all effects, and attention has little or no effect.
For inference moderators, all moderators except involvement affect the direct
effect for proximal effect sizes, suggesting they invoke non-ease processes.
Representativeness based on retrieval target affected the direct effect as well for
proximal, but it affected the indirect effect for distal effect sizes. Thus, the overall pattern
of estimated coefficients is consistent with explanations that require new mediators that
are typically not measured, or even identified, in the ease-of-retrieval literature.
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For the exploratory methodological moderators, publication status had a
directional effect (filedrawer studies were directionally lower in proximal).
General Discussion
People do not always employ objective evidence to make decisions (Albarracin et
al., 2005; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974).
Many research traditions have investigated alternatives to the effortful evaluation of
objective evidence, including use of quick heuristics (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005;
Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993), reducing negative emotions (Bettman, Luce, &
Payne, 1998) and thinking less (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). A large
research stream posits that people confer how they feel about something as an input to
judgment: the affect-as-information framework (Schwarz & Clore, 1988). In this
tradition, affective feelings, cognitive feelings, and bodily experiences such as facial
feedback (Stepper & Strack, 1993) inform the decision-making process (Greifeneder,
Bless, & Pham, 2007; Schwarz, & Clore, 2007).
This meta-analysis examined a frequent instantiation of the impact of cognitive
feelings (more specifically, accessibility experiences), the ease-of-retrieval effect, to
speak more broadly to the operations of how feelings are used in judgment. In the easeof-retrieval effect, individuals generate varying numbers of examples of content then are
argued to employ feelings of ease instead of alternative inputs to judgment (Schwarz et
al., 1991).
We analyzed 582 effect sizes from 263 studies in 142 papers. These effect sizes
were either using proximal (N = 454) or distal (N = 128) models of ease-of-retrieval. 298
proximal and 92 distal effect sizes were from experimental conditions using the standard
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paradigm, in which authors were attempting to conceptually replicate the original effect
reported by Schwarz et al. (1991). On the other hand, 156 proximal and 36 distal effect
sizes were from experimental conditions using moderated paradigms in which authors
were attempting to reduce or reverse the ease-of-retrieval effect. Additionally, we were
able to conduct a mediation analysis for 209 proximal and 44 distal effect sizes,
decomposing each total effect into an indirect (a x b) and a direct (c') effect.
The results of our analyses have several implications for affect-as-information and
metacognition in addition to the ease-of-retrieval. We focus on the implications from the
proximal paradigm due to their more direct recruitment of cognitive feelings as a
mediating mechanism.
First, on average, the standard paradigm exhibits a robust, medium-sized effect
(rXY = .) of the few-versus-many manipulation on a wide variety of judgment tasks.
Publication bias was found to be present. We estimate that it reduces the average effect
size by about one third in the standard paradigm, leaving about two thirds of the effect to
be explained by other factors. Therefore, we find robust evidence of inductions of a
cognitive feeling, ease, influencing judgment.
Second, about half of the ease-of-retrieval effect in standard paradigms is
mediated by subjective ease when the traditional OLS mediation model is used to
separate the total effect estimate into an indirect and a direct effect (a x b = . and c' = .,
see Table 3). This supports the standard explanation of the effect and presents striking
evidence of the use of affect-as-information. However, it also suggests that other
mediators are commonly present, but seldom identified. The standard explanation
survived analyses that incorporated heterogeneity, measurement error, and correlated
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error. However, the size of the indirect was further reduced in these analyses, while the
direct effect was less affected. This mediation analysis serves as a call to action for
researchers to find new theories and experimental paradigms that will explicate the
robust, and unexplained, direct effect uncovered in this meta-analysis.
Third, for moderated paradigms for proximal effect sizes, the indirect effect is
much smaller than for the standard paradigm (but still significantly positive), and the
direct effect is negative and larger in magnitude. These results strongly suggest that other
mediators are at work in the moderated paradigm.
Fourth, several moderators were found to contribute to variations in effect size
(see Table 4). Importantly, five moderators were designed to represent the types of
moderators of affect-as-information posited elsewhere in the literature (Greifeneder,
Bless, & Pham, 2011), which appeared as manipulations in the moderated paradigms.
Thus, they inform us both about the operation of affect-as-information and possible
explanations of the observed differences between the standard and moderated paradigms.
All five moderators were found to account for significant amounts of the variation in
effect sizes in the total database.
For salience moderators (i.e., those affecting the experience of ease), we found
two important results: one positive and one null. Polarized attitudes reduced the ease-ofretrieval effect. For these participants who had competing inputs to ease (e.g., a polarized
attitude for politics; e.g., Haddock, 2002), effect sizes were negative. However, contrary
to what Kühnen (2010) argues, we found only a small, non-significant effect of the
subjective ease question appearing before the dependent measure (versus after or no
question) in any dataset.
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For inference moderators (i.e., those affecting the relationship between ease and
the dependent measure), we found several important results. Manipulations of processing
motivation that increased processing depth (but were not related to involvement) reduced
effect sizes, which is suggestive that increased cognitive resources made systematic
processing strategies more likely (Chaiken et al., 1989). However, manipulations of
processing motivation that increased involvement were positively related to the ease-ofretrieval effect, which is consistent with the Tormala et al. (2002) framework.
Participants who have heightened personal relevance may be more cognizant of their
higher order feelings. Further, representativeness (misattribution) reduced the ease-ofretrieval effect, consistent with the hypothesized reduced informativeness of cognitive
feelings (Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011). Finally, people predisposed toward using
cognitive feelings exhibited larger ease-of-retrieval effects.
Fifth, when the indirect and direct effect sizes were analyzed separately, many
moderators were found to affect one, but not the other (see Tables 6 and 7). For salience
moderators, the polarized attitude moderator influenced the indirect and direct effect
sizes. The inference moderators mostly affected direct effect sizes much more than
indirect effect sizes for proximal effect sizes. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
the moderator manipulations used in the literature achieved their results mainly by
introducing new mediators that had effects opposite to those of subjective ease.
Sixth, two moderators that were based on degree of self-reference (i.e.,
representativeness [retrieval target] and relevance [judgment task]) were not consistent
with our initial predictions and were reversed for the standard paradigm for proximal
effect sizes. This result may mean that these moderators are less related to
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representativeness and relevance, but instead function similarly to depth of processing
motivation. That is, self-referential retrieval and judgment may encourage more
systematic processing (Chaiken et al., 1989).
Finally, we find few methodological factors that have a large influence on effect
sizes. That the ease-of-retrieval effect is robust across these manipulations supports the
usefulness of the manipulation in the span of inductions of cognitive feelings to be used
as information, and it diminishes concerns about other possible methodological artifacts.
Methodological Implications for Few-Versus-Many Studies
Our meta-analysis also has implications for ease-of-retrieval studies in the future,
inclusive of the way the few-versus-many manipulation is conducted.
First, while our work suggests no aggregate differences between whether the ease
question is placed before or after the dependent measure, there may be reason to place the
question after the dependent measure to avoid demand characteristics explanations
(Kühnen, 2010). In some situations, however, there may be theory-driven reasons for
including the ease question before the dependent measure (e.g., salience; Greifeneder,
Bless, & Pham, 2011; see also Danziger et al., 2005). Therefore, the exact placement of
this question should consider both concerns. However, we also recommend studies that
manipulate the placement of the ease question to test whether the placement influences
the results in a specific paper (see Feldman & Lynch, 1988).
Second, we recommend increased sample sizes to increase power. In a simple
two-cell design, given our effect size, an experimenter would need to run approximately
58.5 participants per cell for proximal and 53.5 for distal to achieve a power of .8. In the
standard paradigm for the proximal model in this meta-analysis, we find that, when

42

excluding the largest designs (N > 300), an average of 25.34 participants are run per cell,
which would only be powered at .45 for each two-cell comparison. In the distal
paradigm, this number would be 30.42 per cell to be powered at .56. We recognize that
we reduced power by splitting designs by moderators and that, in many cases, the full
ANOVA had more statistical power than disaggregated two-cell comparisons due to
pooled estimates of the error term (Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000). However, as
illustrated by our meta-analyses, splitting data into standard and moderated paradigms
enables informative tests of mediation.
Broader Implications of this Meta-Analysis
This meta-analysis arrives at an important time within the fields of social
psychology, consumer behavior, and judgment and decision-making. Many well-known
effects are being re-visited because of failures to replicate (e.g., behavioral priming;
Doyen et al., 2012; Harris et al., 2013; Shanks et al., 2013), and many researchers are
engaging in debates over the existence of published effects (e.g., choice overload;
Chernev, Bockenholt, & Goodman, 2015; Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd, 2010;
unconscious thought theory; Nieuwenstein et al., 2015). Due to these challenges, many
authors of previously published effects are reluctant to provide information, data, or even
communicate about their prior work. The robustness of the ease-of-retrieval effect found
in this meta-analysis presents a case in which published effects are not overly
controversial. Many authors who were contacted for data were not only willing to
respond, but often provided missing data and unpublished studies with non-significant
results or with offers to contact other colleagues for their file-drawer contents. Thus, this
meta-analysis underscores the value of sharing data and experimental details.
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More substantively, we report that a commonly-employed manipulation leads to
an ease-of-retrieval effect of moderate size. This result is important due to the strong
connection of this effect to other phenomena in psychology such as the availability
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and various fluency effects (Alter &
Oppenheimer, 2009). This manipulation is one cornerstone of a broader set of ideas of the
impact of cognitive feelings as information in judgment and decision-making
(Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Schwarz & Clore, 2007).
This meta-analysis also extends the boundaries of other meta-analytic endeavors
by examining the proposed mediator of an effect in addition to the effect itself. This
approach allows the total effect to be decomposed into an indirect effect and a direct
effect. Thus, the adequacy of the proposed mediator can be tested, in addition to its
existence. Moreover, moderators can be related to the direct and indirect effects,
shedding light on the mechanisms of moderation. Finally, when substantial direct effects
are revealed by the meta-analysis (as was the case here), this serves to motivate future
research to uncover the associated mediators.
Finally, we believe this meta-analysis also serves as a call for pre-registered,
large-scale replications of the broad category of effects using highly-powered studies.
Studies in the database relied on smaller samples (or had smaller cell sizes in a larger
factorial design) compared to what others may argue (n > 30; Simmons et al., 2011). It is
prudent to advocate pre-registered, pretested (in terms of number of “few” and “many”
arguments), high-powered replications to demonstrate ease-of-retrieval across a variety of
policy, consumer, health, and other domains. These pre-registered replications ensure that
there is no cherry-picking of dependent-measures.
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Potential Limitations
Data availability due to the passage of time was a major factor in being able to
attain missing information, especially from early research. Notably, we had far fewer
triplets of correlations because less than half of the studies that included a subjective ease
question reported rMY. We thus faced two layers of publication bias: those studies that
were not published due to failing to find significant results, and those studies with
significant results but incomplete reporting (especially, no correlation between ease and
the dependent measure). When reaching out to authors we encountered multiple instances
of inability to recover these missing correlations because the raw data were no longer
available.
Another source of missing data arises when the goal of using the few-versusmany manipulation is simply to provide an alternative procedure for manipulating
another construct (e.g., connectedness with a future self; Bartels & Urminsky, 2011).
Thus, there may be other filedrawers filled with ease-of-retrieval studies in which the
investigation was not interested in ease-of-retrieval per se (i.e., many other types of distal
studies).
Further, we recognize that some studies that rely on the ease-of-retrieval effect do
not use the few-versus-many manipulation (e.g., Herzog, Hansen, & Wänke, 2007;
Raghubir & Menon, 2001). In this meta-analysis, we chose to concentrate solely on the
few-versus-many manipulation to ensure that we had comparable effect sizes.
Future Directions
Our meta-analysis revealed that subjective ease is, at most, a partial mediator of
the ease-of-retrieval effect. Thus, one important future direction is to explore alternative
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explanations, such as unrequested cognitions (Tormala et al., 2007; but see Wänke et al.,
1996). The addition of questions to measure these and other explanations is
straightforward.
Second, future research should examine the ecological validity of subjective ease,
as generated by the few-versus-many manipulation (see Hertwig et al., 2013). While
work in the field has established how naïve beliefs about ease may factor into everyday
judgments (Schwarz, 2004), researchers have only occasionally asked whether the
attributions drawn by individuals are beneficial or detrimental (Todd & Gigerenzer,
2012). For example, Pham et al. (2012) demonstrate that peoples’ predictions may be
improved through relying on their feelings based on the few-versus-manipulation. Future
research should examine how and when relying on feelings of ease may be adaptive or
maladaptive.
Conclusions
How people rely on their feelings has been a strong area of research for several
decades (Greifender, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2007; Zajonc &
Markus, 1982). Substantive research topics have spanned both affective (e.g., sadness;
Lerner & Tiedens, 2001) and cognitive (e.g., ease; Whittlesea, 1993) forms of feelings as
they apply to a large variety of outcomes. One often-studied cognitive feeling has been
the subjective ease of recall for judgment-related examples.
This meta-analysis addressed the question, "Does ease mediate the ease-ofretrieval effect?" Our results suggest the answer is "Yes, but ..." We found that the effect
in the standard paradigm is robust, although about one-third of the effect may be due to
publication bias. These results also speak to the role of feelings as decision inputs within
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the affect-as-information theoretical framework. As for our focal question, we found that
subjective ease is a robust mediator, but that an unexplained direct effect is equally robust
in both standard and moderated paradigms. For moderated paradigms, authors have
identified and manipulated specific theory-based variables. However, the large residual
direct effect for standard paradigms serves as a call to action for future research to answer
the question, "What else mediates the ease-of-retrieval effect?"
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Table 1.
Example cases of proximal and distal effect sizes.
Division and Paper

Reason
Proximal

Schwarz et al. 1991
Haddock 2002
Aarts and Dijksterhuis 1999
Novemsky et al. 2007
Tsai and Thomas 2011
Pocheptsova et al. 2010
Biswas et al. 2012

Keller and Bless 2009

People recall assertive/unassertive instances; they make judgments
of assertiveness.
People recall reasons to like/dislike Tony Blair, then they make
judgments about Tony Blair.
People recall instances of biking, then they make judgments about
how frequently they bike.
People imagine having to generate reasons for choosing a given
product, then they make a choice of product.
People imagine reasons to donate or not, then they decide
whether/how much to donate.
People think of occasions for going to a restaurant; willingness-topay for dinner in that restaurant is the DV.
Participants come up with reasons why a car may have starting
problems; participants judge likelihood that a 5-year old used
Volkswagen car might fail to start anytime within the next 6
months.
Participants think of few or many things in their life impacted by
having a right leg amputated; perceived negative affect duration
was the DV.
Distal

Pham et al. 2012
Schlegel et al. 2011
Bartels and Urminsky 2011
Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2005

Alter and Balcetis 2011
Muller et al. 2011

Sussman and Alter 2012

People recall times they were correct in trusting their feelings, then
make predictions about some outcome.
People come up with descriptors of themselves, then judge
meaning in life.
People consider how hard it would be to generate reasons their
identity would remain stable, then their discount factor is assessed.
People come up with exemplars of minorities they like, then they
complete measures of implicit stereotyping (RT as dependent
measure).
People consider positive or negative elements of NYC, then they
rate the felt distance to NYC.
Participants come up with few or many unfair things about a
negotiation game; the main DV is cooperation in the negotiation
game.
Participants think of items they had bought from a product
category; willingness-to- pay for items from that category (based
on subsequent questions) was the DV.
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Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics of Ease-of-Retrieval Effect Sizes.
Variable

Proximal (N = 454)

Distal (N = 128)

2006 (5.25)
2007

2009 (3.33)
2010

254 (55.9)
200 (44.1)

97 (75.8)
31 (24.2)

350 (77.1)
104 (22.9)

101 (78.9)
27 (21.1)

298 (65.6)
156 (34.4)

92 (71.9)
36 (28.1)

22 (4.8)
432 (95.2)

2 (1.6)
126 (98.4)

160 (35.2)
294 (64.8)

74 (57.8)
54 (42.2)

256 (56.4)
198 (43.6)

103 (80.5)
25 (19.5)

22 (4.8)
432 (95.2)

0 (0)
128 (100)

2.50 (1.11) [2]
8.60 (2.95) [8]

2.44 (0.99) [2]
9.47 (3.08) [10]

106 (23.3)
290 (63.9)
58 (12.8)

32 (25)
42 (32.8)
54 (42.2)

369 (81.3)
85 (18.7)
1
2

70 (54.7)
58 (45.3)
1
2

Year
M (SD)
Median
Country
United States (%)
Non-US (%)
Publication Type
Journal Article (%)
Unpublished (%)
Paradigm
Standard (%)
Moderated (%)
Misattribution
Present (%)
Absent (%)
Target of Retrieval
Self (%)
Not Self(%)
Target of Judgment
Self (%)
Not Self (%)
Polarized Attitude
Yes (%)
No (%)
Arguments
M, Few (SD) [Median]
M, Many (SD) [Median]
Measure of Subjective Ease
Before DV (%)
After DV (%)
None (%)
DV Type
Attitude (%)
Non-Attitude (%)
Median, Number of Ease Items
Median, Number of Measures
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Table 3.
Overall Effect Sizes [95% CIs] for the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect.
Effect Size
Combined
Standard
Moderated
Standard/Moderated
Paradigm
Paradigm
Total Effect of X on Y (c) – Proximal
c (all data)
c (mediation triplets)

.121 [.094, .149]
.109 [.073, .145]

.253 [.224, .281]

-.178 [-.215, -.140]

.223 [.184, .262]

-.166 [-.230, -.100]

Direct (c') and Indirect (a x b) Effects of X on Y - Proximal
c’ (mediation triplets)
a x b (mediation triplets)

.019 [-.105, .053]
.096 [.060, .132]

.105 [.064, .145]

-.205 [-.273, -.137]

.114 [.074, .154]

.042 [.010, .073]

Total Effect of X on Y (c) – Distal
c (all data)

.165 [.120, .208]

.264 [.220, .307]

-.082 [-.158, -.005]

c (mediation triplets)

.154 [.085, .221]

.308 [.219, .393]

-.125 [-.231, -.015]

Direct (c') and Indirect (a x b) Effects of X on Y - Proximal
c’ (mediation triplets)
a x b (mediation triplets)

.112 [.034, .191]
.034 [-.020, .087]

.208 [.144, .272]

-.121 [-.232, -.010]

.046 [-.029, .121]

.002 [-.034, .037]
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Table 4.
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect
Combined Standard and Moderated Paradigm Data
Moderator
Level
Number
Mean Effect Size
Regression
of Effect
(S.E.)1
Coefficient2
Sizes
Salience Moderators
Range
454
.009 (.013)
.015
Attention

Before DV (+1)
After DV (-1)

106
348

Polarized Attitude

Yes (+1)
No (-1)

22
432

Processing
Motivation
(depth)

High (+1)

12

No manip (0)
Low (-1)

417
25

.128 (.014)
.150 (.057)

High (+1)

26

.178 (.057)

No manipu (0)
Low (-1)

404
24

.124 (.015)
.008 (.061)

Self (+1)

160

.108 (.022)

Not-Self (-1)

294

.130 (.018)

Representativenes
s
(misattribution)

Present (+1)

22

Absent (-1)

432

.136 (.014)

Relevance
(judgment task)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

256
198

.123 (.018)
.121 (.021)

High (+1)

15

No manip (0)
Low (-1)

426
13

Processing
Motivation
(involvement)
Representativenes
s
(retrieval target)

Relevance
(disposition)

.114 (.023)
.124 (.015)

-.002

-.140 (.056) ***
.134 (.014)

-.064 ***

Inference Moderators
-.184 (.076) ***
-.034 **

^

.030 **

-019

-.246 (.065) ***

-.092 ***

-.001

.226 (.076) ***

.045 ***

.128 (.014)
-.194 (.083)
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Number
of Effect
Sizes

Standard Paradigm Data Only
Mean Effect Size
Regression
(S.E.)1
Coefficient2

298

-.005 (.012)

.012

73
225

.245 (.019)
.255 (.016)

-.005

-----

-----

---

---

---

---

-----

-----

---

---

-----

-----

114

.196 (.021) ***

184

.286 (.017)

---

---

---

---

180
118

.221 (.018) ***
.298 (.021)

---

---

-----

-----

---

-.030 *

---

-.028*
---

Table 4 (continued).
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results
Moderator

Level

Year

Combined Standard and Moderated Paradigm Data
Number
Mean Effect
Regression
of Effect
Size (S.E.)1
Coefficient
2
Sizes
Exploratory Methodological Moderators
454
-.006 (.013)
-.011

Standard Paradigm Data Only
Mean Effect
Regression
Size (S.E.)1
Coefficient
2

298

-.008 (.010)

170
128

.232 (.019)
.280 (.022)

^

-.007

65

.137 (.030)

**
*

-.053

233

.277 (.015)
^

.015

Country

USA (+1)
Non-USA (-1)

254
200

.117 (.018)
.127 (.021)

Publication Status

Filedrawer (+1)

104

.044 (.027)

Published (-1)

350

.137 (.015)

Number of measures (M)

454

.011 (.014)

.014

298

.025 (.014)

Number of measures (Y)

454

.0002 (.014)

-.001

298

.016 (.012)

Attitude (+1)

369

.112 (.015)

-.019

239

.241 (.017)

Non-Attitude (-1)

85

.155 (.030)

59

.292 (.030)

Type of dependent
measure
(attitude)

.0004

Number
of Effect
Sizes

**

-.035

*

-.009

**
*

.014
^

-.025

^

Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.
1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated
standard errors are reported. Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels.
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers. All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below 10
and the maximum condition index was below 30.
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Table 5.
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for distal paradigm.
Combined Standard and Moderated Paradigm Data
Moderator
Level
Number
Mean Effect Size
Regression
of Effect
(S.E.)1
Coefficient2
Sizes
Salience Moderators
Range
128
-.009 (.019)
-.005
Attention

Processing
Motivation
(depth)

Processing
Motivation
(involvement)

Before DV (+1)
After DV (-1)

32
96

High (+1)

6

No Manip (0)

.170 (.043)
.165 (.022)

.177 (.021)

Low (-1)

4

.115 (.097)

High (+1)

1

.331 (.207)

.026

Standard Paradigm Data Only
Mean Effect Size
Regression
(S.E.)1
Coefficient2

92

-.008 (.020)

-.008

22
70

.320 (.043)
.243 (.027)

.017

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

126

.167 (.019)

---

---

---

Low (-1)

1

-.064 (.201)

---

---

---

Self (+1)

74

.152 (.023)

Not-Self (-1)

54

.195 (.033)

Representativenes
s
(misattribution)

Present (+1)

2

Absent (-1)

126

.170 (.020)

Relevance
(judgment task)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

103
25

.158 (.021)
.198 (.044)

-.028

Relevance
(disposition)

High (+1)
No Manip (0)
Low (-1)

2
124
2

-.015 (.187)
.165 (.019)
.409 (.208)

-.040

Representativenes
s
(retrieval target)

No Manip (0)

.021

Inference Moderators
-.036 (.107)
-.018

118

Number
of Effect
Sizes

-.018

50
42

-.250 (.227) ^

-.063 *

Exploratory Methodological Moderators

90

-.023

.307 (.033)

---

---

---

---

---

---

76
16
^

.226 (.03) ^

-------

.270 (.025)
.239 (.051)
-------

.0004

-------

Year
Country

Publication Status3

Number of
measures (M)
Number of
measures (Y)
Type of dependent
measure
(attitude)

128

-.020 (.022)

-.051

92

-.035 (.024)

USA (+1)

97

.174 (.025).

.025

73

.273 (.026)

Non-USA (-1)

31

.155 (.045)

19

.239 (.047)

Filedrawer (+1)

27

.097 (.045)

17

.213 (.054)

Published (-1)

101

.176 (.019)

75

.275 (.025)

128

.009 (.02)

.002

92

.033 (.020)

.033

128

-.018 (.021)

-.019

92

.020 (.021)

.019

Attitude (+1)

70

.180 (.028)

-.004

51

.275 (.029)

0

Non-Attitude (-1)

58

.155 (.027)

41

.250 (.031)

-.038

^

***

.

-.048

^

Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.
1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated
standard errors are reported. Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels.
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers. All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below 10
and the maximum condition index was below 30.
3Model for bivariate analyses in combined dataset was unable to be run for this covariate; we removed the random intercept for this bivariate analysis.
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Table 6.
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Indirect Effect (a x b) and the Direct Effect (c') Decomposition of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect (combined
dataset)
Moderator

Level

N

Indirect Effect (axb)

Mean Effect
Size (S.E.)1

Range

209

.013 (.010)

Before DV (+1)
After DV (-1)

47
162

.078 (.021)
.102 (.018)

Yes (+1)
No (-1)

5
204

-.037 (.057)
.101 (.019)

Processing Motivation
(depth)

High (+1)
No manip. (0)
Low (-1)

6
193
10

.043 (.070)
.098 (.018)
.086 (.058)

Processing Motivation
(involvement)

High (+1)
No manip. (0)
Low (-1)

6
195
8

Representativeness
(retrieval target)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

Representativeness
(misattribution)

Attention

Regression
Coefficient2
Salience Moderators
.024
-.011

-.020

*

Mean Effect
Size (S.E.)1

Regression
Coefficient2

-.021 (.014)

-.030

.021 (.026)
.019 (.018)

.004

Regression
Coefficient3

^

.003
-.007

-.187 (.096)
.025 (.017)

*

-.030

*

-.042

**

-.003

-.281 (.109)
.024 (.018)
.189 (.086)

**

-.049

**

-.051

**

.092 (.065)
.098 (.019)
.063 (.065)

.003

.118 (.094)
.016 (.017)
.004 (.094)

88
121

.081 (.022)
.105 (.019)

-.011

.060 (.025)
-.010 (.022)

*

Present (+1)
Absent (-1)

7
202

.066 (.063)
.097 (.018)

-.006

-.364 (.110)
.030 (.018)

***

Relevance
(judgment task)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

127
82

.087 (.020)
.109 (024)

.006

.045 (.021)
-.023 (.027)

*

.004

Relevance
(disposition)

High (+1)
No manip. (0)

8
193

.051 (.082)
.1004 (.019)

.005

.209 (.091)
.024 (.018)

**

.046

Polarized Attitude

*

Total Effect
(c)

Direct Effect (c')

Inference Moderators

92

.016

.039

-.080

.019

*

***

.011

-.093

***

-.002
**

.055

**

Low (-1)

8

.009 (.082)

-.209 (.090)

209

Exploratory Methodological Moderators
.009 (.009)
-.004
-.015 (.014)

USA (+1)

114

.098 (.023)

Non-USA (-1)

95

.095 (.025)

Filedrawer (+1)
Published (-1)

65
144

.072 (.035)
.102 (.019)

-.005

Number of measures (M)

209

.014 (.017)

Number of measures (Y)

209

-.014 (.014)

176

.087 (.019)

33

.126 (.032)

Year
Country

Publication Status

Type of dependent
measure
(attitude)

Attitude (+1)
Non-Attitude (1)

.006

-.008

-.0001

-.006

-.022 (.028)
.035 (.019)

-.036*

-.041

.015

-.011 (.017)

-.019

-.001

-.017

.012 (.017)

.024

.007

.016 (.019)

-.008

-.004

.018 (.023)
.023 (.026)

-.012

^

-.026

.033 (.039)

Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.
1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated
standard errors are reported. Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels.
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers. All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below
10 and the maximum condition index was below 30.
3 The Total Effect from is provided as a benchmark.
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Table 7.
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Indirect Effect (a x b) and the Direct Effect (c') Decomposition of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for distal.
Moderator

Level

N

Indirect Effect (axb)
Mean Effect
Size (S.E.)1

Range

Regression
Coefficient2
Salience Moderators

Total Effect
(c)

Direct Effect (c')
Mean Effect
Size (S.E.)1

Regression
Coefficient2

Regression
Coefficient3

44

.019 (.016)

.024

-.023 (.035)

-.116

-.032

Before DV (+1)
After DV (-1)

23

.060 (.026)

.112

.092 (.055)

.035

.078

21

.005 (.017)

High (+1)
No Manip (0)

1
42

-.019 (.171)
.022 (.016)

Low (-1)

1

.074 (.171)

Representativeness
(retrieval target)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

14
30

.016 (.026)
.033 (.026)

-.119

.136 (.059)
.090 (.053)

Representativeness
(misattribution)

Present (+1)
Absent (-1)

2
42

.058 (.180)
.022 (.015)

.005

-.305 (.248)
.121 (.038)

Relevance
(judgment task)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

41
3

.022 (.016)
.036 (.089)

-.072

.117 (.039)
.054 (.138)

Attention

Processing Motivation
(depth)

Year

.131 (.053)
Inference Moderators
-.010

-.287 (.234)
.119 (.038)

-.055

^

-.067

.190

^

.098

-.152

*

-.139

*

.221 (.234)

44

Exploratory Methodological Moderators
-.012 (.026)
-.014
.020 (.046)

^

-.036

-.068

-.119

-.163

Country

USA (+1)
Non-USA (-1)

38
6

.032 (.013)
.-.026 (.027)

-.016

.101 (.043)
.149 (.077)

.070

.069

Publication Status

Filedrawer (+1)
Published (-1)

6
38

.025 (.071)
.023 (.016)

-.122

.019 (.109)
.125 (.039)

.013

-.060

Number of measures (M)

44

.004 (.025)

-.083

-.004 (.04)

-.025

-.043

Number of measures (Y)

44

-.002 (.023)

-.037

-.011 (.042)

.017

-.057

94

*

^

Type of dependent
measure
(attitude)

Attitude (+1)
Non-Attitude (1)

28

.048 (.024)

16

.006 (.019)

.075

.078 (.045)

-.116

-.093

.167 (.052)

Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.
1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated
standard errors are reported. Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels.
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers. All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below
10 and the maximum condition index was below 30.
3 The Total Effect is provided as a benchmark
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S1

Subjective
Ease
I2

Few vs. Many

S2

Dependent
Measure

I1
Salience Moderators (S)
Range
Attention
Polarized Attitude

Inference Moderators (I)
Processing Motivation
Representativeness
Relevance
Polarized Attitude

Figure 1. Theoretical organization of moderators of ease-of-retrieval effect.
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Figure 2. The mediation model of the ease-of-retrieval effect.
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A. Standard Paradigm, Proximal

Standard Paradigm - Proximal
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

B. Moderated Paradigm, Proximal

Moderated Paradigm - Proximal
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Figure 3. Distribution of proximal effect sizes in the standard (A) and moderated
paradigms (B).
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A. Standard Paradigm, Proximal

Standard Paradigm - Distal
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

B. Moderated Paradigm, Proximal

Moderated Paradigm - Distal
30
25
20
15
10
5

0

Figure 4. Distribution of distal effect sizes in the standard (A) and moderated paradigms
(B).
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A. Standard Paradigm (before Trim-and-Fill)

B. Standard Paradigm (after Trim-and-Fill)

C. Standard Paradigm (with Contours)

Figure 5. Funnel plots for the standard paradigm proximal (Fisher’s z). Panel A: the
funnel depicts the confidence interval for the sample mean before applying the trim-andfill algorithm. Panel B: the funnel depicts the confidence interval after applying the trimand-fill algorithm. Panel C: the funnel depicts alpha contours (white indicates
nonsignificant, light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of funnel p < .01)
assuming the null hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true.
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A: Moderated Paradigm (before Trim-and-Fill)

B: Moderated Paradigm (after Trim-and-Fill)

C. Moderated Paradigm (with Contours)

Figure 6. Funnel plots for the moderated paradigm proximal (Fisher’s z). Panel A: the
funnel depicts the confidence interval for the sample mean before applying the trim-andfill algorithm. Panel B: the funnel depicts the confidence interval after applying the trimand-fill algorithm. Panel C: the funnel depicts alpha contours (white indicates
nonsignificant, light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of funnel p < .01)
assuming the null hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true.
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A. Combined Dataset (before Trim-and-Fill)

B. Combined Dataset (after Trim-and-Fill)

C. Combined Dataset (with Contours)

Figure 7. Funnel plots for the combined dataset proximal (Fisher’s z). Panel A: the funnel
depicts the confidence interval for the sample mean before applying the trim-and-fill
algorithm. Panel B: the funnel depicts the confidence interval after applying the trim-andfill algorithm. Panel C: the funnel depicts alpha contours (white indicates nonsignificant,
light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of funnel p < .01) assuming the null
hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true.
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A. Standard Paradigm (before Trim-and-Fill)

B. Standard Paradigm (after Trim-and-Fill)

C. Standard Paradigm (with Contours)

Figure 8. Funnel plots for the standard paradigm distal (Fisher’s z). Panel A: the funnel
depicts the confidence interval for the sample mean before applying the trim-and-fill
algorithm. Panel B: the funnel depicts the confidence interval after applying the trim-andfill algorithm. Panel C: the funnel depicts alpha contours (white indicates nonsignificant,
light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of funnel p < .01) assuming the null
hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true.
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A: Moderated Paradigm (before Trim-and-Fill)

B: Moderated Paradigm (after Trim-and-Fill)

C. Moderated Paradigm (with Contours)

Figure 9. Funnel plots for the moderated paradigm distal (Fisher’s z). Panel A: the funnel
depicts the confidence interval for the sample mean before applying the trim-and-fill
algorithm. Panel B: the funnel depicts the confidence interval after applying the trim-andfill algorithm. Panel C: the funnel depicts alpha contours (white indicates nonsignificant,
light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of funnel p < .01) assuming the null
hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true.
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A. Combined Dataset (before Trim-and-Fill)

B. Combined Dataset (after Trim-and-Fill)

C. Combined Dataset (with Contours)

Figure 10. Funnel plots for the combined dataset distal (Fisher’s z). Panel A: the funnel
depicts the confidence interval for the sample mean before applying the trim-and-fill
algorithm. Panel B: the funnel depicts the confidence interval after applying the trim-andfill algorithm. Panel C: the funnel depicts alpha contours (white indicates nonsignificant,
light grey .05 < p < .10, dark grey p < .05, outside of funnel p < .01) assuming the null
hypothesis (i.e., z = 0) is true.
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errM

Confound
(Z)

errY

Figure 11. Mediation model that includes measurement error (errM) and correlated error
due to an unmeasured confounding variable (Z).
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Appendix A
Example e-mail for reaching out to authors
Dear []:
[Co-author] and I are conducting a meta-analysis of the ease-of-retrieval effect. You have been a contributor to this
literature, so we hope you can help us. Attached is a spreadsheet with the data we have been able to abstract from your
publications.
The data we seek are correlations (as reported or computed from other reported measures) between the few-many
manipulation (X), the manipulation check on subjective difficulty (M), and the dependent measure of interest (Y). For
your attached study, this would be []. In addition to examining the basic effect, we are examining the mediation of the
effect by subjective difficulty, which is why we need three correlations for each observation.
Importantly, we are separating reported results into experimental conditions that the authors present as conceptual
replications of the original effect reported by Schwarz et al. (1991) -- the standard paradigm -- and conditions in which
the authors change the standard paradigm in ways that they expect will moderate the effect, causing attenuation or
reversal. Thus, we often get two or more observations from a single experiment.
Currently, we have data from 142 articles and dissertations, 258 experiments, and 539 observations. It is no surprise
that the basic effect in the standard paradigm conditions is very robust, and this effect is reliably reduced or reversed in
the non-standard conditions. However, there is a significant level of heterogeneity in the effect sizes, and we hope to
identify the factors that do and do not contribute to this variation. Also, we hope to explore the role of subjective
difficulty as a mediator of the effect. Regarding the latter, we have r(XY) for 85% of the observations and r(XM) for
94% of the observations, but for r(MY) only 21% of observations.
What do we need from you? First, please review how we have separated the conditions of your experiments into
standard and non-standard paradigms and confirm that they are consistent with your interpretation of your
manipulations. Second, we need the missing correlations. We are happy to do whatever we can to make this easier for
you. Below are some options.
OPTION 1: Send us the original data. We will only use it for the purpose of computing the correlations we need.
OPTION 2: Hire a student research assistant to do this work under your direction. We reimburse you for this expense
(up to some reasonable amount). Also, we would be happy to work with this student via phone/Skype.
OPTION 3: Do it yourself. Just fill in the yellow cells in the attached spreadsheet. Alternatively, we have designed a
website that assists in this process. It is preloaded with the data we already have, and it has effect size "calculators" to
make the task easier. Of course, the RA in Option 2 might also want to use the website.
OPTION 4: Some combination of the above, or some other process that occurs to you.
Of course, if you have unpublished experiments in your "file drawer" (new or old), we would love to have the
correlations from those experiments.
Please let us know if you can help. Thanks in advance.
Regards
[Authors]
Note: While we used the phrase “very robust” to describe the effect when reaching out to authors, we caution against
using this language as a template for future meta-analyses so as not to bias authors. It is possible that this language
could encourage more individuals to send data, but it is also possible it may affect whether individuals with successful
or unsuccessful filedrawer studies are willing to respond.

107

Figure A1. Example sheet sent to authors to request missing data and to verify our
interpretation of their studies.
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Appendix B
Table of Effect Sizes
Table B1. List of studies using a few-versus-many manipulation in the database before excluding studies.
Paper
Exp Sourc
Topic Retrieved
Difficul Fe
Man
DV
e1
ty
w
y
Questio
n2
Aarts &
Dijksterhuis
(1999)
Aarts &
Dijksterhuis
(1999)
Aladjem (2010)

1

J

Biking instances

A

3

8

2

J

Biking instances

B

3

8

1

D

Reasons to drive a BMW

B

1

10

Aladjem (2010)

2

D

Reasons why Dutch team
would win Soccer World

B

1,2

7, 10

Aladjem (2010)

3

D

Pro/Con reasons in favor of
presidential ticket

A

1

10

Alter & Balcetis
(2010)

3

J

Reasons NY (C1) vibrant
and exciting/ (C2) dirty and
dangerous

N

2

10

109

Frequency
of usage
estimate
Frequency
of usage
stimate
Attitudeassertion
effect
(enjoyment
of listing
task);
attitude
Attitudeassertion
effect
(enjoyment
of listing
task);
attitude
Attitudeassertion
effect
(enjoyment
of listing
task);
attitude
Attitude
towards
NYC

Misattributio
n3

XY Std

XY
Mod

N

r = .23, N =
78

-

N

r = .30, N =
51

r = -.09,
N = 49

N

r = .32, N =
69.5

r = -.30,
N=
69.5

N

r = .30, N =
77.5

r = -.44,
N=
77.5

N

r = .32, N =
65

r = -.31,
N = 74

N

C1: r = .34, N
= 30, C2: r =
.25, N = 30

-

Angle (2012)

pilo
t

D

Behaviors engaged in that
demonstrate university spirit

N

4

12

Armitage (2007)

1

J

Instances of taking stairs
instead of elevator

A

3

8

Armitage (2007)

2

J

Instances of volunteering to
help others

A

3

8

Ask et al. (2012)

1

J

(C1) Truth/ (C2) lie clues

B

2

6

Avnet, Pham, &
Stephen (2012)

1

J

Times correct in trusting
feelings

A

2

10

Avnet, Pham, &
Stephen (2012)

3

J

Times correct in trusting
feelings

A

2

10

Bares (2007)

1

D

Shy/mean/friendly/nice/boo
ks liked

A

1,
3

5,8

110

Choice of
Universityrelated
lottery
Frequency
estimate of
stairs;
attitude
towards
stairs,
behavioral
intention
towards
stairs
Frequency
estimate of
volunteering
; attitude,
behavioral
intentions,
behavioral
control,
subjective
norm
Credibility
judgment

N

r = .29, N =
61

-

N

r = .23, N =
83

-

N

r = .27, N =
77

-

N

-

# of Feeling
Related
Reasons
used to
justify
evaluation
of book;
trust in
feelings
reliance on
feelings to
make choice
How much
do you like
being

N

C1: r = .33 N
= 42, C2: r =
.31 N = 42
r = .26, N =
59

N

r = .18, N =
97

-

N

r = .30, N =
10; r = .02, N
= 10; r = -.11,

r = -.15,
N = 10;
r = -.05,

-

friendly
(shy/friendly
); How
much do
people like
you
(mean/nice);
How much
do you like
reading
(book);
frequency

Bares (2007)

F

D

Shy/mean/friendly/nice/boo
ks liked

A

3

8

Bartels &
Urminsky
(2011)

3

J

Reasons identity would
remain stable

B

2

12

111

How much
do you like
being
friendly
(shy/friendly
); How
much do
people like
you
(mean/nice);
How much
do you like
reading
(book)
Connectedn
ess to future
self

N = 11; r =
.62, N = 10; r
= .05, N = 10;
r = -.25, N =
10

N

r = -.05, N =
44; r = .10, N
= 44; r = -.01,
N = 39; r =
.18, N = 39

N

r = .23, N =
97

N = 9, r
= .15, N
= 11, r
= 0, N
= 10; r
= -.30,
N = 10;
r = .06,
N = 10;
r = .15,
N = 10;
r = -.40,
N = 9; r
= .33, N
= 9; r =
.09, N =
10; r = .11, N =
10; r =
.04, N =
10; r =
.14, N =
10; r = .03, N =
10
-

-

Belli et al.
(1998)

1

J

Specific events experienced
when 5-7 and 8-10 years old

A

4

12

Belli et al.
(1998)

2

J

Specific events experienced
when 5-7 and 8-10 years old

N

4

12

Bianchi et al.
(2009)

3

J

Positive aspects of the
group the Germans

N

3

12

Biswas, Keller,
& Burman
(2012)

1

J

Reasons car might have
starting problems

A

4

12

Biswas, Keller,
& Burman
(2012)

2

J

Reasons car might have
starting problems (C1) high
need for closure, (C2) low
need for closure

A

4

12

Biswas, Keller,
& Burman
(2012)

3

J

Performance-related
problems of music CD (C1)
neutral exp (C2) negative
exp

A

4

12

Biswas, Keller,
& Burman
(2012)

4

J

Reasons car might have
starting problems (C1) cue
absent (C2) cue present

N

4

12

112

Judgment of
childhood
memory
Judgment of
childhood
memory
Ingroup
projection
ratings;
social
projection
rating
Probability
of 5-year old
used
Volkswagen
failing
Probability
of 5-year old
used
Volkswagen
failing
Probability
of typical
music CD
from same
company
having
performance
-related
problems
within 6
months of
purchase
Probability
of 5-year old
used
Volkswagen
failing;
number of
possible
reasons for a

N

r = .18, N =
152

-

N

r = .21, N =
107

-

N

r = .35, N =
66

-

N

r = .39, N =
41

-

N

C1: r = .43, N
= 39

C2: r =
.08, N =
39

N

C1: r = .32 N
= 45

C2: r =
-.28 N
= 49

C2

C1: r = .28 N
= 50

C2: r =
-.27 N
= 50

Bohner et al.
(2002)

1

J

Brinol, Petty, &
Tormala (2006)

1

J

Broemer (2001)

1

J

Bulbul (2007)

4b

D

Carter &
Dunning (2008)

1

U

Carter &
Dunning (2009)

2

U

Reasons of personal
behaviors that would
increase/decrease risk of
rape; (C1) no pres + low
RMA +decr (C2) time pres
+ low RMA + decr (C3) no
pres + low RMA + incr (C4)
time pres + low RMA + incr
(C5) time pres + high RMA
+ incr (C6) no pres + high
RMA +decr , (C7) time pres
+ high RMA + decr, (C8)
no pres + high RMA + incr
Reasons in favor of
comprehensive exams; (C1)
ease is good, (C2) ease is
bad

B

2

6

N

2

10

B

5

10

A

2

10

(C1, C3, C5) Positive/ (C2,
C4) negative attributes
about (C1, C2, C3) George
Bush/ (C3, C5) Obama;
(C1, C2, C5) Democrat or
(C3, C4) Republican

A

2

8

Arguments in favor
of/against constitutional
amendment banning gay
marriage (C1) against +
against, (C2) against +

A

2

7

(C1) Desired/ (C2)
undesired end states in
relationship
Reasons why or why not to
purchase

113

car to have
starting
problems
Vulnerabilit
y to sexual
assault

N

C1: r = .25 N
= 49, C2: r =
.16 N = 32,
C3: r = .17 N
= 34 C4: r =
.19 N = 42,
C5: r = .07 N
= 40

C6: r =
-.10 N
= 37,
C7: r =
.08 N =
42, C8:
r = -.30
N = 37

Attitude
favorability
towards
senior
comprehensi
ve exams
Interpersona
l closeness

N

C1: r = .35 N
= 30, C2: r =
.38 N = 30

-

N

-

Assortment
size (small
or large)
preference
Evaluation
of President;
judged
success of
presidency

N

C1: r = .29 N
= 52, C2: r =
.21 N = 52
r = .28, N =
42

N

C5: r = .03, N
= 42, C4: r =
.31 N = 7

Attitude
Certainty

N

C1: r = .11 N
= 19

C3: r =
-.32 N
= 7, C2:
r = -.01
N = 29,
C1: r =
.21 N =
28
C2: r .32 N =
10, C3
=r=-

-

Carter &
Dunning (2011)

3

U

Carter &
Dunning (2009)

4

U

Carter &
Dunning (2009)

5

U

Carter & Sanna
(2008)

2

Caruso (2008)

originally for, (C3) for +
originally against
Factors that would help
Obama in 2012 for (C1)
democrat or (C2) republican

A

2

8

(C1) charitable or (C2)
Neutral / introverted
behaviors
(C1) charitable or (C2)
Neutral/introverted
behaviors

A

2

12

A

2

10

J

(C1) Direct/ (C2) indirect
self-presentation strategies

B

3

12

1a

J

Assertive

A

2

8

Caruso (2008)

1b

J

Assertive

A

2

8

Caruso (2008)

2

J

Creative

A

2

6

Caruso (2008)

3

J

Unsafe feeling

A

2

6

Caruso et al.
(2011)

1

U

examples in which did not
have enough money

B

2

6

Chang (2010)

1

J

Consequences of disease

A

2

5

Chang (2010)

2

J

A

3

7

Chang (2010)

3

J

Number of ways to prevent
hemorrhoids
Consequences of disease
(C1) solutions (C2)
consequences

A

2

5
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.06 N =
39
C2: r =
-.12 N
= 45

Subjective
Likelihood;
percentage
of popular
vote for
Obama
Trait rating,
relative trait
rating
Self-rated
Trait rating,
relative trait
rating
Judgment of
childhood
memory
Self-rated
Assertivenes
s
Self-rated
Assertivenes
s
Self-rated
Creativity
Safety

N

C1: r = .02, N
= 135

N

C1: r = .07 N
= 26

N

C1: r = .06 N
= 110

N

C1: r = .48 N
= 16, C2: r =
.59 N = 16
r = .43, N =
30

r = -.09,
N = 30

N

r = .13, N =
57

r = -.24,
N = 57

N

Satisfaction
with
personal
finances
Perceived
severity
Perceived
efficacy
Public
Service
Announcem
ent
effectivenes
s

N

r = .24, N =
48
r = .19, N =
38
r = .05, N =
99

r = -.13,
N = 47
r = -.39,
N = 38
-

r = .28 N =
47
r = .21 N =
95
C1: r = .32 N
= 48

-

N

N

N
N
N

C2: r =
-.41 N
= 23
C2: r =
.09 N =
101
-

C2: r =
.08 N =
49

Chang (2010)

4

J

Consequences of disease:
(C1) tinea pedis or (C2)
peridontal

N

2

5

Severity of
disease

N

-

Cheng (2005)

3

D

Good things about being an
Asian American

N

3

12

N

r = -.17, N =
108

Corby & Homa
(2011)*

1

J

A

6

12

N

-

-

Corby & Homa
(2011)*
Cutright,
Bettman, &
Fitzsimons
(2013)
Cutright,
Bettman, &
Fitzsimons
(2013)
Danziger,
Moran, &
Rafaely (2006)

2

J

A

6

12

-

-

J

N

2

10

Self-rated
traits
Perceptions
of control

N

Pilo
t

Recent/childhood examples
of assertive, creative,
optimism
Assertive, friendly,
optimism, creative
Things in life over which
have complete control

attitude
towards
being Asian
American
Self-rated
traits

N

r = .37, N =
29.6

-

1

J

Things in life over which
have complete control

N

2

10

Perceptions
of control

N

r = .38, N =
59

1

J

Reasons in favor of
proposal of changing
number of school years in
Israel; (C1, C2) high
experiential or (C3, C4) low
experiential

(C1,
C3) B,
(C2,
C4) A

2

8

N

C1: r = .16 N
= 66, C2: r =
.18 N = 79,
C3: r = .25 N
= 84

C4: r =
-.21, N
= 75

DeMarree et al.
(2012)
Demotta (2012)

2

J

A

4

10

N

D

A

2

8

r = .26, N =
64
r = .28, N =
128

-

3

Times tried very hard to
achieve something
Reasons organization was
competent

Deval (2010)

1

D

Reasons for choosing
vacation package: (C1) online + high inv (C2)
memory + low (C3) on-line
+ low (C4) memory + high

N

2

8

Evaluation
of proposal
to change
number of
school years
in Israel
from 12 to
11
Persistence
on anagrams
Competence
of
organization
Attitude
towards
vacation
package;
confidence
(C1, C3)

C1: r = .34 N
= 44, C2: r =
.36 N = 41

C3: r =
-.08 N
= 44,
C4: r =
-.22 N
= 43
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N

N

C1: r =
.09 N =
99.5,
C2: r =
-.24 N
= 99.5
-

-

Deval (2010)

2

D

Reasons for choosing TV
(C1) on-line + high need for
closure (C2) memory + low
(C3) on-line + low (C4)
memory + high
Traits on which men and
women reliably differ; (C1)
low, (C2) medium, (C3)
high

N

1

10

Dijksterhuis,
Macrae, &
Haddock (1999)

1

J

Echterhoff &
Hirst (2006)

1

Echterhoff &
Hirst (2006)

Attitude
towards 3D
HDTV;
confidence
(C1, C3)
Judges’
ratings of
Stereotypica
lity in target
portrayals
Judged
memory
quality;
vividness
Judged
memory
quality

N

C1: r = .35 N
= 46, C2: r =
.32 N = 44

A

3

8

J

Memory of experiences on
NYE

A

4

12

2

J

A

4

12

Eibach, Libby,
& Gilovich
(2003)
Etcheverry, Le,
& Hoffman
(2013)

4

J

(C1) no shock, (C2)
attenuated shock, (C3) high
shock Memories of
September 11th
Things about you changed
since high school

B

3

3

J

Reasons friend is satisfied

B

Florack & Zoabi
(2003)*
Florack & Zoabi
(2003)*
Fox (2006)

1

J

2

J

1

J

Gawronski,
Bodenhausen, &
Banse (2005)
Gawronski,
Bodenhausen, &
Banse (2005)

4

J

Reasons for/against
investment
Reasons for/against
investment
Ways in which course could
be improved
(C1) Introverted/ (C2)
extroverted exemplars

N

C1: r = .72, N
= 31

N

r = .32, N =
93

N

C1: r = .28 N
= 73, C2: r =
.41 N = 73

C3: r =
-.07 N
= 69

12

Judgment of
self-change

N

r = .33, N =
80

-

3

8

N

r = .32, N =
44

-

N

1

3

N

-

-

A

1

3

N

-

-

N

2

10

N

3

10

A

3

10

Ingroup
Extroversion
; outgroup
extraversion

N

r = .28, N =
58
C1: r = .50 N
= 16, C2: r =
.49 N = 16
C1: r = .21 N
= 35, C2: r =
.29 N = 35

-

N

Level of
approval;
perceived
relationship
satisfaction
Willingness
to invest
Willingness
to invest
Course
Ratings
Outgroup
extroversion

5

J

Students high in (C1)
introversion/ (C2)
extroversion
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N

C3: r =
.14 N =
42, C4:
r = .05
N = 43
C2: r =
.46, N =
31, C3:
r = -.50,
N = 31
-

-

-

Gomillion
(2012)

1

U

Ways in which partner
facilitates academic goals

A

4

12

Grayson &
Schwarz (1999)

1

J

Behaviors that could
increase/decrease risk of
assault

B

4

12

Grayson &
Schwarz (1999)
Greifeneder &
Bless (2007)

2

J

B

3

7

1

J

B

2

5

Greifeneder &
Bless (2007)

2

J

Behaviors that could
increase risk of assault
Reasons in favor of
introduction of new
quarterly surgery fee
Assertiveness

B

2

8

Greifeneder &
Bless (2007)

3

J

B

2

5

Greifeneder &
Bless (2008)

1

J

Reasons in favor of
introduction of new
quarterly surgery fee
Number of kitchen tools

B

4

12

Greifeneder &
Bless (2008)

2

J

Reasons in favor of
expansion of Mannheim
airport

B

2

6

Greifeneder &
Keller (2012)

1

J

B

2

6

Greifeneder &
Keller (2012)

2

J

B

2

6

Evaluation
of airport
extension

N

Greifeneder et
al. (2011a)

1

J

Reasons in favor of airport
extension: (C1) promotion
(C2) middle (C3)
prevention
Reasons in favor of airport
extension (C1) promotion
(C2) middle (C3)
prevention
Unfair aspects of the
university admission
process

B

2

4

Procedural
justice;
attitude
towards the
ZVS

N
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Perceived
partner
instrumental
ity;
academic
ability test
Likelihood
of being
assaulted

N

r = -.11 N =
53, r = .03 N
= 54

-

N

r = .48 N =
29; r = .21 N
= 29

Perceived
risk
Evaluation
of surgery
fee
Self-rated
Assertivenes
s
Evaluation
of surgery
fee
Evaluation
of kitchen
tools
Attitude
towards
airport
extension
Evaluation
of airport
extension

N

r = .29 N =
30
r = .24 N =
43.5

r = -.14
N = 30,
r = -.22
N = 25
r = -.44
N = 29
r = -.19
N=
43.5
r = -.39
N = 40

N

N

r = .21 N =
40

C2

C1: r = .28 N
= 21.5

N

r = .27, N =
33

C2: r =
-.43 N
= 21.5
r = -.28,
N = 33

N

r = .20, N =
44

r = -.11,
N = 44

N

C1: r = .24 N
= 39.5, C2: r
= .11 N =
39.5
C1: r = .33 N
= 19.67, C2: r
= .18 N =
19.67
r = .46 N =
23

C3: r =
-.09 N
= 39.5
C3: r =
-.09 N
= 19.67
-

Greifeneder et
al. (2011a)

2

J

Unfair aspects about
orientation exam for (C1)
certain or (C2) uncertain

A

2

4

Procedural
justice;
organization
al
attractivenes
s
Procedural
justice;
organization
al
attractivenes
s
Fairness
perception

N

C1: r = .23 N
= 47.5

C2: r =
-.23 N
= 47.5

Greifeneder et
al. (2011a)

3

J

Unfair aspects about
orientation exam (C1)
certainty (C2) control (C3)
uncertainty

A

2

4

N

C1: r = .39 N
= 32.67, C2: r
= .16 N =
32.67

C3: r =
-.04 N
= 32.67

Greifeneder et
al. (2011b)

1

J

A

2

4

Greifeneder et
al. (2011b)

2

J

A

1

Haddock (2002)

1

J

Aspects of trust game
seeming unfair as senders
(C1) low uncertainty (C2)
high uncertainty
Aspects of trust game
seeming unfair as senders
(C1) low uncertainty (C2)
high uncertainty
Reasons to (C1, C3) like/
(C2, C4) dislike Tony Blair
with (C1, C2) low or (C3,
C4) high interest in politics

N

C1: r = .34 N
= 30

C2: r =
-.11 N
= 30

3

Trusting
behavior

N

C1: r = .34 N
= 27.5

C2: r =
-.13 N
= 27.5

A

2

5

Evaluation
of Tony
Blair

N

C1: r = .16 N
= 23, C2: r =
.38 N = 23

A

3

7

Attitude
strength

N

A

3

7

Attitude
certainty

N

C1: r = .14 N
= 30,
C2: r = .41, N
= 27
C1: r = .36 N
= 20, C2: r =
.29 N = 20

C3: r =
-.11 N
= 27.5,
C4: r =
-.06 N
= 27.5
-

Haddock,
Rothman, &
Schwarz (1996)

1

J

Reasons (C1) for or (C2)
against doctor-assisted
suicide

Haddock et al.
(1999)

1

J

Haddock et al.
(1999)

2

J

Reasons (C1, C3) for or
(C2, C4) against doctorassisted suicide with
moderate (C1, C2) or
extreme (C3, C4) attitude
Reasons (C1, C3) for or
(C2, C4) against doctorassisted suicide with (C1,
C2) high diag or (C3, C4)
low diag

A

3

7

Attitude
certainty

C3/C4
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C1: r = .40 N
= 19.5, C2: r
= .13 N =
19.5

C1: r =
.04 N =
20, C2:
r = -.12
N = 20
C3: r =
-.35 N
= 19.5,
C4: r =
-.20 N
= 19.5

Hansen &
Wänke (2008)

2

J

Arguments against
implementation of federal
DNA databases; (C1)
discrepant or (C2)
congruent
(C1, C3) Pro/ (C2, C4) Con
for voting on Internet

A

2

6

Attitude
towards
DNA
databases

N

C1: r = .34, N
= 31.5

C2: r =
-.18, N
= 31.5

Hansen &
Wänke (2008)

3

J

A

2

8

Attitude
towards
Internet
voting

N

C1: r = .32 N
= 37.5, C2: r
= .18 N =
37.5

A

2

8

Self-esteem

N

-

A

2

12

Self-esteem

N

-

-

A

8

20

Self-esteem

N

-

-

J

Events in your life that led
you to feel confident about
ability to perform
Events in your life that led
you to feel confident about
ability to perform
Events in your life that led
you to feel confident about
ability to perform
NFC Teams, Sitcomes

C3: r =
-.29 N
= 37.5,
C4: r =
-.07 N
= 37.5
-

Hermann,
Leonardelli, &
Arkin (2002)*
Hermann,
Leonardelli, &
Arkin (2002)*
Hermann,
Leonardelli, &
Arkin (2002)*
Hirt, Kardes, &
Markman
(2004)*
IJzerman &
Semin (2010)
Janssen, Muller,
& Greifeneder
(2011)

1

J

2

J

3

J

1

A

2

8

Winning
probability

N

-

-

2

J

Similarities

A

3

10

similarities

N

-

1

J

Number of fair aspects of
contact with company: (C1)
experienced + certain (C2)
inexperienced + uncertain
(C3) inexperienced +
certain (C4) experienced +
uncertain

B

1

4

Procedural
justice

N

C1: r = .15 N
= 130.75

1

J

Reasons for failure

A

2

12

Forecasts

N

r = .20, N =
39

r = -.19,
N = 84
C2: r =
-.07 N
=
130.75,
C3: r =
-.08 N
=
130.75,
C4: r =
-.14 N
=
130.75
-

Kadous,
Krische, &
Sedor (2006)

119

Kadous,
Krsiche, &
Sedor (2006)

2

J

Reasons financial
performance might not be as
positive

A

2

10

Forecasts

N

r = 0, N = 42

-

Keller & Bless
(2009)

1

J

B

2,
3

7, 9

Affect
duration

N

C1: r = .32 N
= 20, C2: r =
.44 N = 26

Kivetz & Zheng
(2006)*

2

J

N

2

10

N

-

pilo
t

J

A

2

10

Choice of
vice option
over virtue
option
Feeling
guilty

C3: r =
-.02 N
= 27,
C4: r =
.05 N =
24
-

Kivetz & Zheng
(2006)*

N

-

-

Kühnen (2010)

1

J

(C1) High faith in intuition,
unrelated; (C2) high faith in
intuition, related; (C3) low
faith in intuition, unrelated;
(C4) low faith in intuition,
related
Examples in which yielded
to vice instead of virtual
/overcame a vice for a
virtue
Examples in which yielded
to vice instead of virtual
/overcame a vice for a
virtue
Biking instances; (C1) low
accuracy + manip first, (C2)
low accuracy + manip
second, (C3) high accuracy
+ manip first (C4) high
accuracy + manip second

B, A

5

15

Frequency
of biking

N

C1: r = .57, N
= 29

Kühnen (2010)

2

J

Assertiveness

(C1) B,
(C2) A

2

8

N

C1: r = .18, N
= 37.5

Kühnen (2010)

3

J

Arguments in favor of
surgery fee; (C1, C2)
attribution absent, (C3, C4)
attribution present

(C1,
C3) B,
(C2,
C4) A

2

5

Self-rated
Assertivenes
s
Attitude
towards
surgery fee

C3/C4

C1: r = .46, N
= 24

Kühnen (2010)

4

J

Attributes on which men
and women differ

(C1) B,
(C2) A

2

12

N

C1: r = .26, N
= 45

C2: r =
-.52 N
=29,
C3: r =
-.35, N
= 27,
C4: r =
-.30 N
= 27
C2: r =
-.30, N
= 29
C2: r =
-.32, N
= 24,
C3: r =
-.32 N
= 23,
C4: r =
-.45, N
= 23
C2: r =
-.30, N
= 46
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Stereotyping
(difference
in

Kunstman et al.
(2013)

2

J

Felt accepted by outgroup

B

2

10

Kunstman et al.
(2013)

3

J

Felt accepted by outgroup

B

2

10

Laham (2013)

1

J

Nonhuman animals they
feel morally obligated to
show concern for

A

3

15

Laham (2013)

2

J

Nonhuman animals they
feel morally obligated to
show concern for

A

3

15

Lai & Kuo
(2007)

1

J

Piracy-related behaviors

B

1

5

Lee (2005)

2

J

Benefits or difficulties of
work

B

3

8

Lemay, Clark, &
Feeney (2007)

3

J

A

2

8

Menon &
Raghubir (2003)

1

J

Things done to help
relationship partner in past 7
days
Aspects to recall from
Micron ad

A

2

8

121

percentage
of each sex
had certain
masculine or
feminine
traits)
Florida State
University
connect
score
Internal
motivation
to respond
without
prejudice;
feelings of
acceptance
by outgroup
Proportion
of world’s
animals feel
obliged to
show moral
concern for
Proportion
of world’s
animals feel
obliged to
show moral
concern for
Selfpositivity
bias
Reduction
Work-life
conflict
Partner
responsiven
ess
Recommend
ation
likelihood

N

r = .33, N =
35

-

N

r = .22, N =
119

-

N

r = .38, N =
39

-

N

r = .31, N =
37

-

N

C1: r = .52 N
=30, C2: r =
.17 N = 30

-

N

r = .28 N =
68

-

N

r = .17, N =
151

-

N

r = .34, N =
133

-

Menon &
Raghubir (2003)

2

J

Aspects to recall from
Micron ad

A

2

8

Menon &
Raghubir (2003)

3

J

A

2

8

Menon &
Raghubir (2003)

4

J

Aspects to recall from
Micron ad; (C1) task
difficult, feedback after;
(C2) task easy, feedback
after, (C3) task easy,
feedback before (C4) task
difficult, feedback before
Aspects to recall from
Micron ad; (C1) loaddifficult, (C2) load-no info,
(C3) no load-difficult

A

4

12

Merckelbach et
al. (2001)

1

J

Negative autobiographical
events before age 10

N

3

9

Nestler (2010)

1

J

Counterfactual thoughts

A

2

10

Nestler (2010)

2

J

Counterfactual thoughts

A

2

10

Novemsky et al.
(2007)

2

J

B

2

10

Novemsky et al.
(2007)

3

J

Reasons for picking a
Microwave oven or digital
camera
Reasons for picking a
camera

B

2

10

Novemsky et al.
(2007)

4

J

Reasons for picking a
Microwave oven

B

2

10

122

for personal
computer
brand
Purchase
and
recommenda
tion
intention
Purchase
and
recommenda
tion
intention

C2

C1: r = .13, N
= 46

C2: r =
-.38, N
= 46

C1/C4

C1: r = .35 N
= 26, C2: r =
.45 N = 26,
C3: r = .41 N
= 26

C4: r =
-.59, N
= 26

Purchase
and
recommenda
tion
intention
Agreement
that have
repressed
many of
their
childhood
memories
Belief
perseveranc
e
Belief
perseveranc
e
Choice
deferral

C1/C3

C1: r = .35 N
= 36, C2: r =
.22, N = 36

C3: r =
-.45, N
= 16

N

r = -.30, N =
52

-

N

r = .34, N =
40

-

N

r = .50, N =
47

-

N

r = .14, N =
289

-

Compromise
Effect
incidence
Compromise
Effect
incidence

N

r = .27, N =
180

-

C2

C1: r = .25, N
= 111

C2: r =
-.20, N
= 111

O’Brien (2013)

2

J

(C1) Happy/ (C2) Unhappy
Experiences in Past, (C3)
Happy/ (C4) Unhappy
Experiences in Future

B

3

12

Future
happiness

N

O’Brien (2012)

1

U

A

2

10

Purchase
satisfaction

N

Ofir (2000)

2

J

A

2

5, 6

Ofir (2000)

3

J

A

2

5

Proportion
of all other
problems
Proportion
of all other
problems

Ofir (2000)

4

J

Good aspects of (C1)
material/ (C2) experiential
good purchase
Number of fault reasons;
(C1) tree 1, (C2) tree 2,
(C3) tree 3
Number of specific failure
reasons; (C1) tree 1, drivers;
(C2) tree 2, drivers; (C3)
tree 1, mechanics, (C4) tree
2, mechanics
Number of specific causal
reasons

A

1

6

Ofir et al. (2008)

1a

J

Number of low-priced
products sold at store

A

2

5

Ofir et al. (2008)

pilo
t

J

Number of low-priced
products sold at store

A

2

9

Ofir et al. (2008)

2

J

A

2

5

Ofir et al. (2008)

3

J

Number of (C1) low-priced/
(C2) high-priced products
sold at store
Number of low-priced
products sold at store

A

2

Oyserman,
Fryberg, &
Yoder (2007)
Oyserman,
Fryberg, &
Yoder (2007)
Oyserman,
Fryberg, &
Yoder (2007)

5

J

Ways group and Whites are
similar

N

6

J

Ways group and Whites are
similar

7

J

Ways group and Whites are
similar

C4: r =
.01, N =
45

N

C1: r = .37, N
= 45, C2: r =
.40 N = 45,
C3: r = .37 N
= 45
C1: r = -.03 N
= 69, C2: r =
-.003 N = 59
-

N

-

-

Proportion
of all other
problems
Store
expensivene
ss
Store
expensivene
ss
Price
perception

N

-

-

N

r = .54, N =
99

-

N

r = .39, N =
134

-

N

-

5

Store-price
judgment

N

C1: r = .39 N
= 76, C2: r =
.27, N = 76
r = .43, N =
51

3

8

N

r = .32, N =
38.67

-

N

3

8

Self-rated
Similarity to
Whites
Similarity to
Whites

N

r = .29, N =
40

-

N

3

8

Similarity to
Whites

N

r = .29, N =
68

-
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-

-

r = -.41,
N = 49

Pahl & Eiser
(2007)

1

J

Behaviors (C1) you / (C2) a
typical student does in a
typical week that may be
harmful to environment

A

2

8

Comparative
selfpositivity

N

C1: r = .06 N
= 49.5, C2: r
= .23 N =
49.5

-

Park (2004)

1

D

A

1

10

Product
Evaluation

N

C1: r = .40 N
= 26.25, C2: r
= .39 N =
26.25

Park (2004)

2

D

A

1

10

Product
Evaluation

N

C1: r = .18 N
= 34.25, C2: r
= .57 N =
34.25

C3: r =
-.35 N
= 26.25,
C4: r =
-.30 N
= 26.25
C3: r =
-.48 N
= 34.25,
C4: r =
-.42 N
= 34.25

Petrocelli &
Dowd (2009)

3

J

Reason for purchase (C1)
compatible prevention (C2)
compatible promotion (C3)
incompatible prevention
(C4) incompatible
promotion
Reason for purchase (C1)
compatible interdependent
(C2) compatible
independent (C3)
incompatible interdependent
(C4) incompatible
independent
If-only statements

A

4

10

N

r = .27, N =
49

r = -.20,
N = 49

Pocheptsova,
Labroo, & Dhar
(2010)

2

J

Reasons to go to a (C1)
causal or (C2) fancy
restaurant

A

1

5

Severity of
punishment;
deservingne
ss of
punishment;
causality
Willingnessto-pay

N

-

Preston & Epley
(2005)

3

J

Observations that (C1) God
can explain, (C2)
observations that can
explain God’s behavior

N

3

10

Perceived
value of
Belief in
God

N

C1: r = .10 N
= 102.5, C2: r
= .33 N =
102.5
-

Raghubir &
Menon (1998)

2

J

AIDS-related behaviors
(Self)

A

3

5

Risk of
AIDS

N

r = .27, N =
50

Raghubir &
Menon (1998)

3

J

Ways in which HIV is
transmitted

A

1

3

Risk of
AIDS

N

r = .30, N =
61
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C1: r =
-.20 N
= 28.5,
C2: r =
-.04 N
= 28.5
-

-

Raghubir &
Menon (2005)

1

J

(C1) Positive/ (C2)
Negative experiences eating
out

A

2

8

Raghubir &
Menon (2005)

2

J

(C1, C3) Positive/ (C2, C4)
Negative experiences eating
out (C1, C2) recently or
(C3, C4) distant

A

2

10

125

Satisfaction
with eatingout
experiences;
open-ended
frequency,
close-ended
frequency,
dollars spent
eating out,
attitude
towards
eating out,
likelihood of
initiating
next eating
out,
likelihood of
positive
experience,
likelihood of
negative
experience
Satisfaction
with eatingout
experiences;
open-ended
frequency,
close-ended
frequency,
dollars spent
eating out –
sit-down,
dollars spent
eating out
fast-food,
attitude
towards
eating out,
likelihood of
initiating

N

C1: r = .23 N
= 47, C2: r =
.31 N = 47

-

N

C1: r = .39 N
= 41.75, C2: r
= .31 N =
41.75

C3: r =
-.002 N
= 41.75,
C4: r =
-.05 N
= 41.75

Rai & Holyoak
(2010)

1

J

Reasons for employee to
take proposed Trolley
action

N

2

7

Roese &
Summerville
(2005)

3c

J

A

2

8

Rothman &
Hardin (1997)

1

J

Examples of opportunities
in (C1) Kindness and
respect in friendships, (C2)
meeting new friends, (C3)
time spent with romantic
partner, (C4) trust in
romantic relationships
Polite/impolite behaviors

A

3

6

Rothman &
Hardin (1997)

2

J

Assertive/Unassertive

A

3

6

Rothman &
Hardin (1997)

3

J

Assertive/Unassertive

A

3

6

Rothman &
Schwarz (1998)

1

J

Risk-increasing/decreasing
factors for self/avg. man
(C1) family history + avg
man + decr (C2) family
history + avg man + incr
(C3) no family + self + decr

A

3

8
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next eating
out,
likelihood of
sit-down,
likelihood of
fast-food
Agreement
with taking
proposed
action
Self-rated
Regret

N

r = .19, N =
124

-

N

C1: r = .01 N
= 60, C2: r =
.21 N = 42,
C3: r = -.22 N
= 50, C4: r =
.01 N = 46

-

N

r = .25, N =
54

r = -.24,
N = 42

C3/C4

C1: r = .11, N
= 20.75; C2: r
= .21, N =
20.75

Self-rated
Assertivenes
s

N

r = .12, N =
58; r = .13, N
= 63

Risk
Perception

N

C1: r = .38 N
= 18, C2: r =
.59 N = 20,
C3: r = .42 N
= 19, C4: r =
.28 N = 17

C3: r =
-.28, N
= 42.50;
C4: r =
-.17, N
= 42.50;
C5: r =
-.14, N
= 20.75;
C6: r =
-.23, N
= 20.75
r = -.17,
N = 58;
r = -.23,
N = 63
C5: r =
.10 N =
21, C6:
r = -.28
N = 18,
C7: r =

Self-rated
Impolite
ratings
Self-rated
Assertivenes
s

Ruder & Bless
(2003)

1

J

Ruder & Bless
(2003)

3

J

Ruder & Bless
(2003)

4

Ruder & Bless
(2003)

(C4) no family + self + incr
(C5) no family + avg + decr
(C6) no family + avg + incr
(C7) family + self + decr
(C8) family +self + incr
Arguments in favor of
reduction in number of
years of education

B

2

6

Reasons against highway
toll; (C1) happy +
diagnostic (C2) sad +
nondiagnostic (C3) sad +
diagnostic (C4) happy +
nondiagnostic

B

2

5

J

Arguments in favor of
reduction in number of
years of education

B

2

5

F

J

Arguments in favor of
reduction in number of
years of education

B

2

6

Sackett (2006)*

6

D

N

2

8

Sanna, Chang, &
Carter (2004)

3

J

Advantages/disadvantages
of optimistic or pessimistic
prediction errors
Thoughts about (C1)
outcome/ (C2) alternative

B

2

10

Sanna, Parks,
Chang, & Carter
(2005)

3

J

B

5

Sanna, Schwarz,
& Small (2002)

1

J

Reasons for (C1)
successful/ (C2)
unsuccessful task
completion
Thoughts that would have
helped side win; (C1) G
win, (C2) British win

A

2

127

Agreement
with policy
for change
in education
system
Agreement
with policy
for highway
toll

-.55 N
= 20,
C8: r =
-.22 N
= 23
r = -.33
N = 26

N

r = .61 N =
24

C2/C4

C1: r = .37 N
= 27.5

Agreement
with policy
for highway
toll
Agreement
with policy
for change
in education
system
Preferences
for
predictions
outcome
inevitability

N

r = .41 N =
31.5

N

r = .43, N =
24

-

N

-

-

N

-

15

difference in
completion
time

N

C1: r = .48 N
= 20, C2: r =
.58 N = 20
C1: r = .50 N
= 20, C2: r =
.55 N = 20

10

Probability
judgment

N

C1: r = .45 N
= 28, C2: r =
.57 N = 29

-

C2: r =
-.49 N
= 27.5,
C3: r =
-.51 N
= 27.5,
C4: r =
-.46 N
= 27.5
r = -.29
N=
31.5

-

Sanna, Schwarz,
& Stocker
(2002)
Sanna, Schwarz,
& Stocker
(2002)
Sanna &
Schwarz (2003)

1

J

Thoughts of other outcomes

N

2

10

2

J

Thoughts of other outcomes

A

2

10

1

J

Thoughts about how
homecoming game might
have turned out differently

B

4

12

Sanna &
Schwarz (2004)

1

J

Things that might lead you
to do well on exam

B

3

12

Scarnier (2007)

2

D

Times controlled child’s
behavior

A

2

8

Shockley (2013)

7

D

Times things went well
when stuck with tradition or
routine

N

2

6

Schwarz et al.
(1991)

1

J

(C1) Assertive
(C2) Unassertive

A

6

12

Schwarz et al.
(1991)

2

J

(C1) Assertive
(C2) Unassertive

A

6

12

Self-rated
Assertivenes
s

N

Schwarz et al.
(1991)

3

J

(C1, C3) Assertive
(C2, C4) Unassertive

A

6

12

Self-rated
Assertivenes
s

C3/C4
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Probability
of other
outcome
Probability
of other
outcome
Difference
between
actual and
predicted
Study
Completion,
Success
Likelihood
Control
(over ability
to influence
child’s
behavior,
other
individuals
can control
their
children
better)
Resistance
to Change
Scale;
feelings of
sticking with
tradition
Self-rated
Assertivenes
s

N

r = .51, N =
34

-

N

r = .49, N =
40

-

C2

C1: r = .57, N
= 25

C2: r =
-.21, N
= 28

N

-

-

N

r = .01, N =
124

-

N

r = .05, N =
47

-

N

C1: r = .35 N
= 20,
C2: r = .66, N
= 20
C1: r = .17 N
= 79,
C2: r = .21, N
= 79
C1: r = .33 N
= 19.5,

-

-

C3: r =
-.28 N
= 19.5,

C2: r = .39, N
= 19.5
Silvera et al.
(2005)

2

J

Categories of potential
causes of failure

N

2

8

Simonsohn,
Simmons, &
Nelson (2011)
Sinclair &
Carlsson (2013)

1

U

(C1) Assertive/ (C2)
Unassertive

N

6

12

1

J

Typical things done for
boys/girls, things done
where felt capable

A

2

10

Sinha &
Naykankuppam
(2013)
Sinha &
Naykankuppam
(2013)

1

J

Tourist spots in England

A

1

7

2

J

Company that makes digital
cameras

A

1

7

Sinha &
Naykankuppam
(2013)

3

J

Painters

A

1

Spielmann,
MacDonald, &
Wilson (2009)

3

J

B

Stephens (2007)

1

D

People within their social
networks with whom they
could imagine developing a
relationship
Behaviors associated with
(C1) AD (C2) HR

Stocker (2006)

3

D

Positive (C1, C3) or
Negative (C2, C4) Thoughts
about my (C1, C2) or
others’ (C3, C4)
relationships

Likelihood
of all other
problems
Self-rated
Assertivenes
s
Occupationa
l preference

N

r = .28, N =
76

N

Willingnessto-pay for
trip
Purchase
likelihood

N

C1: r = -.13 N
= 24, C2: r =
-.20 N = 22
r = .13, N =
85; r = -.28,
N = 73; r =
.06, N = 59; r
= .004, N =
54
r = .44, N =
47.33

N

r = .46, N =
36; r = .50, N
= 36

4

Willingnessto-pay

N

r = .50, N =
44.50; r =
.50, N =
44.50

2

10

Emotional
attachment
to ex-partner

N

r = .28 N =
40.5

N

3

12

N

B

5

25

Likelihood
difference
score
Modified
Investment
Model Scale
(IMS)

C1: r = .14 N
= 59, C2: r =
.02 N = 60
C1: r = -.02,
N = 48.5; C2:
r = .27, N =
48.5; C3: r =
.11, N = 48.5;
C4: r = .08, N
= 48.50
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N

N

C4: r =
-.33, N
= 19.5
r = -.19,
N = 86
-

-

r = -.32,
N=
47.33
r = -.11,
N = 36;
r = -.58,
N = 36
r = -.55,
N=
44.50; r
= -.05,
N=
44.50
r = -.21
N=
40.5
-

-

Stone &
Fernandez
(2011)
Thorisdottir &
Jost

1

J

Distinct times in last year
when spent time in sun but
did not wear sunscreen
Instances in which they felt
threatened

A

2

8

Sunscreen
acquisition

N

r = .37 N =
45

r = -.31
N = 45

1a

J

N

3

12

Threatened
feeling

N

-

r = -.22,
N = 48

Thorisdottir &
Jost
Tormala, Petty,
& Brinol (2002)

1b

J

Instances in which they felt
threatened
Reasons against
comprehensive exams

N

3

12

N

-

N

2

8

N

r = .25, N =
57

r = -.26,
N = 50
r = -.26,
N = 57

J

Positive thoughts about
comprehensive exams

N

2

8

N

r = .25, N =
60.5

r = -.20,
N=
60.5

3

J

Positive thoughts about
comprehensive exams

A

2

10

N

-

-

Tormala, Falces,
Brinol, & Petty

1

J

Positive thoughts about
comprehensive exams

N

2

10

N

r = .44, N =
28

-

Tormala, Falces,
Brinol, & Petty

2

J

Negative thoughts about
comprehensive exams

N

2

10

N

r = .34, N =
38

-

Tormala, Falces,
Brinol, & Petty

3

J

Assertiveness

A

2

10

N

r = .23, N =
74

-

Tormala, Falces,
Brinol, & Petty

4

J

Positive thoughts about
comprehensive exams

N

2

10

N

r = .34, N =
43

-

Tsai & McGill
(2011)

1

J

Reasons for preferring one
camera over another for

A

2

10

perceived
threat
Attitude
towards
senior
comprehensi
ve exams
Attitude
towards
senior
comprehensi
ve exams
Attitude
towards
senior
comprehensi
ve exams
Attitude
towards
comprehensi
ve exams
Attitude
towards
comprehensi
ve exams
Self-rated
Assertivenes
s
Attitude
towards
comprehensi
ve exams;
confidence
Choice
confidence

1

J

Tormala, Petty,
& Brinol (2002)

2

Tormala, Petty,
& Brinol
(2002)*

N

C1: r = .42 N
= 44.5, C2: r

-
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Tsai & McGill
(2011)

3

J

Tsai & Thomas
(2011)

2

J

Tybout et al.
(2005)

1

J

Tybout et al.
(2005)

2

J

Tybout et al.
(2005)

4

Unkelbach &
Plessner (2007)

(C1) low or (C2) high
construal
Reasons for preferring one
movie over another; (C1,
C3) low or (C2, C4) high
construal with (C1, C2) no
attribution or (C3, C4)
attribution
Reasons for donating in
support of polar bears; (C1)
abstract or (C2) concrete
Reasons to drive a
Hyundai/BMW

= .25 N =
44.5
C1: r = .34 N
= 29.5, C2: r
= .37 N =
29.5

A

2

8

Choice
confidence

C3/C4

A

2

8

Donation
amount

N

A

1

10

Product
evaluation

N

r = .32, N =
49.5

r = -.29,
N=
49.5

Reasons to drive a (C3)
Saab/(C1) Hyundai/ (C2)
BMW

A

1

10

Product
evaluation

N

C1: r = .30, N
= 34.3
C2: r = .40, N
= 34.3

C3: r =
-.46, N
= 34.3

J

Reasons to drive a BMW

N

1

10

Product
evaluation

N

r = .15, N =
20.5

r = -.05,
N=
20.5

2

J

Reasons (C1) for/ (C2)
against sports-stadium

A

2

6

Preference

N

-

Vastfjall, Peters,
& Slovic (2008)

2

J

N

2

6

Risk
perception

N

Vaughn (1998)

1

D

Major natural disasters that
occurred in world in last
100 years
Assertive/Unassertive

C1: r = .19 N
= 30, C2: r =
.38 N = 27
r = .45, N =
89

A

3

8

Self-rated
Assertivenes
s

N

r = .28, N =
40; r = -.20,
N = 40

Vaughn (1998)

2

D

Positive things seen in
Detroit

A

3

7

N

r = .06, N =
55

Vaughn (1998)

3

D

Positive things seen in
Detroit

A

3

9

Desire to
live in
Detroit
Evaluation
of Detroit

r = .35,
N = 40;
r = 0, N
= 40
r = -.49,
N = 50

N

r = -.36, N =
29

R = .24,
N = 30
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C3: r =
-.09 N
= 32.5,
C4: r =
0N=
32.5

-

Vaughn (1999)

1

J

Things that you doing to
improve chances of getting
good grades on finals: (C1)
hard + start, (C2) hard +
end, (C3) easy + end, (C4)
easy + start

A

3

8

Self-efficacy

N

C1: r = .25, N
= 43.75

Vaughn &
Weary (2002)

1

J

A

2

5

Likelihood
judgment

N

C1: r = .11 N
= 45, C2: r =
-.04 N = 50

Von Helversen
et al. (2008)

1

J

Reasons event would
happen to them, personally;
(C1) no dysphoria or (C2)
dysphoria
Arguments in favor of
public transit

A

4

12

N

r = .46, N =
20

-

Von Helversen
et al. (2008)

2

J

(C1) Assertive/ (C2)
Unassertive

A

4

11

Attitude
about public
transport
Assertivenes
s

N

-

Walton & Cohen
(2007)*

1

J

A

2

8

Sense could
fit in and
succeed

N

Walton & Cohen
(2007)*

F

J

Friends who had personal
characteristics that would
make them likely to fit in at
the school’s CS department
Skills in domain

C1: r = .40 N
= 24, C2: r =
.28 N = 24
-

A

2

8

N

-

-

Walton & Cohen
(2007)*

P

J

A

2

8

N

-

-

Wänke, Bless, &
Biller (1996)

1

J

Friends who had personal
characteristics that would
make them likely to fit in at
the school’s CS department
Reasons (C1) for/ (C2)
against public transit

Sense could
fit in and
succeed
Sense could
fit in and
succeed

A

3

7

N

C1: r = .35 N
= 35, C2: r =
.12 N = 32

-

Wänke, Bohner,
& Jurkowitsch
(1997)

1

J

Reasons to (C1, C3) drive/
(C2, C4) not to drive BMW
with (C1, C2) actual or (C3,
C4) anticipated experience

A, N

1

10

Confidence;
attitude
towards
using public
transporatio
n
BMW
Evaluation;
Mercedes
Evaluation;
Direct
preference

N

C1: r = .28 N
= 38, C2: r =
.47 N = 25,
C3: r = .45 N
= 42, C4: r =
.44 N = 55

-
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C2: r =
-.01, N
= 43.75,
C3: r =
.08, N =
43.75,
C4: r =
-.07,
43.75
-

-

Weaver,
Vandello, &
Bosson (2013)

2

J

Specific behaviors meeting
cultural ideals for real man

B

2

10

Masculinity;
private (C1)
versus
public (C2)

N

C1: r = .34, N
= 38 C2: r =
.13, N = 35

-

Wehr (2010)*

1

J

A

1

5

Social Skill

N

-

-

Wehr (2010)

2

J

B

1

5

J

A

2

6

r = .18 N =
46, r = .14 N
= 46
r = .39, N =
68

-

1a

Weick &
Guinote (2008)

2

J

Leisure events

A

2

10

Coping
confidence,
serious
Attitude
towards
sending
humans to
Mars
Leisure time
satisfaction

N

Weick &
Guinote (2008)

Autobiographical situations
which were typical problem
episodes or exceptions
Autobiographical situations
which were typical problem
episodes or exceptions
Arguments in favor of
sending humans to Mars

N

r = .30, N =
41.5

Weick &
Guinote (2008)

3

J

Attributes on which men
and women differ

B

2

12

N

r = .24, N =
66

Weick &
Guinote (2008)

4

J

Arguments in favor of new
identification card

A

3

7

N

r = .10, N =
64

r = -.10,
N = 64

Winkielman,
Schwarz, &
Belli (1998)
Winkielman &
Schwarz (2001)

1

J

Events experienced when 57 or 8-10 years old

A

4

12

N

r = .34, N =
48

-

1

J

N

4

12

N

(C1) r = .19
N = 179, (C2)
r = .03 N =
179

-

Woltin,
Corneille, &
Yzerbyt (2014)
Woltin,
Corneille, &
Yzerbyt (2014)

1

J

Events experienced when 57 or 8-10 years old; (C1)
pleasant childhood difficult
to remember / (C2)
unpleasant childhood
difficult to remember
Assertive

Stereotypica
lity;
percentage
estimate
Attitude
toward new
identificatio
n card
Judged
childhood
memory
Childhood
pleasantness

r = -.28,
N=
41.5
r = -.21,
N = 66

A

4

10

N

r = .32, N =
74

-

2

J

Creative

A

2

6

Self-rated
Assertivenes
s
Self-rated
Creativity

C2

C1: r = .35, N
= 44

C2: r =
-.19, N
= 41
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N

r = .09,
N = 68

Woltin,
Corneille, &
Yzerbyt (2014)
Woltin,
Corneille, &
Yzerbyt (2014)
Woltin,
Corneille, &
Yzerbyt (2014)
Woltin,
Corneille, &
Yzerbyt (2014)
Wood (2010)

3

J

Creative

A

2

6

Self-rated
Creativity

N

r = .43, N =
48

r = .04,
N = 47

4

J

Assertive

A

2

8

N

r = .17, N =
59

r = -.19,
N = 62

5

U

Extraversion/lack of
extraversion

A

2

5

Self-rated
Assertivenes
s
Self-rated
Extroversion

N

r = .38, N =
63

r = -.04,
N = 63

6

U

Creative

A

2

6

Self-rated
Creativity

N

r = -.09, N =
75.5

5

J

Big changes going on in life
right now

N

2

8

Choice of
snack

N

r = .15, N =
240

r = -.10,
N=
75.5
-

Yahalom &
Schul (2013)

1

J

Assertive

N

4

10

N

r = .27, N =
43.3

Yahalom &
Schul (2013)

2

J

Assertive

A

4

10

N

r = .40, N =
40

r = -.29,
N=
43.3
r = .02,
N = 40

Yahalom &
Schul (2013)

3

J

Assertive

A

4

10

N

r = .36, N =
59

r = -.17,
N = 59

Yeager &
Krosnick (2002)

1

U

(C1) Assertive/ (C2)
Unassertive

A

6

12

Self-rated
Assertivenes
s
Self-rated
Assertivenes
s
Self-rated
Assertivenes
s
Self-rated
Assertivenes
s

N

-

Yeager &
Krosnick (2010)

2

U

(C1) Assertive/ (C2)
Unassertive

A

3

12

N

Yeager &
Krosnick (2012)

3

U

(C1) Assertive/ (C2)
Unassertive

A

3

12

Self-rated
Assertivenes
s
Self-rated
Assertivenes
s

Yeager &
Krosnick (2012)

4

U

(C1, C3) Assertive/ (C2,
C4) Unassertive

(C1,
C2) B,
(C3,
C4) A

3

12

Self-rated
Assertivenes
s

N

C1: r = -.016
N = 674, C2:
r = .07 N =
623
C1: r = .03 N
= 404, C2: r =
.07 N = 373
C1: r = .04 N
= 1532, C2: r
= -.02 N =
1579
C1: r = .003
N = 517, C2:
r = -.02 N =
522, C3: r =
.04 N = 526,
C4: r = .04 N
= 540
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N

-

-

-

Yeager &
Krosnick (2013)

5

U

(C1, C3) Assertive/ (C2,
C4) Unassertive

(C1,
C2) B,
(C3,
C4) A

3

12

Self-rated
Assertivenes
s

N

Yeager &
Krosnick (2013)

6

U

(C1) Assertive/ (C2)
Unassertive

A

3

12

Self-rated
Assertivenes
s

N

Yoke (2009)

2

D

A

6

12

2

J

A

1

8

3

J

A

1

8

4

J

A

1

8

Math
interest
Product
Evaluation
Product
Evaluation
product
evaluation

N

Zhao, Hoeffler,
& Dahl (2012)
Zhao, Hoeffler,
& Dahl (2012)
Zhao, Hoeffler,
& Dahl (2012)

Well-known successful
same-sex role models
Activities could do with X1100
Activities could do with X1100
Activities could do with Z500

N
N
N

C1: r = .06 N
= 772, C2: r =
-.05 N = 727,
C3: r = .10 N
= 817, C4: r =
-.05 N = 776
C1: r = -.01 N
= 108, C2: r =
-.04 N = 110

-

r = .19, N =
79
r = .32, N =
43
r = .28, N =
55
r = .38, N =
55

-

-

r = -.07,
N = 41
r = -.01,
N = 58

Notes: Positive effect sizes reflect results in line with the predictions of the original ease-of-retrieval result; for example, generating more arguments in favor of a
position yields less support in subsequent dependent measures for that position. Negative effect sizes reflect reversals of those predicted effects.
* indicates study was not included in the final analysis due to exclusion due to statistical insufficiency.
1J = Journal, D = Dissertation, U = Unpublished
2 B=Before, A=After, N=None
3 N = None
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Table B2. List of studies using a few-versus-many manipulation in the database – distal effect sizes.
Paper

Exp

Sourc
e1

Topic Retrieved

Difficulty
Question2

Few

Man
y

DV

Misattribution3

XY Std

Alter &
Balcetis (2010)

3

J

Reasons NY (C1) vibrant
and exciting/ (C2) dirty
and dangerous

N

2

10

N

C1: r = .32, N
= 30, C2: r =
.41, N = 30

Avnet (2005)

2

D

Times correct in trusting
feelings: (C1) pleasant or
(C2) unpleasant

N

2

10

Subjective
Distance
from
Princeton to
New York
City
Book
Ratings

N

C1: r = .19 N
= 26.5, C2: r
= .56 N =
26.5

Avnet, Pham, &
Stephen (2012)

2

J

A

2

10

3

J

A

2

10

Attitude
towards
reading
Ratio Bias

N

Avnet, Pham, &
Stephen (2012)
Avnet, Pham, &
Stephen (2012)

N

C1: r = .11 N
= 26, C2: r =
.48 N = 26
r = ., N = 97

4

J

Times correct in trusting
feelings for (C1) pleasant
or (C2) unpleasant
Times correct in trusting
feelings
Times correct in trusting
feelings

N

2

10

N

r = .18 N = 37

Avnet, Pham, &
Stephen (2012)

5

J

A

2

10

N

C1: r = .31 N
= 26, C2: r =
.49 N = 31

Avnet, Pham, &
Stephen (2012)

6

J

A

2

10

N

C1: r = .36 N
= 42, C2: r =
.05 N = 49

Bartels &
Urminsky
(2011)

3

J

Times correct in trusting
feelings: (C1, C2) low
relevant or (C3, C4) high
relevance for (C1, C3)
pleasant or (C2, C4)
unpleasant
Times correct in trusting
feelings: (C1, C2) no load
or (C3, C4) load for (C1,
C3) pleasant or (C2, C4)
unpleasant
Reasons identity would
remain stable

Acceptance
of 20%
share of pie
in
Ultimatum
Game
Recommen
dation of
whether
friend
should meet
their target
Evaluations
of
nonfiction
book

B

2

12

Discount
factor

N

r = .32, N =
97
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Bartels &
Urminsky
(2011)
Beck (2004)

4

J

Reasons identity would
remain stable

B

2

12

3

D

N

3

7

Beck (2004)

4

D

(C1) Successful/ (C2)
unsuccessful metamemory
judgments
Reasons would or would
not be successful

N

2

6

Carter & Sanna
(2008)

2

J

(C1) Direct/ (C2) indirect
self-presentation strategies

B

3

12

Caruso et al.
(2011)

1

U

Everyday purchases

B

2

6

Cheng (2005)

3

D

Good things about being
an Asian American

N

3

12

Crescioni
(2012)

1

D

Stressors

B

3

12

Cutright,
Bettman, &
Fitzsimons
(2013)

1

J

Things in life over which
have complete control

N

2

10

Cutright,
Bettman, &

3

J

Things in life over which
have complete control

N

2

10
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Discount
factor;
impatience
Predicted
success

Valence of
metamemor
y
assessments
Subjective
N
Distance
Satisfaction
with
personal
finances
Bicultural
Identity
Integration
Scale-Pilot
Version;
Distance
Scale;
Conflict
scale
Combined
persistence
(attempts
and time
spent on
puzzle)
Attitude
favorability
towards
brand
extension;
perceived
control
Likelihood
of

N

N

r = .28, N =
71

N

C1: r = .0 N =
26, C2: r =
.41 N = 26
r = .11, N =
51

N

C1: r = .48 N
= 16, C2: r =
.59 N = 16
-

-

r = .09,
N = 51

N

r = .07, N =
108

-

N

r = .37, N =
38

-

N

r = .35, N =
59

-

N

r = .53, N =
46.5

r = .11,
N=
46.5

Fitzsimons
(2013)
Ehrlinger
(2004)
Eibach, Libby,
& Gilovich
(2003)
Etkin & Ratner
(2013)

9

D

Reasons might lose money
with investment
Things about you changed
since high school

B

3

12

4

J

B

3

12

4

J

(C1, C2) Similarities/ (C3,
C4) Differences in protein
bars for (C1, C3)
temporally near or (C2,
C4) temporally far

N

2

10

Fuller,
McIntyre, &
Oberleitner
(2013)

1

J

Instances of (C1) success/
(C2) failure

A

3

9

Gawronski
(2003)

3

J

Counterarguments to (C1,
C2) pro/ (C3, C4) con for
(C1, C3) having freedom
or (C2, C4) not

N

2

7

Gawronski &
Bodenhausen
(2005)
Gawronski &
Bodenhausen
(2005)

1

J

(C1) Liked/ (C2) Disliked
African Americans

A

3

2

J

A

Gawronski &
Bodenhausen
(2005)

3

J

Disliked African
Americans (C1) response
compatibility (C2)
stimulus compatibility
Women considered strong
(C1) response
compatibility (C2)
stimulus compatibility

A

considering
extension
Overconfide
nce
External
world
change
Motivation
to pursue
fitness goal

N
N

N

Performance
on trivial
pursuit;
comparative
ability
assessment;
performance
perception
Attitude
attribution

N

10

Implicit
prejudice

N

3

10

Implicit
prejudice

N

3

10

Implicit
stereotyping

N
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N

r = .33, N =
33
r = .25, N =
80

-

C1: r = .16 N
= 37.75, C2:
r = .17 N =
37.75, C3: r
= .28 N =
37.75, C4: r
= .12 N =
37.75
C1: r = .40 N
= 20, C2: r =
.33 N = 21

-

C1: r = .11 N
= 19.75, C2:
r = .35 N =
19.75, r =
.35 N =
19.75, r =
.34 N =
19.75
C1: r = .32 N
= 18, C2: r =
.59 N = 17
C1: r = .51 N
= 21

-

C1: r = .34 N
= 31

-

-

-

C2: r =
-.40 N
= 22
C2: r =
-.34 N
= 32

Gawronski &
Bodenhausen
(wp)
Gawronski &
Bodenhausen
(wp)
Gershoff,
Mukherjee, &
Mukhopadhyay
(2008)
Greifeneder et
al. (2011b)

1

U

African American
individuals whom they
particularly disliked
Strong women they
particularly disliked

B

5

12

Implicit
Prejudice

C2

C1: r = .39,
N = 24

2

U

3

B

5

12

Implicit
Stereotyping

C2

C1: r = .41,
N = 22

J

Things liked about movie

A

3

8

False
Consensus

N

r = .34, N =
103

1

J

A

2

4

Trusting
Behavior

N

C1: r = .29 N
= 30

C2: r =
-.25, N
= 30

Greifeneder et
al. (2011b)

2

J

A

1

3

Trusting
behavior

N

C1: r = .34 N
= 27.5

C2: r =
-.13 N
= 27.5

Haddock
(2004)

2

J

A

1

6

Temporal
bias

N

C2: r = .24,
N = 43.5

C1: r =
-.29, N
= 43.5

IJzerman &
Semin (2010)
IJzerman &
Semin (2010)
IJzerman &
Semin (2010)
Janiszewski,
Lichtenstein, &
Belyavsky
(2008)

2

J

Aspects of trust game
seeming unfair as senders
(C1) low uncertainty (C2)
high uncertainty
Aspects of trust game
seeming unfair as senders
(C1) low uncertainty (C2)
high uncertainty
Reasons how (C2)
personally made event
happen/ (C1)other people
and external factors made
event happen
Similarities

A

3

10

N

-

3

J

Similarities

N

3

10

N

-

4

J

Differences

N

3

10

N

-

3

J

Bike feature/place to use
the bike; (C1) intermediate
offer, (C2) premium offer,
or (C3) standard offer

A

1

3

Ambient
temperature
Ambient
temperature
Ambient
temperature
Transaction
commitment

N

C1: r = .17,
N = 56

Keller & Bless
(2005)

1

J

(C1) Stereotypic/(C2)
non-stereotypic personal
experiences

B

2

5, 6

N

C1: r = .27 N
= 43, C2: r =
.18 N = 43

Kennedy
(2008)

1

D

Reasons why academic
event was

B

3

12

Emotional
intelligence
test
performance
Inevitability
rating

r = .28,
N = 50
r = .25,
N = 70
r = .39,
N = 36
C2: r =
-.24 N
= 63,
C3: r =
.03 N =
55
-

N

C1: r = -.12
N = 52
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C2: r =
-.28, N
= 24
C2: r =
-.19, N
= 24
-

C2: r =
-.22 N
= 52

Kennedy
(2008)

2

D

Lee (2005)

1

J

Lee, Amir, &
Ariely (2009)

3

J

Ling (2009)

3

D

Ling (2009)

7

Ling (2009)

positive/negative in (C1)
first or (C2) 3rd person
Reasons about why
performed in low
percentile (C1) first or
(C2) 3rd person
Benefits or difficulties of
work
Times correct in trusting
feelings

B

3

12

A

2

6

N

2

10

Instances of optimistic
thinking

N

2

8

D

Instances of optimistic
thinking

N

2

8

8

D

Instances of optimistic
thinking

N

2

8

Min & Arkes
(2012)

1

J

Wedding planning steps

A

2

5

Min & Arkes
(2012)

2

J

Class assignment planning
steps; (C1) pessimistic or
(C2) optimistic

A

2

5
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(Hindsight
Judgment)
Anticipated,
Expected
(Hindsight
Judgments)
Possible
selves
Number of
transitivity
violations
Purchase
decision;
motivation
Exercise
intention

N

C1: r = .06 N
= 26.5

C2: r =
-.10 N
= 26.5

N

r = .30 N =
79.5
r = .20, N =
101

-

N

N

r = .27, N =
76.5

N

r = .26, N =
38.75; r =
.43, N =
38.75

Willingnessto-pay

N

r = .10, N =
48.50; r =
.33, N =
48.50

Optimistic
bias
(predicted
minus actual
completion
times);
accuracy
Optimistic
bias
(predicted
minus actual
completion
times);
accuracy

N

r = .19, N =
103

N

C1: r = .17 N
= 36, C2: r =
.39 N = 39

r = .03,
N=
101
r=.15, N
= 76.5
r = .18,
N=
38.75; r
= -.17,
N=
38.75
r=.29, N
=
48.50; r
= .08,
N=
48.50
-

-

Min & Arkes
(2012)

3

J

Steps of planning; (C1)
ease is bad or (C2) ease is
good

A

2

8

Optimistic
bias
(predicted
minus actual
completion
times);
accuracy
Cooperative
Behavior

N

C1: r = .26 N
= 60, C2: r =
.16 N = 58

-

Müller et al.
(2010)

1

J

Unfair aspects of
negotiation procedure

B

2

4

N

r = .29, N =
51

Store
favorability
Overall
attitude
towards
group
Prediction
accuracy

N

r = .48, N =
100
r = -.03, N =
104

r=.31, N
= 51
-

Ofir et al.
(2008)
Park (2009)

1b

J

A

2

5

1a

D

Number of low-priced
products sold at store
What another person
would say during
conversation

A

4

15

Pham, Lee, &
Stephen (2012)

1

J

Times correct in trusting
feelings

N

2

10

N

r = .10, N =
231

-

Pham, Lee, &
Stephen (2012)

2

J

N

2

Pham, Lee, &
Stephen (2012)
Pham, Lee, &
Stephen (2012)
Pham, Lee, &
Stephen (2012)
Pham, Lee, &
Stephen (2012)
Redden &
Galak (2012)

4

J

N

5

J

6

J

8

J

2

J

Times correct in trusting
feelings, Times searching
for info on Google
Times correct in trusting
feelings
Times correct in trusting
feelings
Times correct in trusting
feelings
Times correct in trusting
feelings
Last times heard favorite
song

10

Prediction
accuracy

N

r = .27, N =
85.5

2

10

N

N

2

10

N

2

10

N

2

10

N

2

6

r = .19, N =
134
r = .11, N =
204
r = .23, N =
52
r = .37, N =
116.67
r = .22, N =
200.67

Thoughts about (C1)
outcome/ (C2) alternative

B

2

10

Reasons for (C1)
successful/ (C2)
unsuccessful task
completion
Times worse off
financially

B

5

15

Prediction
accuracy
Prediction
accuracy
Prediction
accuracy
Prediction
accuracy
Choice of
favorite
song
Subjective
temporal
distance
Subjective
temporal
distance

r=.03, N
= 85.5
-

Sanna, Chang,
& Carter (2004)

3

J

Sanna, Parks,
Chang, &
Carter (2005)

3

J

Sharma et al.
(2014)

2

J

N

2

10

Dishonesty
rate

N

141

N

N
N
N
N

N

N

-

-

C1: r = .66 N
= 20, C2: r =
.69 N = 20
C1: r = .51 N
= 20, C2: r =
.57 N = 20

-

r = .28, N =
50

-

-

Sharma et al.
(2014)

2pil
ot

J

Times worse off
financially, Assertive

A

2

10

Sharma et al.
(2014)

4

J

Times worse off
financially

N

2

10

Sharma et al.
(2014)
Stephen &
Pham (2008)

4f

J

N

2

10

1

J

Times worse off
financially
Times correct in trusting
feelings

N

2

10

Stephen &
Pham (2008)

2

J

Times correct in trusting
feelings

N

2

10

Stephen &
Pham (2008)

3

J

Times correct in trusting
feelings

N

2

10

Stephen &
Pham (2008)

pilo
t

J

Times correct in trusting
feelings

N

2

10

Sussman &
Alter (2012)
Thorisdottir &
Jost

4b

J

Recently purchased items

A

3

10

1a

J

Instances in which they
felt threatened

N

3

12

Thorisdottir &
Jost

1b

J

Instances in which they
felt threatened

N

3

12

Weaver,
Vandello, &
Bosson (2013)
Wood (2010)

2

J

B

2

10

5

J

Specific behaviors
meeting cultural ideals for
real man
Big changes going on in
life right now

N

2

8
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Self-rated
Financial
well-being
Mean
sentence
severity
Fairness

N

r = .32, N =
88.5

r = .01,
N=
88.5
-

N

r = 0, N = 96

N

-

Offers in
Ultimatum
Game
Initial offers
in
counteroffer
game
Offer size in
Dictator
Game
Self-rated
Trust in
feelings
Willingnessto-pay
Self-rated
Closedmindedness
(NFC scale)

N

r = .06, N =
187
r = .31, N =
60

N

r = .27, N =
47

-

N

r = .36, N =
58

-

N

r = .36, N =
36

-

N

-

N

r = .14, N =
254
-

Self-rated
Closedmindedness;
perceived
threat
Imminent
payoff
choice
Choice of
snack

N

-

r=.33, N
= 50

N

r = .32, N =
35

r = .03,
N = 38

N

r = .15, N =
240

-

-

r=.04, N
= 48

Zauberman,
Ratner, & Kim
(2009)
Zhao, Hoeffler,
& Dahl (2012)

5

J

(C1) Special/ (C2)nonspecial experiences

N

2

10

4

J

Activities could do with
Z-500

A

1

8

Willingnessto-pay for
Keychain
Choice of
product over
Amazon gift
certificate;
product
evaluation

N

N

C1: r = .16 N
= 112, r =
.10 N = 112
r = .33, N =
55

-

r=.06, N
= 58

Notes: Positive effect sizes reflect results in line with the predictions of the original ease-of-retrieval result; for example, generating more arguments in favor of a
position yields less support in subsequent dependent measures for that position. Negative effect sizes reflect reversals of those predicted effects.
* indicates study was not included in the final analysis due to exclusion due to statistical insufficiency.
1J = Journal, D = Dissertation, U = Unpublished
2 B=Before, A=After, N=None
3 N = None
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APPENDIX C: STANDARD PARADIGM MEDIATION MODERATOR ANALYSES
Table C.1.
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Indirect Effect (a x b) and the Direct Effect (c') Decomposition of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for proximal
standard paradigm.
Moderator

Level

N

Indirect Effect (axb)
Mean Effect
Size (S.E.)1

Range

.032
-.010

Before DV (+1)
After DV (-1)

31

.098 (.024)

112

.118 (.020)

Representativeness
(retrieval target)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

68
75

.069 (.024)
.144 (.022)

Relevance
(judgment task)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

95
48

.095 (.023)
.146 (.029)

Attention

Regression
Coefficient2
Salience Moderators

.015 (.012)

^

Mean Effect
Size (S.E.)1

Regression
Coefficient2

Regression
Coefficient3

-.024 (.015)

-.030

.003

.113 (.026)

.006

-.003

.100 (.029)
.109 (.026)

.023

-.014

.087 (.024)
.137 (.032)

-.036

.102 (.021)
Inference Moderators
*
-.032
^
-.010

Exploratory Methodological Moderators
.011 (.011)
-.009
-.016 (.013)

Year

Total Effect
(c)

Direct Effect (c')

^

-.048

.008

-.004

-.002

-.006

Country

USA (+1)
Non-USA (-1)

78
65

.111 (.026)
.118 (.029)

-.005

.083 (.026)
.130 (.029)

Publication Status

Filedrawer (+1)
Published (-1)

40
103

.085 (.042)
.120 (.022)

-.006

.002 (.039)
.130 (.021)

Number of measures (M)

.020 (.019)

.017

.015 (.019)

-.019

.0002

Number of measures (Y)

-.011 (.017)

-.014

.020 (.018)

.025

.012

.105 (.023)

-.002

Type of dependent
measure
(attitude)

Attitude (+1)
Non-Attitude (1)

119

.100 (.022)

24

.159 (.037)

-.018

.104 (.041)

144

**

-.061

**

-.070

-.021

*

**

Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.
1 Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated
standard errors are reported. Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels.
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers. All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below 10
and the maximum condition index was below 30.
3 The Total Effect is provided as a benchmark
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Table C.2.
Moderator Means and Multiple Regression Results for the Indirect Effect (a x b) and the Direct Effect (c') Decomposition of the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect for distal
standard paradigm.
Moderator

Level

N

Indirect Effect (axb)
Mean Effect
Size (S.E.)1

Range

Mean Effect
Size (S.E.)1

Regression
Coefficient2

Regression
Coefficient3

.019 (.026)

.024

-.027 (.049)

-.017

.045

.119

.169 (.096)
.221 (.106)

-.092

-.005

.228 (.114)
.170 (.091)

.134

-.005

.221 (.026)
.042 (.105)

.102

.072

-.087

-.094

Before DV (+1)
After DV (-1)

15
16

.075 (.045)
.006 (.023)

Representativeness
(retrieval target)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

10
21

-.008 (.029)
.028 (.018)

Relevance
(judgment task)

Self (+1)
Not-Self (-1)

28
3

.018 (.014)
.036 (.105)

Attention

Regression
Coefficient2
Salience Moderators

Inference Moderators
-.15
-.041

Exploratory Methodological Moderators
-.028 (.038)
.038
-.027 (.077)

Year

Total Effect
(c)

Direct Effect (c')

Country

USA (+1)
Non-USA (-1)

26
5

.025 (.010)
-.028 (.030)

-.018

.207 (.074)
.143 (.105)

.054

.055

Publication Status

Filedrawer (+1)
Published (-1)

3
28

.030 (.107)
.018 (.013)

-.065

.063 (.108)
.219 (.026)

.014

-.051

Number of measures (M)

.014 (.039)

-.053

.035 (.062)

.096

.067

Number of measures (Y)

-.006 (.031)

-.019

.063 (.059)

.077

.074

.155 (.089)

-.067

Type of dependent
measure
(attitude)

Attitude (+1)
Non-Attitude (1)

19

.068 (.042)

12

.006 (.024)

.113

.254 (.114)

Note: ^ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001.
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.014

^

1

Sample means and standard errors were computed separately for each level, except for continuous variables for which bivariate regression slopes and associated
standard errors are reported. Bivariate tests were used to determine statistical significance levels.
2 Coefficients are based on a multiple regression that used a two-level model with random intercepts for papers. All variables were standardized. VIFs were all below 10
and the maximum condition index was below 30.
3 The Total Effect is provided as a benchmark
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Essay 2
The Effects of Perceptual and Cognitive Salience on Product Valuations
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ABSTRACT
Decades of research have proposed models of how individuals integrate
information for product judgments. Many findings suggest consumers often do not use
relevant information if it is not accessible (i.e., top of mind) and often use irrelevant
information if it is accessible. Prior research explains these judgments by postulating that
salience (i.e., the amount of attention paid to information) determines whether
information is accessible or not. Yet, this research is silent about the possible effects of
salience on the valuation of accessible information. In contrast, three experiments show
that salience biases valuation, even when information is both accessible and relevant.
These salience biases are shown to originate from both cognitive and perceptual sources.
Further, the authors argue that the temporal dynamics of salience-based biases across
repeated decisions have implications for what processes explain those biases. Cognitive
salience biases were found to decrease with repeated decisions, which is consistent with
self-correcting process explanations. However, perceptual salience biases did not decline
(and directionally increased), which may result from persistent features of a stimulus
display reinforcing these biases.

Keywords: salience, valuation, accessibility, memory, attention
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How do people integrate information when making decisions? Ideally, individuals
should engage in analytical processing: they should focus on information that is relevant
and important , and they should ignore irrelevant information (Chaiken, Liberman, and
Eagly 1989; Hutchinson and Alba 1991; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). However,
research frequently shows that important information is often ignored while irrelevant,
but more salient, information is given substantial weight (Klayman and Ha 1987; Lord,
Ross, and Lepper 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). The result of this contamination
is decisions that are biased (Evans 2008; Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Payne et al.
1993).
In the context of consumer decisions about products and services, information
salience, the amount of attention devoted to an information input, per se, should not
affect valuations, but there is evidence that it does (Carpenter, Glazer, and Nakamoto
1994; Hutchinson and Alba 1991; Towal, Mormann, and Koch 2013). For example,
Carpenter, Glazer, and Nakamoto (1994) showed that irrelevant attributes affect
consumer valuations, even when they are told that the attributes provide no meaningful
benefits. Thus, "mere salience" can clearly affect valuation.
Salience contaminating valuation has an enormous role in consumer behavior as a
piece of the advertising literature. Krugman's (1965) classic analysis of how low
involvement advertising works postulated that advertising seldom overtly persuades
people. Instead, advertising functions "…by shifting the relative salience of attributes
suggested to us by advertising as we organize our perception of brands and products"
(Krugman 1965, p. 353). From our perspective, Krugman's claim is these shifts in
salience change the perceived importance of the attributes, and these changes affect
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product valuation without explicitly persuading the consumer. As compared to the
difficult task of explicit persuasion, building awareness is easy and can be accomplished
by either creative executions or heavy repetition (Dekimpe and Hanssens 1995; Erdem,
Keane, and Sun 2008). Thus, money may not be able to buy love, but it almost certainly
can buy salience.
This paper seeks to update our understanding of how salience effects operate.
Most of the evidence supporting salience effects relies on a categorical model of the
relationship between salience and valuation. Specifically, information is either accessible
(at point b, high salience) or it is not (at point a, low salience), and the accessible
information is either relevant or irrelevant (see Figure 1, panel A). However, this model
is silent about the possible effects of salience on the valuation (v) of accessible
information (see Figure 1, panel B). Instead, in this model there is a simple step function:
inaccessible information at point a (panel B) is not incorporated into the response,
whereas accessible information at point b (panel B) is. In this research, we examine the
extent to which salience contaminates valuation when all information is relevant and
equally accessible (see Figure 1, panels C and D). In Figure 1 panels C and D, both a and
b represent accessible information with relatively less (a) or more (b) salience. These
differences in salience translate into differences in valuation between v(a) and v(b).
This paper makes three contributions. First, we show that salience biases
judgment, even when information is both accessible and relevant. Second, we show that
the source of the salience bias can be either perceptual or cognitive. Perceptual salience
is determined by stimulus-driven and goal-directed processes that direct the consumer's
attention toward specific locations in the physical environment. Cognitive salience is
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determined by the accessibility of information in memory and the mental elaborations of
perceived and recalled information that occur during decision making. Third, we show
that the temporal dynamics of these biases across repeated decisions have implications
for possible explanations of the bias. We find that the cognitive salience bias decreases
with repeated decisions. This decline is consistent with self-correcting process
explanations, and inconsistent with explanations based on polarization or enduring
changes in valuation (discussed in more detail below). Perceptual salience biases did not
decline, and in fact increased slightly, with repeated decisions. Presumably, this is
because the source of perceptual salience biases are characteristics of the stimulus
display, which are always present during decision making.

SALIENCE AND VALUATION

One framework for how salience and valuation interact is an expansion of the
accessibility-diagnosticity model of Feldman and Lynch (1988). Their model postulates
that consumer decision-making relies on two inter-related factors: the accessibility of
informational inputs, and the perceived diagnosticity, or relevance given task goals, of
those inputs. Accessibility is usually defined as the readiness with which an input can be
applied in a task (Higgins 1989). Notably, what is accessible is only a small subset of
what is available to individuals given their goals and the cues in the environment (Estes
1955; McGeoch 1932; Tulving and Pearlstone 1966).
Feldman and Lynch (1988) propose that accessibility and diagnosticity operate in
a memory-based, feed-forward manner. Individuals have some set of accessible
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information based on recency, frequency, or other factors. This information is
subsequently weighted based on its perceived diagnosticity for achieving task-specific
goals. Importantly, all relevant information is not diagnostic because it might apply
equally to all decision alternatives. In this framework, available and diagnostic
information that is not accessible will not be used as an input to judgment unless some
cue in the environment helps retrieve it from memory.
As an example of this feed-forward operation, consider a colleague, Bob, who
stops by your office to ask you if you want him to buy you a candy bar from the café. If
Snickers is not accessible, even if it is or is not diagnostic, you cannot ask Bob to buy a
Snickers for you. If Snickers is accessible, then one of two outcomes may occur. If you
subsequently decide Snickers is not healthy or delicious (not diagnostic), you may ask
Bob to buy you something else or nothing. If you decide Snickers is delicious and
desirable (diagnostic), then you may ask Bob to purchase a Snickers.
As noted earlier, accessibility is a categorical version of salience based on a low
threshold separating sufficient and insufficient salience (see Figure 1A). This feedforward operation is a cornerstone of the hierarchy-of-effects model of consumer
behavior often taught in introductory marketing courses (Figure 2, Barry 1987).
According to this model, information proceeds from becoming salient during steps of
product information acquisition to valuation steps including pre- and post-purchase
evaluations. In this model, the Feldman and Lynch (1988) version of accessibilitydiagnosticity suggests information that is acquired in the salience steps (Awareness of
Need, Identify Products, Get Information about Products) is passed along for evaluation
in the valuation stages (Evaluate Products, Purchase Product, Post-Purchase Evaluation).
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The present paper suggests instead that the process of information becoming salient can
have an impact on product evaluation over and above the implications of the information.
In the next section, we describe the construct of salience in greater detail and propose that
there is an important difference between perceptual and cognitive salience.

PERCEPTUAL AND COGNITIVE SOURCES OF SALIENCE

We define salience psychologically and at a very general level as the amount of
attention devoted to an information input. In doing so we adopt a "textbook" view of
attention (e.g., D'Esposito and Postle 2015; Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun 2013; Purves et
al. 2012).
Salience can emerge from two sources because informational inputs can originate
in the immediate physical environment (i.e., perceptual sources) or in long-term memory
(i.e., cognitive sources). Of the vast array of information that is available in the
environment or in memory, attention filters out most and selects a relatively small
amount for further processing. The information in working memory can, and usually is,
manipulated in some way, including inference and integration. Thus, these manipulations
of information (generally called "thinking and deciding") are also cognitive sources of
information. The contents of working memory are also heavily influenced by goaldirected attention processes, which are sometimes called endogenous or top-down.
However, stimulus-driven attention processes, which are sometimes called exogenous or
bottom-up, can sometimes capture or reorient attention (Carrasco 2011; Corbetta and
Shulman 2002; Corbetta, Patel, and Shulman 2008; Egeth and Yantis 1997; Theeuwes
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2010). We categorize these processes as perceptual salience because they are directing
attention to locations in the physical environment.
As an example of this difference between perceptual and cognitive sources of
salience, consider the car comparison tool from Consumer Reports (see Figure 3). This
tool stacks several car profiles inclusive of attributes side by side for easier comparison.
To illustrate perceptual salience, in Figure 3 the Overall Score row may be more
perceptually salient because it appears at the top of the list, and it is processed first and
longer. In contrast, Predicted Reliability might be less perceptually salient because it
appears in the middle of the list and is processed later, for less time, and competes for
attention with thoughts about the earlier attributes. To illustrate cognitive salience,
imagine an individual has been thinking deeply about her valuation of Predicted
Reliability because she sees that this is the main difference between the Subaru and the
Toyota (and the Jeep has been ruled out based on Overall Score). In this case, although
Predicted Reliability is low in perceptual salience, it would be very high in cognitive
salience because of the internal deliberations devoted to assessing its value.
In our experimental paradigm, we manipulate the perceptual salience of product
attributes by varying their location in a list of attributes. Attributes at the beginning and
end of the list are often found to be more salient, while attributes in the middle of the list
are less salient (e.g., Dayan and Bar-Hillel 2011). We manipulate the cognitive salience
of product attributes by making the tradeoffs between attribute levels easy for one
attribute and hard for all others. Importantly, all attribute information is accessible and
diagnostic, but some attribute information is more salient. The critical empirical question
is the extent to which valuation is biased by differences in perceptual and cognitive
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salience. We expect effects for both types because we believe that activation in working
memory is the primary mechanism of the bias.
In the next section, we describe how different theories of decision biases make
different predictions about the temporal aspects of salience-based biases.

TEMPORAL ASPECTS OF SALIENCE-BASED BIASES

We use a conjoint analysis paradigm in which salience is manipulated between
subjects in an initial phase of product valuations (call the learning phase), and then all
subjects continue making product valuations under identical circumstances (called the
test phase). This allows us to measure salience biases in terms of part-worths (Green et al.
2001; i.e., valuations of each attribute level) and to observe whether an initial salience
bias increases, remains constant, or decreases as subjects repeatedly consider trade-offs
among different attribute levels.
The temporal dynamics of the salience bias has implications for possible
explanations of the effect. Each different temporal dynamic suggests different
psychological mechanisms.
First, if the effect is bolstered over repeated decisions as people continue to make
decisions, then there may be evidence of polarization (Lord et al. 1979). This would be
one class of psychological explanations. That is, as individuals make more decisions,
information made salient initially is maintained in working memory and becomes even
more highly-weighted. Similar to Krugman’s (1965) account of low involvement
advertising, information made salient early on may alter the structure of consumer
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perceptions and cause subsequent evaluations to serve as reinforcing repetitions of that
structure, contributing to "overlearning." This type of carry-forward bias is akin to one
explanation of pioneering advantage. That is, early entrants to a market have a large
market share because they influence the reference point for ideal attribute combinations
that future entrants must consider (Carpenter and Nakamoto 1989).
Second, it is possible that the salience effect persists over time, but does not
strengthen, which would be a different class of psychological explanations. Persistence of
a bias over time in the presence of potentially de-biasing information is the hallmark of
what Arkes (1991; see also Brownstein 2003) called psychophysically based errors that
"result from the nonlinear mapping of physical stimuli onto psychological responses."
Arkes’ examples of such biases included the sunk cost effect (Arkes and Blumer 1985),
buyer-seller asymmetries (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990), and loss aversion
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). A more recent example of persistent biases is resource
slack, which is a persistent belief that one will have greater freedom or availability of
monetary or temporal resources in the future (Zauberman and Lynch 2005).
Finally, the bias may "self-correct" as people continue to make decisions, which
would be a third class of psychological explanations. For example, the endowment effect
is attenuated as people continue to make trades or are given experience with trading over
time (Engelmann and Hollard 2010; List 2003). Several different mechanisms may cause
an attenuation. For example, information made salient may be more fluent than other
information early on, and fluency can bias valuation (Alter and Oppenheimer 2009). As
people make more decisions, information that was originally not as salient is encountered
and becomes just as fluent as the initially salient information, counteracting the bias.
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Anchoring and adjustment may also explain attenuation (Tversky and Kahneman 1974).
Individuals may develop attribute valuations by anchoring their initial valuations at zero
for all attributes, then adjusting faster towards their true values for salient information.
Essentially, salient attributes get a head start. As people make more decisions, they may
finish adjusting valuations towards their true value for all attributes, which would
eliminate the salience bias. Third, a self-inference story may account for salience’s
impact declining over repeated decisions. People may infer that salient information is
more important due to a naive theory (Schwarz 2004). However, if salience decays as
people familiarize themselves with the task, then people may reassess how salient a given
input is, in which case there will no longer be a bias.
Summarizing, the paradigm we use allows us to observe the dynamics of salience
biases. An increasing bias favors polarization-based explanations, a constant bias favors
persistence-based explanations, and a decreasing bias favors self-correcting processes as
explanations.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

We test our model using a conjoint analysis paradigm in which attribute salience
is manipulated across conditions such that some attributes have greater salience. Conjoint
analysis is particularly appropriate for testing our theory because (1) it is widely viewed
and one of the most rigorous and valid methods for assessing valuation (Green et al.
2001; Meissner, Musalem, and Huber 2016) and (2) prior work suggests that stimulus-
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based (bottom-up) factors do not predict choice, but instead, valuation and goal-directed
(top-down) factors drive choice and fixations (Meissner et al. 2016).
We employ a multi-phase paradigm consisting of a learning phase and one or
more test phases. Each phase collects judgments based on a fractional factorial design
that allows valuation estimates (i.e., part-worths) for each of four binary attributes. The
full instructions for Study 1 are included in Appendix A, and a schematic diagram of the
procedure and stimuli is depicted in Figure 4.
Prior to the learning phase, participants read a cover story instructing them to
assume that they are in the market to buy a specific product and then stated willingness to
pay for a series of specific products defined by attribute profiles. For example, one
product category was cars. Participants were given information about four binary
attributes for each car (e.g., MPG, sound system, safety rating, and warranty length). The
attributes were chosen such that most or all participants would agree about which level
was better (e.g., 33 MPG is better than 28 MPG). Participants were then informed about a
general price range for the product (e.g., $16,000-$30,000, with an average of $23,000
for cars). Similar stimuli were used for other products, such as monthly cell phone plans
and Disney Vacation packages (see Table 1).
Hereafter we refer to attributes one, two, three, and four based on their position in
the attribute list from top to bottom on the screen: first, second, third, and fourth,
respectively. For each participant, the semantic identity of each attribute position (i.e.,
MPG, warranty, sound system, rating) was displayed in one of four orders based on a 4x4
Latin square design (Rosenthal and Rosnow 2008). These four orders are a betweensubject factor. Based on prior research, we expect that the first attribute position would be
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more perceptually salient than other positions because it is natural to start at the top
(Anderson 1971; Mantonakis et al. 2009).
In the learning phase, participants were presented four pages with two specific
products per page. Willingness-to-pay judgments were requested for each specific
product. Cognitive salience is manipulated in this phase as a between-subjects factor,
Page Structure (Biased vs. Control; see Figure 5). Within each page in the Biased
condition, within each page only one attribute (the focal attribute) differed between the
two products on the page. This attribute was in the fourth (bottom) position of each
product description in Studies 1 and 2, and the third position in Study 3. The other three
attributes differed across each of four pages in the learning phase, but not within a page.
Even though the willingness-to-pay judgments were distinct, subjects were expected to
realize that the difference between their two judgments on each page should reflect only
their valuation of the focal attribute. Thus, the tradeoff between the levels of this attribute
was very cognitively salient. The tradeoffs between levels of the other levels necessarily
relied on memory (either short term memory for previous judgments or long term
memory for general beliefs about attribute values). Thus, the three non-focal attributes
were less cognitively salient. Consistent with our definition of cognitive salience,
information about a focal attribute should be active in working memory while
information about non-focal attributes should be less so.
In the Control condition, more than one attribute differed on most or all pages,
and the attribute that differed changed from page to page. Thus, cognitive salience should
be more evenly distributed over attribute positions. In this experiment design, perceptual
salience is a main effect of Attribute Position and cognitive salience is primarily an
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interaction between Page Structure and Attribute Position in which the focal attribute is
valued more in the Biased than in the Control condition, and vice versa for non-focal
attributes (see Figure 4).
Importantly, the Page Structure manipulation was achieved using the same eight
product versions, but altering which pairs occurred on the same page in the Biased and
Control conditions. This controls for any effects of product versions (including possible
configural effects of attribute valuations), and the Latin Square design for semantic
identity (i.e., Order) controls for the effects of attribute valuation. Importantly, if there are
no effects of perceptual or cognitive salience, then there should be no effects of Attribute
Position, Page Structure, or their interaction when averaging across Orders. The exact
design of products and orders in the learning phase are shown in Table 2A and 2B.
In the test phases (see Figure 6), participants saw eight pages with one product
version per page, and all participants complete the same tasks. The test phases allow us to
examine the temporal dynamics of the salience manipulations. One to three attributes
differed from page to page (see Table 2C). Participants in both Page Structure conditions
saw the same product versions in the same order; thus, any effects of Attribute Position,
Page Structure, or their interaction are due to the enduring effects of perceptual or
cognitive salience in the learning phase.

STUDY 1: EFFECTS OF COGNITIVE AND PERCEPTUAL SALIENCE ON PARTWORTHS
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In Study 1, we use three different product replicates. Across cars, cell phone
plans, and Disney vacation packages, we predict that calling more attention to the fourth
attribute position, both by perceptual and cognitive salience, will lead that attribute to
have a relatively greater part-worth. However, differences between the Biased and
Control conditions will be due to cognitive salience alone.
If part-worths are unaffected by salience, we should observe the pattern of means
shown in Figure 7A. In this figure, there are no differences among conditions, and each
attribute position has a roughly similar part-worth. Remember, our design
counterbalances the identity of the attributes across orders, so these differences average
out in the marginal means. If cognitive salience influences part-worths, then we should
observe an effect of our manipulation on the Biased condition’s fourth attribute partworth (Figure 7B). However, we should also not see increases in the part-worths of
attribute positions one, two, and three in the Biased condition because attention is not
devoted to those; if anything, attention is directed away from them. Thus, attribute
positions one, two, and three should not have larger part-worths in the Biased condition
and might have smaller part-worths if salience effects are symmetric (i.e., increased
salience increases valuation, and decreased salience decreases valuation).
Further, if perceptual salience influences part-worths, then we should observe
position effects such that the prominent attributes at the top and bottom of the list receive
higher part-worths than attributes in the middle of the list (Figure 7C).
We counterbalance the position of all semantic identities of attributes in our
studies, so if individuals’ ratings reflect their underlying beliefs and preferences, we
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should observe the pattern of results seen in Figure 7A on average. Therefore, the effects
in Figures 7B and 7C are indeed biases.
Method
Participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 774) were randomly assigned to
one cell in a 4 (Order) x 2 (Condition: Biased or Control) x 3 (Product: Cars, Cell Phone
Plans, or Disney) between-subject design. Attribute Position (First, Second, Third,
Fourth) was a within-subjects factor.
Participants completed the basic setup as described in the Experimental Paradigm
section with the design matrix from Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C. Participants saw one of cars,
cell phone plans, or Disney vacation packages. A summary of the attributes for each
product category can be seen in Table 1.
As described in the experimental paradigm section, participants randomly saw
one of four orders of attribute names across the four attribute positions based on a 4x4
Latin square design (Rosenthal and Rosnow 2008).
In Study 1 (only), Biased condition participants also were instructed to be mindful
of how much they valued whatever attribute that would subsequently appear in the fourth
position (referred to by name of the attribute, not position). This "enhanced"
manipulation of salience was removed in Studies 2 and 3. Note that these instructions
directed top-down attention toward the focal attribute and is therefore a manipulation of
cognitive, not perceptual salience. In the Control condition, the instructions merely asked
participants to be mindful of tradeoffs across attributes. Full instructions can be found in
Appendix A.

163

Participants completed sixteen willingness-to-pay judgments: eight in learning
phase with two per page on four pages, and eight in the test phase with one per page on
eight pages. Each judgment was recorded via numerical keyboard entry.
Results
Across both learning and test phases, we predicted that increasing the cognitive
salience of the fourth attribute should a) bolster its part-worth, and b) reduce (or at least
not increase) the relative part-worths of the other attribute positions. To have a
meaningful unit of measure across three product categories, we analyze the combined
data across product categories and across attribute identities in which each product’s partworth is divided by the stated average price in the study (e.g., $23,000 for Cars, $80 for
Cell Phone Plans, and $850 for Disney Vacation Packages; see Table 1) then multiplied
by 100 (i.e., a percent of stated average price scale). In all analyses, we include Order to
control for the valuation differences across the specific identities of the attributes.
The Effect of Cognitive and Perceptual Salience on Valuation. We find evidence
in support of our predictions, as shown in Table 3 and Figure 8. Consistent with our
predicted effect of cognitive salience, the attribute in the fourth position in the learning
and test phases was higher in the Biased condition compared to the Control condition.
Further, this result was not the case for attributes in the first, second, or third positions.
These attributes had directionally smaller part-worths in the Biased condition compared
to the Control condition. As discussed earlier, this pattern is consistent with an effect of
cognitive salience (e.g., compare Figure 7B to Figures 8A and 8B).
Further, the pattern of means reveals a position effect in the average attribute partworths: the first part-worth is larger than the second and the fourth is larger than the third.
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This effect is present in both learning and test phases. As discussed earlier, this pattern is
consistent with an effect of perceptual salience (e.g., compare Figure 7C to Figures 8A
and 8B, especially the Control condition).
Statistical Tests of Effect of Cognitive Salience on Valuation in Learning Phase.
Consistent with our theory, in the learning phase a 4 (Attribute Position) x 2 (Condition:
Biased or Control) x 3 (Product) x 4 (Order) mixed ANOVA revealed that attribute (one,
two, three, or four) interacted with condition (F(3, 750) = 17.88, p < .001).
First, in support of our theory, we found a boost in the attribute four part-worths
in the Biased (M = 6.61) versus Control (M = 3.94; F(1, 750) = 51.54, p < .001)
conditions. However, also consistent with our predictions, this relationship was not the
case for attribute one (MBiased = 5.43, MControl = 5.98, F(1, 750) = 1.86, p = .17), two
(MBiased = 4.50, MControl = 4.81, F(1, 750) = .81, p = .37), or three (MBiased = 3.59, MControl
= 4.00, F(1, 750) = 1.26, p = .26). This pattern of results is consistent with Figure 7C in
which cognitive salience biases valuation.
Statistical Tests of Effect of Cognitive Salience on Valuation in Test Phase. The
same analysis (a 4 (Attribute Position) x 2 (Condition: Biased or Control) x 3 (Product) x
4 (Order) mixed ANOVA) on the test phase yielded another interaction of condition and
attribute (F(3, 750) = 8.17, p < .001; see Figure 8B).
First, in line with our predictions, we found a significant contrast between the
attribute four part-worths in the Biased (M = 5.57) compared to Control (M = 3.88; F(1,
750) = 18.03, p < .001) conditions. However, consistent with our theory, this relationship
was not the case for attribute one (MBiased = 4.46, MControl = 4.65, F(1, 750) = .28, p =
.59), two (MBiased = 3.82, MControl = 4.18, F(1, 750) = 1.10, p = .29), or three (MBiased =
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2.37, MControl = 2.75, F(1, 750) = 1.29, p = .26). The predicted interaction between
attributes 1-3 versus 4 and condition was significant (F(1, 750) = 24.48, p < .001).
Alternative Quantification of Cognitive Salience Results. A different way to
codify the cognitive salience effect (CSE) in the results is to compare the part-worth of
attribute four against the mean of all other attribute part-worths. Because attribute four
(the focal attribute) should be boosted in the Biased but not Control condition, and no
other attributes should see said increase due to the manipulation in the learning phase, the
comparison of attribute four against the other attributes should represent the size of the
effect. We call this index the relative value of the focal attribute, hereafter RVF. Indeed, a
2 (Phase) x 2 (Condition) x 3 (Product) x 4 (Order) ANOVA reveals said index is larger
in the Learning and Test phases for the Biased condition (Learning: F(1, 750) = 53.17, p
< .001; Test: F(1, 750) = 24.48, p < .001; see Figure 8C). In studies 2 and 3 we represent
the cognitive salience effect on this index to simplify the interpretation of the results.
Statistical Tests of Effect of Perceptual Salience on Valuation in Learning Phase.
We also observed an effect of attribute position on our results in the learning phase (F(3,
750) = 23.98, p < .001) that was consistent with perceptual salience effects from being
located in the top and bottom of the attribute list. That is, part-worths were higher for
attributes in the first (M = 5.70) and fourth (M = 5.28) positions compared to the second
(M = 4.65) and third (M = 3.79) positions (F(1, 750) = 56.80, p < .001). We observed
further evidence consistent with the top position bump: the attribute in the first position
had a significant boost over the second attribute (F(1, 750) = 18.18, p < .001), and
attribute four had a bump over attribute three (F(1, 750) = 37.21, p < .001).
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Statistical Tests of Effect of Perceptual Salience on Valuation in Test Phase.
Consistent with perceptual salience’s effects, there were attribute position effects in the
test phase (F(3, 750) = 29.23, p < .001) that supported top and bottom effects. The
contrast pitting the first (M = 4.55) and fourth (M = 4.73) positions against the second (M
= 4.00) and third (M = 2.56) positions was significant (F(1, 750) = 59.95, p < .001).
Further contrasts supported a boost to attribute one over attribute two (F(1, 750) = 5.59, p
= .018) and attribute four over attribute three (F(1, 750) = 72.59, p < .001).
Alternative Quantification of Perceptual Salience Results. Similarly, it is also
possible to codify the perceptual salience results on indices (PSE). The first index, PST,
represents the lift to the top attribute (attribute one) compared to the next attribute
(attribute two). This index is then not confounded with the manipulation of cognitive
salience on attribute four. A 2 (Phase) x 2 (Condition) x 3 (Product) x 4 (Order) ANOVA
reveals this index is positive in both the learning (M = 1.16, SE = .36, t = 3.21, p = .001)
and test phases (M = .47, SE = .34, t = 1.36, p = .17) in the Control condition, and overall
(Learning: M = 1.05, t = 4.26, p < .001; Test: M = .55, t = 2.36, p = .018). We compute a
similar index for the bottom attribute (attribute four) compared to the attribute above it
(attribute 3), hereafter PSB. We also find a positive effect for an alternative index in the
test phase contrasting attributes three and four in the Control condition (M = 1.13, t =
3.03, p = .003). We mainly test this index in the Control condition to ensure the
perceptual salience effects are not confounded by the cognitive salience manipulation.
Discussion
Study 1 demonstrates that increasing the cognitive salience of particular tradeoffs
across attributes in learning phase had a carryover effect on valuation in test phase: part-
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worths for the fourth attribute were higher for the Biased condition relative to the Control
condition. This effect held across various attributes for several products (cars, cell phone
plans, vacation packages), which serves as evidence of the effect’s generalizability.
Further, consistent with perceptual salience influencing valuation, attributes in
positions one (first) and four (last) had increased part-worths compared to the middle
attributes. Attribute one also had a boost over a middle attribute in the Control condition,
showing the effect was not confounded with cognitive salience (i.e., attribute four). We
return to estimating perceptual salience without confounds later in this paper.
However, an argument may be levied against Study 1’s results concerning
whether the instructions were too heavy-handed. The instructions asking participants to
attend to the attribute of interest might have led to demand effects. In Studies 2 and 3 we
remove the heavy-handed instructions to demonstrate the results persist without them.
We also add two more test phases to investigate the temporal dynamics of these salience
effects.

STUDY 2: REPEATED DECISIONS ELIMINATES IMPACT OF COGNITIVE
SALIENCE

In Study 2, we address whether people can overcome the effect of cognitive
salience on valuation by becoming acclimated to the decision environment through
repeated decisions. Given repeated decisions after a focal attribute has been made salient,
there are three possible outcomes. First, people may persist in exhibiting a bias from
salience no matter how many decisions they make (bias constant). Second, people may
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show a stronger bias as more and more decisions are made, which would be consistent
with polarization (i.e., thinking more about attribute four bolsters its part-worth; Lord et
al. 1979). Third, the bias may be self-correcting and decline over time. This decline might
be due to an anchoring and adjustment process, information salience becoming more
even over time (because no new biases are introduced), or self-inference (see the earlier
section on Temporal Aspects of Salience-Based Biases).
To test the temporal dynamics of the effect over repeated decisions, we repeated
the first 16 judgments of the study in a second set of 16 judgments in two additional test
phases. Note that for four binary attributes, there are 16 possible product versions.
Similar to the initial 16 judgments, the second 16 were divided into two sets of eight,
each of which was a fractional factorial of the full set that provided estimates of attribute
part-worths. These two set are referred to as test phases II and III, with test phase I being
the set of eight judgments immediately following the learning phase (i.e., the test phase in
Study 1). As in Study 1, the test phases were the same for participants in the Biased and
Control conditions.
We also handle a potential confound from the previous studies. In those studies,
the learning and test phases always had the same eight products. In this study, we
developed a new set of designs for a Biased and Control condition using the products
from the test phase, and a new test phase using the products from the learning phase. This
counterbalancing ensures our results are not particular to what products individuals see in
the learning phase (of the 16 possible combinations of four attributes). This new design
can be found in Appendix B.
Method
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Participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 823) were randomly assigned to
one cell of a 4 (Order) x 2 (Condition: Biased or Control) x 2 (Learning Stimuli: Original
or New) between-subject design.
Study 2 (along with Study 3) uses the layout shown in Figures 2B and 3B.
Further, in this study (and in Study 3), unlike Study 1, participants used a slider scale to
indicate their responses. This change enables a test that the effect is not restricted to any
particular response modality.
Participants randomly received either the same design matrix as Study 1
(Learning Stimuli: Original condition), or a different design matrix in which the Biased
and Control conditions were constructed using the products from the Study 1 test phase
(Learning Stimuli: New condition). This counterbalancing of what products were used in
learning and test phase reduces the likelihood that our results are influenced by a
confound with product versions.
Participants, in addition to making the initial set of 16 judgments from the
previous studies, also completed two test phases: test phase II, which repeated the
product versions from the learning phase in a different order, and test phase III, which
repeated the product versions from the test phase I in a different order. These phases had
one judgment per page for eight pages each for the eight products.
Results
Tests of Impact of Cognitive Salience. For simplicity, we compute one dependent
measure to illustrate the size of the effect for each phase (learning, test I, test II, and test
III) of the study. As in Study 1, this dependent measure (RVF) examines the percentagesize of each attribute valuation and subtracts the mean of attributes one, two, and three
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from attribute four (i.e., the focal attribute). The estimate of the cognitive salience effect
should be larger in the Biased condition than in the Control condition.
As shown in Figure 9A, consistent with self-correcting process explanation
described earlier, the size of the cognitive salience effect declines monotonically from the
learning phase to test phase III. In the learning phase, the effect is much stronger in the
Biased condition compared to the Control condition. This effect (i.e., the difference
between the Biased and Control conditions) declines for test phase I and test phase II, and
is almost completely attenuated by test phase III. Additionally, the difference between the
size of the effect in Biased and Control appears larger in the learning phase compared to
when the same eight products appear in test phase II. The same pattern holds true for test
phase I and test phase III.
A 4 (Order) x 2 (Condition) x 2 (Learning Stimuli) x 4 (Phase) ANOVA yielded
the critical phase (learning, test I, test II, or test III) by condition (Biased or Control)
interaction of interest (F(3, 807) = 12.99, p < .001), in addition to a main effect of
condition (MBiased = 1.36, MControl = .44; F(1, 807) = 18.44, p < .001). However, this effect
of condition was only significant in Learning (F(1, 807) = 49.09, p < .001), the first test
phase (F(1, 807) = 10.84, p = .001), and the second test phase (F(1, 807) = 8.87, p =
.003), but not the third test phase (F(1, 807) = .63, p = .43). Importantly as well, the
Biased and Control conditions differ in relative magnitude between the learning phase
and its duplication, test phase II (F(1, 807) = 11.53, p < .001), and between test phase I
and its duplication, test phase III (F(1, 807) = 8.70, p = .003). Therefore, we find
evidence that additional judgments in this task are associated with overcoming the nature
of the cognitive salience manipulation.
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Further, the nature of which products were used in the learning or test phase I
(i.e., Original vs. New) did not meaningfully interact with condition (F(1, 807) = .01, p =
.91), and did not exert a main effect either (F(1, 807) = .00, p = .98). We therefore do not
find evidence for any confounds from the specific products used in our design matrix for
the learning phase.
Tests of Impact of Perceptual Salience. A 4 (Phase) x 4 (Order) x 2 (Condition) x
2 (Learning Stimuli) x 4 (Attribute Position) ANOVA revealed similar perceptual
salience effects (PSE) on the index computed from Study 1 (PST, Attribute 1– 2). The
means for each attribute, phase, and condition are in Table 3. Overall, this effect was
directional in learning (M = .25, t = 1.64, p = .10) but was directionally growing across
test phase I (M = .34, t = 2.47, p = .014), test phase II (M = .97, t = 6.18, p < .001), and
test phase III (M = 1.07, t = 7.00, p < .001). In the Control condition, this effect held in
learning (directionally; M = .06, t = .26, p = .79), test I (M = .45, t = 2.28, p = .023, test II
(M = 1.06, t = 4.69, p < .001, and test III (M = 1.18, t = 5.38, p < .001). We also observe
this effect for the comparison between bottom (attribute four) and middle (attribute 3). In
the Control condition, we observed larger part-worths for attribute four compared to three
(PSB) in learning (M = 1.61, t = 7.20, p < .001), test I (M = .61, t = 2.85, p = .005, test II
(M = .78, t = 3.73, p < .001), and test III (M = .83, t = 3.95, p < .001). Therefore,
although the effects of cognitive salience dissipated by the end of the study, we observe
position effects that demonstrate perceptual salience does not totally fade.
Discussion
Study 2 demonstrates that over the course of repeated decisions, the effect of
cognitive salience on valuation declines. In two additional test phases, participants
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exhibited smaller effects of cognitive salience compared to the earlier learning phase and
test phase. Therefore, experience with the stimulus-based environment can help
overcome the impact of the Biased versus Control manipulation. This result is consistent
with self-correction types of explanations. On the other hand, the impact of perceptual
salience from position effects was consistently large throughout the phases, which is
more in line with persistence-based explanations.
However, one criticism may still be levied against Studies 1 and 2: they only
make the fourth attribute salient in the Biased condition. It is possible that the effect may
be limited to that position. We rule out this possibility in Study 3.

STUDY 3: CONCEPTUAL REPLICATION WITH ANOTHER ATTRIBUTE POSITION

We replicate Study 2 in a context in which we switch the design matrix for the
third and fourth attribute positions in the learning phase for the Biased condition, making
the third attribute position focal. That is, in this study, we increase the cognitive salience
of the third attribute by making it the only one to change within a page in the Biased
condition’s learning phase. This switch rule out the alternative explanation that the
cognitive salience effect is an artifact of the attribute of interest being the bottom
attribute.
Method
Participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 630) were randomized into one
cell of a 4 (Order) x 3 (Condition: Biased, Control, or Control*) x 2 (Learning Stimuli:
Original or New) between-subject design.
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The study was the same as Study 2 with for two changes. First, in the learning
phase, we modified the design matrices such that only the third attribute differed between
the two products in the Biased condition. This modification was achieved by flipping the
design matrix (both in the original learning stimuli and modified stimuli) for attributes 3
and 4, and attributes 1 and 2. Participants completed three test phases after the initial
learning phase manipulation just as they had in Study 2.
The second change was that we used a second control condition, Control*, to
address a possible confound in the design matrix in the Control condition that introduced
differences among attribute positions in the number of times they differed on the same
page. These differences might create differences in cognitive salience across attributes.
Comparing CSEs on RVF for each attribute position in the Control and Control*
conditions allows us to examine this possibility. In the Control condition in Study 3, it is
possible that attribute positions 2 and 4 were also less cognitively salient because they
had identical levels (i.e., 28 MPG for each of the two products) on two of the four
learning phase pages, compared to attribute positions 1 and 3, which differed on all four
pages. To rectify this possibility, we constructed a new design matrix using the same
products in which each attribute is constant on exactly two of the four pages. Thus, the
Control* condition provides measures of perceptual salience that are not potentially
confounded with cognitive salience. The set of design matrices used in the learning
phases in Study 3 can be found in Appendix C.
Results
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Tests of Impact of Cognitive Salience. We compute the size of the effect of
cognitive salience on valuation by subtracting the mean (percentage-adjusted) valuation
from attributes one, two, and four from attribute three.
Consistent with Study 2, we found a decline in the size of the cognitive salience
bias (CSE) on RVF when moving from learning phase through test phase III. The two
control conditions had a smaller bias (at least through test phase II) in favor of attribute
three compared to the Biased condition, which had a learning phase that made the third
attribute more cognitively salient.
A 4 (Order) x 3 (Condition) x 4 (Phase) x 2 (Learning Stimuli) ANOVA
confirmed this replication: the size of the effect between Biased and the two Control
conditions declines from learning phase through test phase III (Figure 9B). We drew
contrasts between the Biased and two control conditions in both phases. This result
emerges through an omnibus main effect of condition (MBiased = 1.06; MControl = .383;
MControl* = -.055; F(2, 606) = 7.45, p < .01) that is qualified by the key phase (learning,
test I, test II, test III) x condition interaction (F(6, 606) = 5.17, p < .001). In Study 3, the
contrast between the Biased condition and the two control conditions is significant in the
learning (M = 3.46; F(1, 606) = 26.25, p < .001), first test phase (M = 1.86; F(1, 606) =
8.69, p = .003), and second test phase (M = 1.30; F(1, 606) = 4.11, p = .043), but not in
the third test phase (M = .54; F(1, 606) = .76, p = .384). These results demonstrate the
robustness of our effect and manipulations across attribute positions.
Further, consistent with Study 2, we did not observe any meaningful impact of the
learning stimuli set on our results. It did not significantly interact with the conditions
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(F(2, 606) = 1.08, p = .34), and it did not have a significant main effect (F(1, 606) = .97,
p = .33).
Tests of Impact of Perceptual Salience. We find an effect of perceptual salience
that slightly declines over the learning and test phases in Study 3. This effect can be
codified as an advantage to attributes in more salient positions. Table 3 reports the results
by attribute position within each phase and condition (see also Figures 7B and 7C). This
pattern of means generally support a position-based advantage to the top attribute in a 3
(Condition) x 4 (Order) x 2 (Learning Stimuli) x 4 (Phase) ANOVA. This metric was
directionally positive (favoring a boost to the perceptually salient, top attribute) over
attribute two (PST index) in the Control* condition (learning: M = .66, t = 2.07, p = .039;
test I: M = .71, t = 2.64, p = .009; test II: M = .13, t = .41, p = .68; test III: M = .50, t =
1.64, p = .10) and in the Control condition (learning: M = 1.20, t = 3.52, p < .001; test I:
M = 1.06, t = 3.74, p < .001; test II: M = .35, t = 1.07, p = .29; test III: M = .14, t = .42, p
= .68). However, the index for attribute four’s advantage over attribute three (PSB) was
not consistently positive in the Control* condition (see Table 3).
Discussion
Study 3 provides a replication of our results when the attribute made cognitively
salient the third, not the fourth, position. This result rules out a methodological artifact
that potentially could have been present in Studies 1 and 2, for which we increased the
cognitive salience of the fourth attribute. However, we should note that because the
fourth attribute already receives a boost from perceptual salience, it should be more
difficult to observe an effect on it between the Biased and Control conditions. Therefore,
studies 1 and 2 were more conservative in their testing of cognitive salience.
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SIMULTANEOUS ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECTS OF PERCEPTUAL AND
COGNITIVE SALIENCE

To better address possible overlapping effects of cognitive and perceptual salience
on attribute valuation, we pool the two conditions (Biased, Control) in Study 2 and the
three conditions (Biased, Control, Control*) in Study 3 to test cognitive and perceptual
salience in the same statistical model. This approach serves as an internal meta-analysis
of our studies. We include five conceptual predictors of each individual’s part-worths for
the 4 attribute positions: two for cognitive salience and three for perceptual salience.
These predictors represent the possible causal factors underlying our experimental
manipulations.
For perceptual salience, we include three predictors representing whether an
attribute was in a top, salient position (attribute position one), a bottom-salient position
(attribute position four), or in a middle position (attribute position three). We use attribute
position two as the reference level.
For cognitive salience, we include two predictors indicating two aspects of
manipulations in the Learning Phase. First, “Same Page Variation” represents the number
of pages on which an attribute had varied within the two options in the learning phase. In
the Biased condition, attributes 4 (Study 2) and 3 (Study 3) varied between the two
options on the page for all four pages, and the other three attribute positions did not vary
on the same page. This created two levels of variation in the Biased condition. In the
Control condition for Study 2, attribute positions 2 and 4 varied on all pages and attribute
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positions 1 and 3 varied only on two of four pages. In the Control condition for Study 3,
attribute positions 1 and 3 varied on all pages and attribute positions 2 and 4 varied only
on two of four pages. The Control* condition in Study 3, all four attribute positions
varied on 2 of 4 pages. Second, “Context” represents the extent to which the experimental
manipulation (Biased vs. Control) favored the target attribute over and above the effect of
Same Page Variation. These two variables provide a more refined representation of
cognitive salience. Recall that our initial description of the Biased condition centered
around the large difference between the focal and non-focal attribute positions in that
condition in same page variation. However, we did not discuss the smaller differences in
same page variation that existed in the Control conditions. Thus, these two variables
capture the direct effects of same page variation in all conditions plus context dependent
effects of the Bias manipulation (i.e., same page variation of one attribute position
relative to other positions).
The whole set of contrast codes for the salience variables can be found in
Appendix D. These contrast codes were standardized with a mean of zero and variance of
one to make the estimated regression coefficients more interpretable, and to allow
interactions to be represented by simple products of variables (Irwin and McClelland
2001).
Pooling over each phase we regressed the five aforementioned covariates, a set of
variables representing the attribute identities compared to a reference attribute (here,
MPG), and the interactions of phase with the five covariates. That is, we coded each
phase (-1.5 = Learning, -.5 = Test I, .5 = Test II, 1.5 = Test III), standardized it (mean
zero and variance one), and interacted it with the five main predictors. Attribute position
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was treated as a repeated measure for sixteen measures per person (four part-worths for
each phase for each of four phases). We did not find evidence for collinearity concerns
(maximum VIF under 10, maximum condition index under 30).
The results of the regression pooled across phases is shown in Table 4. Both
cognitive salience variables exhibit large, reliable effects in the early phases and decline
dramatically in the later phases (i.e., negative coefficients on the interaction with phase).
In contrast, the perceptual salience effect for attribute position 1 is positive, large, reliable
and relatively constant across phases (only directionally positive interaction with phase).
Attribute position 4 does not exhibit strong perceptual salience effects (or interactions
across phase, despite being positive), while being in attribute position 3 has a negative
impact (and a directionally positive interaction with phase). These results reinforce the
effects from our studies: cognitive salience increases valuation, but this effect recedes
over repeated decisions, whereas perceptual salience boosts top valuations of attributes in
top positions while hurting those in middle positions.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Prior research on the relationship between salience and valuation has assumed
that salience is categorical (i.e., information is accessible or it is not) and that salience has
no effect on valuation once information is sufficiently salient to be used as an input to
valuation (Feldman and Lynch 1988; Meissner, Musalem, and Huber 2016). We
contribute to the literature by advancing a relationship between salience and valuation in
which salience affects valuation in a graded fashion. Information is not merely salient or
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not. The contamination of salience into valuation can even occur in settings in which
salience varies among accessible decision inputs.
The three studies reported here provide evidence of how salience affects valuation
in a stimulus-based environment. Specifically, we employ a conjoint paradigm to test
how salience may affect valuation. Attributes with greater salience subsequently had
larger part-worths, even when accessibility and relevance were held constant at high
levels.
Further, we demonstrated that salience effects can take two forms: perceptual or
cognitive, both of which affect valuation. Perceptual salience reflects stimulus-based
processes based on the physical environment, which were manipulated in our studies by
attribute position (top, middle, bottom). Cognitive salience refers to which information is
activated in working memory. Cognitive salience was manipulated in our studies during
an initial learning phase by making the comparison of attribute levels easy for some
attributes and difficult for others.
Finally, these studies demonstrate impact of cognitive salience was not
permanent. After repeated decisions, cognitive salience biases declined and were
eventually eliminated. By examining the temporal dynamics of the salience effects over
repeated decisions, we rule out several possible explanations of the effects based on
explanations inconsistent with these results. The observed reduction in the cognitive
salience bias support explanations based on self-correcting mechanisms.
On the other hand, perceptual salience effects were weakly positive over repeated
decisions. However, the psychological interpretation of this result is complicated because
each attribute remained in the same position (e.g., top) throughout the study. Unlike the
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cognitive salience manipulation, the stimulus display reinforced position effects beyond
the learning phase and is necessarily present.
Prior research in the conjoint analysis literature found that the estimated partworths were stable and unaffected by perceptual salience (Meissner et al. 2016). To the
contrary, we demonstrate that manipulations of cognitive and perceptual salience can
exert strong influences on part-worths. In our paradigm, the effects of cognitive salience
decrease over time, but biases due to perceptual salience were more persistent. From a
marketing research perspective, the biases due to cognitive salience could be mitigated by
having people make many judgments and the biases due to perceptual salience could be
mitigated by counterbalancing attribute position for each person across trials. However,
from a consumer behavior perspective, these mitigating factors are seldom present in
real-world situations for which a small number of trade-offs are likely to be considered
and the presentation of attribute information is fixed.
Limitations and Future Research
Two limitations suggest fruitful areas for future research. First, while we pinpoint
a possible set of mechanisms (e.g., anchoring and adjustment, Tversky and Kahneman
1974) that may explain the decline of the cognitive salience effects over repeated
decisions, we do not explicitly favor a lone mechanism. Instead, there is a class of
possible “self-correcting” explanations. Further research may combine analyses of
repeated decisions with other manipulations to isolate specific mechanisms. However,
these results are still useful in ruling out competing explanations (e.g., polarization; Lord
et al. 1979) that have opposing predictions (i.e., increases in salience’s impact over
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repeated decisions). The results also provide a call for other biases to examine their
temporal impact to examine if they are self-correcting or may grow.
Second, while this paper addresses analogs of salience and valuation, it does not
explicitly comment on the debate regarding constructed preferences (Bettman et al. 1998;
Feldman and Lynch 1988). The original Feldman and Lynch (1988) paper commented
more deeply on this topic in contrast with older models of decision-making (Fishbein and
Ajzen 1975). While the present results suggest that temporarily salient information can
affect preferences, which supports the constructionist view, we do not expand as deeply
on that point as other pieces of the framework. However, we find that these temporary
influences subside after repetition.
Concluding Remarks
Ultimately, we demonstrate how salience can affect valuation in a continuous
fashion: information is not merely salient or not. Further, this research proposes two
distinct forms of salience, perceptual and cognitive, that may have distinct effects on
valuation. Finally, we examine the stability of these effects that exist in several realms of
decisions including advertising and marketing research.
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Table 1
ATTRIBUTES USED FOR EACH PRODUCT IN STUDY 1
Product
Attribute
Low Level
High Level
Cars

MPG

28

Cars

Sound System

Basic – 3 speakers, 1
subwoofer

Cars
Cars
Cell Phone Plans
Cell Phone Plans
Cell Phone Plans
Cell Phone Plans
Disney Vacations

Safety Rating
Warranty
Monthly Data
Texts
Minutes
3-way calling
Visit Length
Number of
Disney
Dinners
Hotel quality
Number of
lines skipped
per day
Average Price

3.5 Stars
1 year
1 GB
100
150
Unavailable
3 days

33
Advanced – 9
speakers, 2
subwoofers
4.5 Stars
4 years
3 GB
Unlimited
Unlimited
Available
5 days

0

2

2.5 stars

4 stars

2

3

Low Price

High Price

$23,000
$80
$850

$16,000
$30
$600

$30,000
$130
$1100

Disney Vacations
Disney Vacations
Disney Vacations

Cars
Cell Phone Plans
Disney Vacations
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Table 2A
DESIGN MATRIX FOR LEARNING PHASE OF CONTROL CONDITION
Page
Product
Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

+1
-1
-1
-1
+1
-1
+1
+1

+1
-1
+1
-1
-1
+1
-1
+1

+1
+1
-1
+1
-1
-1
-1
+1

+1
-1
-1
+1
-1
+1
+1
-1

Table 2B
DESIGN MATRIX FOR LEARNING PHASE OF BIASED CONDITION
Page
Product
Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4

4
2
3
6
5
7
1
8

-1
-1
-1
-1
+1
+1
+1
+1

-1
-1
+1
+1
-1
-1
+1
+1

+1
+1
-1
-1
-1
-1
+1
+1

+1
-1
-1
+1
-1
+1
+1
-1

Table 2C
DESIGN MATRIX FOR TEST PHASE FOR BOTH CONDITIONS
Page
Product
Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

+1
-1
+1
+1
-1
+1
-1
-1

-1
+1
+1
+1
-1
-1
-1
+1
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+1
+1
-1
-1
-1
+1
-1
+1

-1
+1
-1
+1
-1
+1
+1
-1

Table 3
MEANS (STANDARD ERRORS) FOR STUDIES 1, 2, AND 3 FOR PARTWORTHS
Attr

Study 1
Biased
Control

Study 2
Biased
Control
Learning Phase
1.69 (.2)
2.5 (.2)
1.3 (.1)
2.4 (.1)
.2 (.2)
1.1 (.2)

1
2
3

5.4 (.3)
4.5 (.2)
3.6 (.2)

6.0 (.3)
4.8 (.3)
4.0 (.3)

4
RVF1
PST2
PSB3

6.6 (.3)
2.1 (.3)
.9 (.3)
3.0 (.3)

3.9 (.3)
-1.0 (.3)
1.16 (.4)
-.06 (.4)

3.5 (.2)
2.5 (.2)
.4 (.2)
3.3 (.2)

1
2

4.5 (.2)
3.8 (.2)

4.65 (.3)
4.18 (.3)

3
4
RVF
PST
PSB

2.4 (.2)
5.6 (.3)
2.0 (.3)
.6 (.3)
3.2 (.4)

1
2
3

Biased

Study 3
Control

Control*

1.9 (.2)
1.7 (.2)
3.4 (.2)

2.8 (.3)
1.6 (.3)
2.8 (.3)

2.5 (.3)
1.9 (.2)
1.7 (.2)

.8 (.2)
1.9 (.3)
.1 (.3)
-2.6 (.3)

1.2 (.3)
.9 (.3)
1.2 (.3)
-1.6 (.4)

2.2 (.2)
-.6 (.3)
.7 (.3)
.6 (.3)

1.9 (.2)
1.7 (.2)

2.7 (.2)
.7 (.2)
.1 (.2)
1.6 (.2)
Test I
2.4 (.2)
2.0 (.2)

2.1 (.2)
1.5 (.2)

2.8 (.2)
1.8 (.2)

2.3 (.2)
1.6 (.2)

2.75 (.3)
3.88 (.3)
.03 (.3)
.47 (.3)
1.13 (.4)

1.2 (.1)
2.9 (.2)
1.3 (.2)
.2 (.2)
1.7 (.2)

1.8 (.1)
2.4 (.2)
.4 (.2)
.5 (.2)
.6 (.2)

2.9 (.2)
1.3 (.2)
1.3 (.3)
.6 (.3)
-1.6 (.3)

2.7 (.3)
2.1 (.2)
.5 (.3)
1.1 (.3)
-.6 (.4)

2.2 (.2)
2.1 (.2)
.3 (.3)
.7 (.3)
-.1 (.3)

----

----

2.3 (.2)
1.4 (.2)
1.1 (.1)

Test II
3.0 (.2)
1.9 (.2)
1.7 (.1)

1.9 (.2)
1.6 (.2)
2.5 (.2)

2.5 (.3)
2.1 (.2)
2.4 (.3)

2.1 (.2)
1.9 (.2)
2.0 (.3)

4
RVF
PST
PSB

-----

-----

2.7 (.2)
1.1 (.2)
.9 (.2)
1.6 (.2)

1.8 (.2)
.7 (.3)
.4 (.3)
-.7 (.3)

2.2 (.2)
.2 (.3)
.4 (.3)
-.3 (.3)

2.0 (.2)
-.0 (.3)
.1 (.3)
.0 (.3)

1
2

---

---

2.5 (.2)
1.6 (.2)

2.5 (.2)
.3 (.2)
1.1 (.2)
.8 (.2)
Test III
2.8 (.2)
1.6 (.2)

2.4 (.2)
1.6 (.2)

2.4 (.3)
2.3 (.2)

2.3 (.3)
1.8 (.2)

3
4

---

---

1.2 (.1)
2.4 (.2)

1.6 (.1)
2.4 (.2)

2.2 (.2)
1.6 (.2)

2.2 (.3)
1.9 (.2)

2.1 (.2)
1.9 (.2)

RVF
PST
PSB

----

----

.6 (.2)
1.0 (.2)
1.2 (.2)

.4 (.2)
1.2 (.2)
.8 (.2)

.3 (.3)
.8 (.3)
-.6 (.3)

.0 (.3)
.1 (.3)
-.3 (.3)

.1 (.3)
.5 (.3)
-.2 (.3)

Notes: 1 Relative value of focal attribute (in study 1 and 2: attribute 4 partworth – mean(attribute 1, 2, 3 partworths; in
study 3: attribute 3 partworth – mean (attribute 1, 2, 4 partworths). 2 Perceptual salience top (attribute one partworth –
attribute two partworth). 3 Perceptual salience bottom (attribute four partworth – attribute three partworth).
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Table 4
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (STANDARD ERRORS) FOR IMPACT OF
COGNITIVE AND PERCEPTUAL SALIENCE POOLED OVER PHASES FOR
STUDIES 2 AND 3
Effect

Regr Coeff

S.E.

t

Same Page Variation
Context
Attribute Position 1 vs. 2
Attribute Position 3 vs. 2
Attribute Position 4 vs. 2
Phase
Phase*Same Page Variation
Phase*Context
Phase*Attribute Position 1
Phase*Attribute Position 3
Phase*Attribute Position 4
Warranty vs. MPG
Sound System vs. MPG
Safety Rating vs. MPG

.35
.18
.37
-.22
-.04
.02
-.13
-.10
.03
.02
.02
.11
-.16
.31

.04
.04
.04
.04
.04
.02
.02
.02
.02
.02
.02
.04
.04
.04

8.86***
4.62***
9.04***
-5.07***
-.99
1.01
-6.91***
-5.50***
1.19
.79
1.00
3.03**
-4.34***
8.43***

Note: ^ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Figure 1
OUTLINE OF EXPERIMENTAL TASK

190

Figure 2
CLASSIC MODEL OF CONSUMER DECISION-MAKING
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Figure 3
CAR COMPARISON TOOL FROM CONSUMER REPORTS
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Figure 4
OUTLINE OF EXPERIMENTAL TASK
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Figure 5
EXAMPLE FIRST PAGES OF LEARNING PHASE
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Figure 6
FIRST PAGE OF TEST PHASE IN STUDY 1 AND 2
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Figure 7
HYPOTHETICAL RESULTS WHEN THE FOCAL ATTRIBUTE IS IN THE 4TH
POSITION: NO SALIENCE EFFECTS (7A), AND EFFECT OF COGNITIVE
SALIENCE (7B) AND AN EFFECT OF PERCEPTUAL SALIENCE (7C)

Percentage

7A - No Salience Effects

Biased
Control

Attribute 1

Attribute 2

Attribute 3

Attribute 4

Percentage

7B - Effects of Cognitive Salience

Biased
Control

Attribute 1

Attribute 2
Attribute 3
Attribute Part-worth

Attribute 4

Percentage

7C - Effects of Perceptual Salience

Biased
Control

Attribute 1

Attribute 2

Attribute 3
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Attribute 4

Figure 8
LARGER PART-WORTH (%) WEIGHTS ON ATTRIBUTE FOUR IN
LEARNING (8A) AND TEST (8B) PHASES IN STUDY 1; SIZE OF COGNITIVE
SALIENCE EFFECT IN BOTH PHASES (8C)

8A - Learning Phase
Percentage

8
6
Biased

4

Control

2

0
Attribute 1

Attribute 2

Attribute 3

Attribute 4

8B - Test Phase
5

Biased
Control

3
1
-1

Attribute 1

Attribute 2

Attribute 3

Attribute 4

8C - Cognitive Salience Effect
Attr4 - MEAN (Attr1, Attr2,
Attr3)

Percentage

7

3
2
1

Biased

0

Control

-1
-2

Learning Phase

Test Phase
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Figure 9
COGNITIVE SALIENCE EFFECT ACROSS PHASES WHEN THE FOCAL
ATTRIBUTE WAS THE FOURTH POSITION (9A, STUDY 2) OR THE THIRD
POSITION (9B, STUDY 3)

3
2.5

Biased

2

Control

1.5
1
0.5
0
Learning

Test I

Test II

Test III

9B - Study 3
2.5

Attr3 - MEAN(Attr1, Attr2, Attr4)

Attr4 - MEAN(Attr1, Attr2, Attr3)

9A - Study 2

Biased
2
Control
1.5

Control*

1
0.5
0
Learning

Test I

-0.5

-1
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Test II

Test III

APPENDIX A: STUDY INSTRUCTIONS
STUDY 1 (CARS)
Car Study
Imagine that you are in the market to buy a new car. You will see descriptions of 16 cars
with varying attributes and will be asked to declare how much you would be willing to
pay (in $) for a car with those attributes.
The attributes (low level, high level) you will see today are:
Warranty (1 year, 4 years),
Sound System (Basic – 3 speakers, 1 subwoofer; or Advanced – 9 speakers, 2
subwoofers),
Safety Rating (3.5 Stars, 4.5 Stars), and
MPG (28, 33).
All of the cars shown today are midsize sedans with market sale retail price (MSRP) of
$16,000 to $30,000, with an average MSRP of $23,000.
Please take your time and be sure to think carefully about each judgment you make in this
task and to list valid willingness to pay (WTP) numbers. Note that, obtaining more than a
10% discount off the MSRP is very rare and, in addition to buying a car for yourself, you
might be willing to buy a car you do not like and then sell it. Thus, your WTP amount
should reflect the MAXIMUM amount you would be willing to pay for the car, and
you might either keep it for yourself or sell it for profit.
[Multiple Condition: We are especially interested in how people determine their
valuations across attributes. While providing willingness to pay numbers, please be
mindful of the tradeoffs across all of the attributes. Sometimes multiple attributes will
change within or across pages, and it is important for you to figure out how much you
value the improvements from low to high levels for each attribute.]
[Single Condition, MPG: We are especially interested in how people determine their
valuation of MPG. While providing willingness to pay numbers, please be mindful of the
values for MPG. Sometimes the value of MPG will change within or across pages, and it
is important to figure out how much you value the improvement from 28 MPG to 33
MPG for MPG.]
Please click “Next” to begin.
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STUDY 2 INSTRUCTIONS (CARS)
Car Study
Imagine that you are in the market to buy a new car. You will see descriptions of 16 cars
with varying attributes and will be asked to declare how much you would be willing to
pay (in $) for a car with each of those attributes.
The attributes (low level, high level) you will see today are:
Warranty (1 year, 4 years),
Sound System (Basic – 3 speakers, 1 subwoofer; or Advanced – 9 speakers, 2
subwoofers),
Safety Rating (3.5 Stars, 4.5 Stars), and
MPG (28, 33).
Please click “Next” to continue.
==Next page==
You will be indicating your willingness to pay (WTP) for each of these products on the
scale below. That is, you will be rating the maximum price you would pay. For example,
suppose you wanted to buy a laptop with 15” display and a light weight, and the
maximum price you would pay is $1,000. In this task, you would indicate $1,000 as your
willingness to pay.
On each page you will be asked to indicate your willingness to pay (WTP) for two products.
Please click “Next” to continue.

==Next page==
An example set of judgments is shown below for two laptops. Please indicate your
willingness to pay (WTP) for each of the below laptops.
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==Next page==
All of the cars shown today are midsize sedans with market sale retail price (MSRP) of
$16,000 to $30,000, with an average MSRP of $23,000.
Note that, obtaining more than a 10% discount off the MSRP is very rare and, in addition
to buying a car for yourself, you might be willing to buy a car you do not like and then sell
it. Thus, your WTP amount should reflect the MAXIMUM amount you would be
willing to pay for the car, and you might either keep it for yourself or sell it for profit.
Please click “Next” to begin.
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APPENDIX B: STUDY 2 NEW LEARNING AND TEST PHASE DESIGN MATRICES
Table B1
DESIGN MATRIX FOR NEW LEARNING PHASE OF CONTROL CONDITION
Page
Attribute 1
Attribute 2
Attribute 3
Attribute 4
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4

-1
+1
+1
+1
-1
+1
-1
-1

-1
+1
-1
+1
+1
-1
+1
-1

-1
-1
+1
-1
+1
+1
+1
-1

-1
+1
+1
-1
+1
-1
-1
+1

Table B2
DESIGN MATRIX FOR NEW LEARNING PHASE OF BIASED CONDITION
Page
Attribute 1
Attribute 2
Attribute 3
Attribute 4
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4

+1
+1
-1
-1
+1
+1
-1
-1

-1
-1
+1
+1
+1
+1
-1
-1

+1
+1
+1
+1
-1
-1
-1
-1

-1
+1
+1
-1
+1
-1
-1
+1

Table B3
DESIGN MATRIX FOR NEW TEST PHASE FOR BOTH CONDITIONS
Page
Attribute 1
Attribute 2
Attribute 3
Attribute 4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

+1
-1
+1
-1
+1
-1
-1
+1

-1
+1
-1
+1
+1
-1
-1
+1

-1
-1
-1
-1
+1
+1
+1
+1

202

+1
-1
-1
+1
-1
+1
-1
+1

APPENDIX C: STUDY 3 LEARNING PHASE DESIGN MATRICES
Table C1
DESIGN MATRIX FOR LEARNING PHASE OF CONTROL CONDITION,
ORIGINAL
Page
Attribute 1
Attribute 2
Attribute 3
Attribute 4
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4

+1
-1
+1
-1
-1
+1
-1
+1

+1
-1
-1
-1
+1
-1
+1
+1

+1
-1
-1
+1
-1
+1
+1
-1

+1
+1
-1
+1
-1
-1
-1
+1

Table C2
DESIGN MATRIX FOR LEARNING PHASE OF BIASED CONDITION,
ORIGINAL
Page
Attribute 1
Attribute 2
Attribute 3
Attribute 4
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4

-1
-1
+1
+1
-1
-1
+1
+1

-1
-1
-1
-1
+1
+1
+1
+1

+1
-1
-1
+1
-1
+1
+1
-1

+1
+1
-1
-1
-1
-1
+1
+1

Table C3
DESIGN MATRIX FOR LEARNING PHASE OF CONTROL* CONDITION,
ORIGINAL
Page
Attribute 1
Attribute 2
Attribute 3
Attribute 4
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4

-1
-1
-1
+1
-1
+1
+1
+1

-1
+1
-1
-1
+1
-1
+1
+1

+1
-1
-1
-1
+1
+1
-1
+1
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+1
-1
+1
-1
-1
-1
+1
+1

Table C4
DESIGN MATRIX FOR LEARNING PHASE OF CONTROL CONDITION, NEW
Page
Attribute 1
Attribute 2
Attribute 3
Attribute 4
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4

-1
+1
-1
+1
+1
-1
+1
-1

-1
+1
+1
+1
-1
+1
-1
-1

-1
+1
+1
-1
+1
-1
-1
+1

-1
-1
+1
-1
+1
+1
+1
-1

Table C5
DESIGN MATRIX FOR LEARNING PHASE OF BIASED CONDITION, NEW
Page
Attribute 1
Attribute 2
Attribute 3
Attribute 4
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4

-1
-1
+1
+1
+1
+1
-1
-1

+1
+1
-1
-1
+1
+1
-1
-1

-1
+1
+1
-1
+1
-1
-1
+1

+1
+1
+1
+1
-1
-1
-1
-1

Table C6
DESIGN MATRIX FOR LEARNING PHASE OF CONTROL* CONDITION,
NEW
Page
Attribute 1
Attribute 2
Attribute 3
Attribute 4
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4

-1
+1
-1
-1
-1
+1
+1
+1

-1
-1
-1
+1
+1
-1
+1
+1

+1
-1
-1
-1
+1
+1
-1
+1
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-1
+1
-1
+1
+1
+1
-1
-1

APPENDIX D: REGRESSION CONTRASTS FOR STUDY 2 AND 3 ANALYSES
Table D1
REGRESSION CONTRASTS FOR ANALYSES OF STUDY 2 AND 3 FOR EACH
PHASE
Condition
(Attr)

Study 2
Control (1)
Study 2
Control (2)
Study 2
Control (3)
Study 2
Control (4)
Study 3
Control (1)
Study 3
Control (2)
Study 3
Control (3)
Study 3
Control (4)
Study 3
Control* (1)
Study 3
Control* (2)
Study 3
Control* (3)
Study 3
Control* (4)
Study 2
Biased (1)
Study 2
Biased (2)
Study 2
Biased (3)
Study 2
Biased (4)
Study 3
Biased (1)
Study 3
Biased (2)
Study 3
Biased (3)
Study 3
Biased (4)

Same Page
Variation

Context

Perceptual Perceptual Perceptual
Salience – Salience – Salience –
Attr1
Attr3
Attr4

0

-1/9

1

0

0

2

-1/9

-1

-1

-1

0

-1/9

0

1

0

2

-1/9

0

0

1

2

-1/9

1

0

0

0

-1/9

-1

-1

-1

2

-1/9

0

1

0

0

-1/9

0

0

1

0

-1/9

1

0

0

0

-1/9

-1

-1

-1

0

-1/9

0

1

0

0

-1/9

0

0

1

-2

.-1/9

1

0

0

-2

-1/9

-1

-1

-1

2

1

0

1

0

-2

-1/9

0

0

1

-2

-1/9

1

0

0

-2

-1/9

-1

-1

-1

-2

-1/9

0

1

0

2

1

0

0

1
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APPENDIX E: EYE-TRACKING EXPERIMENT

We piloted an eye-tracking study to examine how attention to informational
inputs changed based on our manipulations of perceptual and cognitive salience
(Chandon et al. 2009; Rayner 2009). This study replicates Study 2 to track participants
from learning phase to test phase III. Our definition of salience suggests that our
manipulations should affect how attention is allocated to the attribute information based
on its position (perceptual salience) and how often it changes within-page in the learning
phase (cognitive salience). We operationalize attention in terms of fixation duration and
fixation count.
Specifically, in the learning phase, we expect more attention (i.e., longer and
more frequent fixations) to be allocated to the top and bottom attributes compared to the
middle attributes (perceptual salience). Further, we predict there will be more attention
paid to the bottom attribute in the Biased condition compared to the Control condition
(cognitive salience) because it is the only attribute that varies within each of the four
pages in the learning phase.
However, the test phases do not have as clear predictions. One possibility is that
the same patterns from the learning phase will persist in the test phase due to carryover:
participants will attend more to top and bottom attributes, and to the bottom attribute in
the Biased condition compared to the Control condition. This result would support an
explanation in which more attention translates into greater valuation. A different result
would be one in which the top and bottom attributes, and the Biased condition’s bottom
attribute, would have fewer fixations in the test phase because the participants determined
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those attribute valuations in the learning phase and can therefore more rapidly make a
product valuation without lingering on those attributes. It is also possible that across
multiple test phases these patterns may differ as participants familiarize themselves with
the study environment. Specifically, participants may have more fixations for longer
durations in test phase I (or shorter) but not in test phase III.
Methods
67 Participants from a behavioral laboratory at a private east-coast laboratory
were randomly assigned to one cell of a 3 (Order) x 2 (Condition: Biased or Control)
between-subject design. This study replicated Study 2 with two exceptions: first, there
was no manipulation of the learning phase stimuli.
Second, participants were calibrated to an eye-tracking machine running iMotions
before participating in the study. However, due to software issues, we were unable to use
the eye-tracking data.
Results
Unfortunately, we were not able to replicate our results in a 2 (Condition) x 3
(Order) x 4 (Phase) mixed ANOVA; there was no main effect of condition (p > .6) or
interaction of phase and condition (p > .10). Although we found directional support for
our theory in the learning phase (MBiased = 2.45, SE = .60; MControl = .68, SE = .61), this
pattern was reversed in test phase I (MBiased = 1.04, SE = .54; MControl = 1.42, SE = .55),
test phase II (MBiased = 1.19, SE = .54; MControl = .95, SE = .55), and test phase III (MBiased
= .68, SE = .49; MControl = 1.20, SE = .50).
Discussion
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Unfortunately, due to a combination of software issues and moderation by sample
(i.e., the students did not reflect the Mechanical Turk results), we were unable to test the
process for how our perceptual and cognitive salience effects operate. While the studies
on mTurk yielded the predicted pattern of results, we did not find similar patterns in a
small laboratory sample. One possibility is that, much like the low-involvement
consumers watching advertising (Krugman 1965), mTurkers were influenced by salience,
while laboratory participants were more engaged. Alternatively, laboratory participants,
who were mostly comprised of students in college, may have not provided reliable
responses due to less experience with purchasing cars. We therefore focus instead on the
temporal effects of our salience manipulations to rule in and out classes of psychological
explanations for these results.
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APPENDIX F: STUDY F
STUDY F: RULING OUT MERE TIME

An alternative interpretation of Studies 2 and 3 is that the decline in the effect
does not come from having made repeated decisions, but instead the passage of time
leads to a drop in the effect strength. Because repeated decisions take time to complete,
having time elapse in the task may also reduce the effect’s strength. Such a decline over
time would be consistent with effects in other literatures (e.g., Higgins et al. 1985).
We rule out this possibility in Study F. We institute a delay task between the
learning phase and test phase for some participants but not others. If time’s passage by
itself (“mere time”) accounts for the patters in Studies 2 and 3, then participants who
experience a delay between the learning phase and test phase should not exhibit the bias
from the previous few studies. If time’s passage is not sufficient to lower the effect of
cognitive salience on valuation, then we should not observe an attenuation based on a
delay between the learning and test phases.

Method
Participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 409) were randomly assigned
into one cell of a 4 (Order) x 2 (Condition) x 2 (Delay: Yes or No) between-subject
design that was identical to Study 2, inclusive of the Biased condition only having the
fourth attribute differ on all pages of the learning phase. Participants only saw the cars
product category.
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Participants either received the delay task between the learning and test phases
(Delay: Yes) or at the end of the study as a separate task (Delay: No). The delay task was
a two- to three-minute reading task in which participants read an article about dolphins.
Participants then also responded to five questions about the article (e.g., How informative
was the article; How interesting was this article; How difficult to understand was this
article; How well do you think this article was written; How much did the article change
your understanding of dolphins) on seven-point Likert scales. This delay task was
intended to not induce memory load or be overly onerous so as to elicit negative affect.

Results
Key to the results of this study is to investigate whether there is an interaction
between the condition (Biased or Control) and delay (Yes or No) factors in the test phase
on the CSE index of attribute four minus the mean of attributes 1, 2, and 3.
Contrary to a delay between learning and test phase attenuating the effect, A 2
(Condition) x 2 (Delay) x 4 (Order) ANOVA did not reveal the an interaction of Delay
and Condition (F(1, 393) = .33, p = .57). Both when the Delay was absent (F(1, 393) =
2.19, p = .14) and present (F(1, 393) = 5.44, p = .02), the Biased condition had a
directionally larger cognitive salience bias (CSE) than the Control condition (see Figure
F1). Therefore, instead of the predicted interaction consistent with a “mere time”
explanation of the results of Studies 2 and 3, we observed a main effect of condition such
that the size of the bias was larger in the Biased (M = 1.66) compared to Control (M =
.68) condition (F(1, 393) = 7.23, p = .008).
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Discussion
Study F rules out an alternative interpretation of the pattern of results from
Studies 2 and 3: that the passage of time (“mere time”), and not having made more
decisions, underlies the effects: there was no attenuation observed due to an enforced
delay.
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Table F1
MEANS (STANDARD ERRORS) FOR STUDY F FOR SIZE OF EFFECT IN
TEST PHASE
Condition

Biased

Control

Delay Absent
Delay Present

1.56 (0.37)
1.77 (0.36)

0.79 (0.37)
0.57 (0.37)
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Figure F1
MERE TIME DOES NOT ACCOUNT FOR EFFECT (STUDY F1)
2.5

2

1.5
Biased
Control

1

0.5

0
Delay Absent

Delay Present

213

APPENDIX G: STUDY G
STUDY G: ATTRIBUTION

In Study G, we manipulate the diagnosticity of the salient attribute based on
calling into question the nature of order effects to subjects (Greifeneder, Bless, and Pham
2011; Schwarz et al. 1991). Participants either proceeded through the same task for cars
as in Study 1 or were interrupted before the learning phase to be warned about being sure
they were thinking of stable part-worths that weren’t influenced by the order in which
they read the attributes. If questioning the diagnosticity behind what is made more
salience conforms to standard attribution manipulations, then we should see salience
affect valuation (part-worths) when the attribution is absent but not when it is present.

Method
Participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 369) were randomized into one
cell of a 4 (Order) x 2 (Condition: Biased or Control) x 2 (Attribution: Present or Absent)
between-subject design.
The study was akin to Study 1 with one major exception: participants in the
Attribution Present condition also saw a screen before the learning phase that asked them
to think carefully about their long-run valuation of attributes, and warned them that their
immediate reactions would be. Specifically, this text said:
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“When determining your willingness to pay values, please think of how
you value each attribute level in the long run—how might you value each
attribute beyond the confines of this study?

Do not be mislead by your immediate reactions, as these may sometimes
be influenced by unimportant aspects of the task, such as which attributes
are first or last. After reading about each attribute level for each car, please
take a moment to pause before stating your willingness to pay.”

Results
Statistical Tests of Impact of Attribution on Cognitive Salience. We again codify
the effects in terms of the index for the size of the bias: attribute four’s part-worth minus
the mean of attributes one, two, and three.
Contrary to predictions in which the attribution instructions would lead to an
attenuation of the bias, a 2 (Condition) x 2 (Attribution) x 4 (Order) ANOVA did not
reveal the predicted interaction of Attribution and Condition (F(1, 353) = .11, p = .74).
However, there was a main effect of condition such that the Biased condition (M = 1.05,
SE = .26) had a larger bias than did the Control condition (M = .15, SE = .28; F(1, 353) =
5.51, p = .019). The Biased condition had a directionally larger effect than in the Control
condition both when the attribution instructions were absent (F(1, 353) = 3.18, p = .075)
and when they were present (F(1, 353) = 2.33, p = .13; see Figure G1).
Statistical Tests of Perceptual Salience. A 2 (Condition) x 2 (Attribution) x 4
(Order) x 4 (Attribute) ANOVA in both learning and test phases revealed the same
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position effects from Study 1. The top and bottom attributes, attributes one and four, had
higher part-worths compared to the middle attributes (two and three) in both learning
phase (F(1, 353) = 39.34, p < .001) and test phase (F(1, 353) = 16.57, p < .001).

Discussion
Study G demonstrates (albeit weak) preliminary evidence that a combination of
encouraging increased processing depth and attribution of reactions to the order of
attributes on the page somewhat reduces the effect of increased cognitive salience. By
questioning the diagnosticity created by salience, we find directional but nonsignificant
evidence of attenuation by which attributes with greater salience no longer receive as
much of a boost through salience.
However, given that there was still a boost in the attribute part-worth when
salience was increased, it is possible that people have a difficult time overcoming the
bias. There were still attribute position effects in the attribution conditions despite
explicit warning to be cognizant of attribute position, which suggests people may underadjust bias.
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Table G1
MEANS (STANDARD ERRORS) FOR STUDY G
Attribute
Attribute 1
Attribute 2
Attribute 3
Attribute 4
Attribute 1
Attribute 2
Attribute 3
Attribute 4

Attribution Absent Attribution Present
Learning Phase
3.28 (0.31)
3.80 (0.27)
2.93 (0.29)
2.94 (0.26)
1.73 (0.29)
1.51 (0.25)
3.45 (0.25)
3.26 (0.22)
Test Phase
2.33 (0.25)
2.82 (0.22)
2.37 (0.28)
2.41 (0.24)
1.57 (0.26)
1.46 (0.23)
2.88 (0.25)
2.64 (0.22)
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Table G2
MEANS (STANDARD ERRORS) FOR STUDY G FOR SIZE OF EFFECT IN
TEST PHASE
Condition

Biased

Control

Attribution Absent
Attribution Present

1.30 (0.38)
0.80 (0.36)

0.27 (0.44)
0.03 (0.35)
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Figure G1
ATTRIBUTION OF EFFECT TO POSITION DOES NOT IMPACT BIAS
(STUDY G)
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